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Preface
In 1984 a group of distinguished American and Japanese scholars met under
the auspices of the Social Science Research Council—with the support of the
Ford Foundation, National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Japan-
United States Friendship Commission—to examine relations between their
countries in a historical and global context. They recognized that the constantly
growing issues between the two countries, which were becoming so complex
that many across the Pacific were warning of a "drifting apart," if not a
rupture, of two of the closest allies since the war, could only be understood
if examined historically—in relation to the overall themes and trends in the
past several decades—and globally—in the context of changing world and
regional affairs.
Such an effort is, if anything, needed even more today when one hears
talk of a serious conflict, crisis of confidence, or misunderstanding between
the United States and Japan that threatens to erode the Pacific alliance. The
editors, therefore, have assembled some of the papers presented at the 1984
gathering to make them available to concerned citizens as well as to the
specialists.
The editors would like to express special thanks to the Social Science
Research Council for its support of the initial gathering and to the University
Press of Kentucky for its willingness to publish the essays in book form. The
editing of the papers has been facilitated by the cheerful and efficient help of
graduate assistants at the University of Chicago and Michigan State Univer-
sity, in particular Alexa Hand and Barbara Welke.
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The United States and Japan
in the Postwar World

PART ONE
U.S.-Japanese
Relations since 1945
As the basic framework of international affairs since the end of World War II, Robert
Gilpin proposes the concept of the "American System." According to this analysis,
the postwar world was characterized by America's military, political, and economic
predominance, and it continued to define the international system until the 1980s.
Western European countries and Japan basically accepted this definition and generally
fitted themselves into it. The American System, however, had two components—the
U.S.-European and the U.S.-Japanese axes, each buttressed by security alliances and
close economic ties—but these two were not always well coordinated, The third
possible axis, the European-Japanese connection, was very tenuous.
Gilpin shows that the American System faces a crisis in the mid-1980s not only
because the supremacy of the United States in the strategic and economic fields has
been undermined by the ascendance of Soviet military power and the challenge of
European, Japanese, and NIC (newly industrialized countries') economies, but also
because the tension between the two axes is reaching a near-breaking point, forcing
upon Washington difficult choices in its dealings with its allies. In the meantime, the
third axis, the European-Japanese connection is, if anything, more ridden with conflict
than ever. The current state of U.S.-Japanese affairs, Gilpin argues, must be put in
this broader context.
The next five essays narrow the focus to East Asia, to United States efforts to
integrate Japan into the American System. Two basic themes emerge: the development
of a more equal relationship between Japan and the United States, referred to by Cohen
(chapter 3) as "normal" and by LaFeber (chapter 6) as the end of an "aberration";
and the persistent asymmetry of American political, and Japanese economic, concerns.
Not surprisingly, China loomed large in U.S.-Japanese relations from the prepa-
rations for the peace conference in 1951 to Japan's recognition of the People's Republic
of China in the aftermath of the "Nixon Shock." Cohen, Hosoya (chapter 2), and
Aruga (chapter 4) all note competing pressures on the Japanese government and the
way in which policy toward China became enmeshed in Japanese as well as American
domestic politics, including the factional struggles within the ruling Liberal Democratic
party. Hosoya underscores the strains engendered by the rigidity of the American
posture toward the People's Republic, and Aruga describes the price Japanese leaders
paid for accepting American leadership. Cohen, on the other hand, stresses the ease
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with which Japan circumvented American strictures—and the acquiescence of Ameri-
can leaders in Japan's course. He offers a novel interpretation of the "Yoshida Letter"
(in which the Japanese prime minister promised to conclude a peace treaty with the
Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan), contending that it was a device by John
Foster Dulles to prevent Dean Acheson from yielding to Yoshida's hope for more
leeway in Japan's relations with the People's Republic.
All of these essays point to the unequal partnership of the 1950s, and Aruga analyzes
widespread Japanese discomfort with this state of affairs as a key to the security treaty
crisis of 1960. Japanese leaders needed a new, less blatantly unequal treaty and found
the United States responsive. He attributes the crisis that nonetheless came to Prime
Minister Kishi's maladroit handling of the Diet. Aruga also explains the restructuring
of Japanese politics consequent to the crisis of 1960.
Southeast Asia is the focus of attention in the essays by Watanabe (chapter 5) and
LaFeber. Watanabe examines Japanese and American maneuvering relative to that
region in the 1950s, while LaFeber looks more sharply at Vietnam as an irritant in
those relations in the 1960s and 1970s. Both note the preeminence of Cold War strategic
concerns in American thinking and the preeminence of economic concerns in Japanese
thought. Watanabe perceives American efforts to direct Japanese trade and the Japanese
search for raw materials toward Southeast Asia. Some American planners clearly saw
this strategy as central to a plan to create a strategic crescent to contain China. Others
were determined to focus Japan's economic attention on Southeast Asia, not only as
an alternative to China but also as a means of protecting American markets. Japanese
planners always intended to find a global solution, and it is clearly their vision that
has been realized.
LaFeber, noting tensions over trade, Okinawa, and China, focuses on America's
war in Vietnam as an immediate and long-term source of friction between the two
allies. Despite Prime Minister Sato's support for American policy in the face of wide-
spread Japanese disgust, the Americans were not satisfied. From Washington's per-
spective, the Japanese, instead of aiding in the strategic effort to contain communism,
were taking advantage of American distress to seize markets, including an enormous
share of America's domestic market.
These essays offer a series of case studies of the shift in relative power between
the United States and Japan since 1945, of the erosion of the American System. As
LaFeber demonstrates—and as revealed in the "Japan bashing" of the 1980s—few
Americans have accepted the loss of American dominance. The generous hegemon of
the 1950s often behaved like an irritable supplicant in the 1970s and 1980s. The ability
of Americans in the twenty-first century to adapt to their country's status as a possibly
declining power will determine whether Cohen's optimism about the future of U.S.-
Japanese relations is justified.
1
The Global Context
ROBERT G. GILPIN
The future of American-Japanese relations must be analyzed in the larger
context of the evolving relationships among the United States, Western Eu-
rope, and Japan. The interactions and tensions among these three industrial
democracies cannot be isolated from one another. Because the United States
has been the linchpin of these crucial relationships since 1945, this article
will refer to them as the "American System" and will argue that this system
is in a state of crisis that necessitates difficult policy choices.
This essay defines the American System as the political understandings,
military alliances, and economic agreements that the United States has entered
into with its principal allies since the end of the Second World War. One set
of relationships is based on the American-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Coop-
eration and Security, signed in 1960, in combination with America's economic
and political relations with Japan. The other set consists of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949, in addition to America's
political and economic relations with its Western European allies. Together
these ties between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and between
the United States and Western Europe, on the other, not only have provided
the basis of American foreign policy over the past several decades, but also
have denned the fundamental relationships among the industrial democracies.
The political, strategic, and economic foundations of the American System
have withstood numerous assaults, but deepening fissures are embedded in
each of these foundations. To understand the present difficulties among the
allies and their consequences for American-Japanese relations, one must first
analyze the foundations of these relationships and the sources of conflict now
growing in significance in the 1980s.
The first, and by far the most important, link among the industrial de-
mocracies has been a common political assessment of the Soviet threat. Pri-
marily as a consequence of Soviet behavior following the collapse of the
wartime alliance against the Axis, the Soviet Union has been regarded as an
expanding imperial power whose intentions are inimical to the interests of
the United States and its allies. This Soviet challenge has been seen as political,
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military, and ideological. It has involved internal subversion through the use
of domestic Communist parties and the external threat of the Red Army. In
response to these perceived dangers, agreement about the necessity of the
policy of Soviet containment has provided the political cement of the Western
system of political and military alliances.
Yet almost from the very beginning of these alliance relationships, there
have been significant differences between American and allied perceptions of
the nature and scope of the Soviet threat, differences that arise principally
from the contrasting geographical circumstances, political interests, and as-
sumed responsibilities of the United States and its European and Pacific allies.
The United States has regarded the Soviet threat as primarily military in
nature and global in scope. Yet until recently, the United States had not given
high priority to the Soviet military threat in Asia. Asian events have been
viewed in the context of Europe. For example, the United States regarded
the Korean War more as a possible forerunner to Soviet adventurism else-
where, particularly in Western Europe, than as a direct threat to the security
of Asia, and based its "swing" strategy on the assumption that, in the event
of a war with the Soviet Union, the United States would shift its military
forces in Asia to the European theater. America believed the major threat in
Asia was the Communist Chinese and, in fact, entered the Vietnamese civil
war to contain what was perceived to be an expansionist China. The Vietnam
War itself and America's estrangement from Communist China put a heavy
strain on relations between the United States and Japan, which did not wish
to be involved. With American-Chinese rapprochement and the growth of
Soviet power in East Asia, however, the political situation has begun to
change. Both the United States and Japan are more concerned than in the past
about the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, but
a profound conflict continues to divide the two allies. Whereas the United
States desires that Japan increase its role in the containment of Soviet power,
the Japanese remain wary of remilitarization and of being drawn into a conflict
of the superpowers over which they have little or no control.
The West Europeans have also differed from the United States' view of
the Soviet threat. They have considered the threat to be primarily political
and have focused their concerns on regional problems. Thus, although the
United States worries about the Middle East, Asia, and South America, West-
ern Europe worries mainly about itself and the effect of superpower collisions
on its own security.
The second foundation of the American System has been the set of parallel
military alliances formed in the 1950s that have connected the United States
with Japan and with Western Europe. Although Western Europe and Japan
have no direct military or security ties with one another, indirectly they have
The Global Context 5
been linked through their respective military ties with the United States. In
effect, in these alliances the United States placed Western Europe and Japan
under its nuclear umbrella. This so-called policy of extended deterrence has
been the real foundation of both alliances and has united the industrial de-
mocracies militarily. The United States, with its commitments in both the
Atlantic and the Pacific regions, has provided the keystone for the global
alliance system directed at the containment of the Soviet Union.
As in the case of their political relations, inherent differences have existed
among the allies over strategic issues, and consequently in the nature of the
two sets of military alliances. In the first place, a fundamental premise of the
initial American military commitment to both Western Europe and Japan was
that it was a limited commitment. For example, American leaders assumed
that, as Europe recovered economically from the devastation of the war, it
would assume an ever-increasing share of the financial and military burden
of containing Soviet power in the European theater. Although the policy of
extended deterrence would stay in place, the conventional defense of Europe
would become primarily a responsibility of the West Europeans themselves
in the NATO division of labor. In the case of Japan, the nuclear umbrella by
itself was deemed to be sufficient to deter the Soviets, and little need was
seen for a major Japanese military role in containing Soviet conventional
power in Northeastern Asia.
The third foundation of the American System has been the so-called Bretton
Woods System of economic cooperation. At the end of the Second World
War this system was established between the United States and Western
Europe and was later expanded to include Japan. Under American leadership
and operating through a set of international institutions—the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
and the World Bank—the industrial democracies and other members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have
cooperated to eliminate barriers to trade and other forms of economic na-
tionalism. Further, these economies have been tied together by the central
role of the dollar in the international monetary system and, with some major
exceptions, increasingly by the freedom of capital movements. Within this
monetary and financial framework, the United States and its economic partners
have tried to liberalize trade through successive rounds of trade negotiations.
Despite this general commitment to the creation of a system of multilateral
free trade, the past several decades have witnessed three major departures
that have become sources of intensifying interallied conflict. One has been a
high level of Japanese protectionism against a wide range of products from
other countries. Another was the formation of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), or Common Market, that has simultaneously lowered trade
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barriers among the West European countries and maintained certain barriers
toward external economies. The third has been a tendency of the United States
to protect selected threatened industries, a practice that has grown in recent
years. This combination of the broad movement toward liberalized trade and
restrictive, protectionist practices has produced the main features of the world
trading system. These features in turn embody a number of asymmetries that
increasingly endanger the future of the contemporary world economy.
One prominent feature of the postwar international economy has been the
American-Japanese relationship. Largely for security reasons, the United
States in the early postwar years took a number of steps to facilitate the
reconstruction of the war torn Japanese economy. It opened the American
economy to Japanese exports and encouraged the transfer of U.S. technology
to Japan, put pressure on the European colonial powers to open their colonies
in South and Southeast Asia to the Japanese, and, over strong European
opposition, secured Japanese entry into the IMF, the GAIT, and other in-
ternational organizations, thus ensuring Japan's full participation in the world
economy. Within this favorable framework, the Japanese have been able to
pursue their highly successful policy of export-led growth and advance to the
position of an economic superpower.'
The American-Japanese relationship has been characterized by a basic
asymmetry that has increased over the years and has become a major source
of tension between these allies. The United States, as it sponsored the reentry
of Japan into the world economy, made a number of economic concessions
to the Japanese without seeking an economic quid pro quo. As a consequence,
the Japanese were able for a number of years to enjoy unimpeded access to
the American market and American technology while giving little economi-
cally in return. The Japanese home market has been relatively closed to Ameri-
can exports and to American direct investment as well. Further, both American
and European financial institutions have been kept out of Japan's government-
manipulated, low interest rate capital market. A major objective of American
and European policy toward Japan in recent years has been to make the
economic relationship with the Japanese more symmetrical. Translated into
specific demands, this means at the least a Japanese economy more open to
foreign goods, the internationalization of the yen, and increased access to
Japanese technology for American businesses and military.
Another prominent feature of the contemporary world economy has been
the rapid growth of a high level of economic interdependence between the
United States and Western Europe. Although the Europeans have discrimi-
nated against American agricultural and manufactured products, the rapidly
expanding European market, as the distinguished economist Jacob Viner had
predicted, proved to be more trade-creating than trade-diverting.2 American
exports to the EEC soared while the Europeans themselves were able to expand
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economically through the lowering of trade barriers. Of equal importance,
American multinational corporations found the rapidly growing and partially
closed European market a fertile soil for foreign expansionism. Thus, the
growth of both trade and investment rapidly linked the two sides of the At-
lantic.
Inherent in this situation, however, was a potential source of serious disa-
greement. From its very beginnings, the EEC, with its trade restrictions and
other departures from a liberal economic order, was regarded by the United
States as a temporary expedient. As Europe regained its competitive strength,
American decision makers assumed that the barriers to free trade would come
down. West Europeans, on the other hand, have had more ambiguous feelings
on this matter. Whereas the West Germans have tended to favor the lowering
of trade barriers, the French have been actively hostile to the dismantling of
the external tariff barriers and especially of the common agricultural policy.
These conflicting views have resulted in a stalemate and have frustrated the
creation of what president John F. Kennedy called a "grand design" for the
economic and political integration of the industrial democracies. In recent
years, the tension between American and European conceptions of the global
economic order have increased and now threaten the unity of the transatlantic
economy.
The third significant feature of the contemporary world economy is a direct
consequence of the other two features. In the economic as in the security
realm, the United States plays a pivotal role in the relations among the in-
dustrial democracies. Western Europe and Japan are tied to one another prin-
cipally through their respective associations with the United States. In contrast
to the intimate and extensive American-European and American-Japanese
linkages, the Europeans and the Japanese have few formal relations, and the
Europeans for their part would undoubtedly like to keep it that way.
Because of opposition on both sides, trade and investment between the
EEC and Japan until recently have been very slow in developing. From the
early postwar period, the EEC and Japan have discriminated against one
another's goods. West European exasperation with the Japanese has intensified
because of Japan's large trade surplus with the EEC and what the Europeans
perceive as continuing Japanese discrimination against European goods. More
ominously, a growing and powerful strain of European thought has become
increasingly xenophobic regarding Japanese competition. This line of thought
argues that Japanese "tribal" culture and "unfair" government policies sepa-
rate Japan from the liberal Western trading system. Hence, it is argued that
Japan should be ostracized by the United States and Western Europe; the
Japanese, it is claimed, are really not like us and should be drummed out of
the club. Individual West European countries and the Common Market acting
as a bloc have begun to take more strenuous measures to close off the West
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European market to the Japanese. With the parallel growth of American pro-
tectionism over the past decade, especially with respect to Japanese goods,
this third asymmetry of the world economy, i.e., the absence of close Eu-
ropean-Japanese political and security ties that might moderate economic con-
flicts, has become a major problem, which magnifies the fundamental issue
of where Japan and, more generally, the newly industrializing countries (NICs)
of Asia fit into an increasingly protectionist world economy.
Since World War II, the political, security, and economic relations among
the United States and its principal allies have provided the foundations of the
American System and of American foreign policy more generally. Although
these relations have proven to be highly durable, inherent differences in per-
ception and interest among the allies have existed for a long time.
Political relations between the United States and Japan and those between
the United States and Western Europe have moved in diametrically opposed
directions since the founding of the two sets of alliances. Despite a number
of severe crises and the ever-present deep conflicts over economic and security
matters, American and Japanese political relations have improved in many
respects since the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, although the United
States does continue to give primacy to the European connection, the strains
in this relationship have grown ever greater with the passage of time.
The deterioration of American-West European relations that began with
the Vietnam War has continued because of contrasting attitudes toward East-
West detente and the Soviet Union. For the West Europeans, a major priority
is the reunification of the continent and the closing of the split between Eastern
and Western Europe, especially for the Federal Republic of Germany whose
ultimate objective is the reunification of the nation. From this perspective,
detente and the East-West discussions begun at Helsinki in 1975 are funda-
mental. Nothing must interfere with the slow and long-term healing of the
cleavage dividing Eastern and Western Europe.4
Although relatively few Americans reject the ideal of detente and the easing
of East-West tensions, most would no doubt characterize the results of detente
as disappointing if not as a failure. The Reagan administration and important
currents in American public opinion believe that the United States has gained
little from detente in terms of overall relations with the Soviet Union. Most
West Europeans, on the other hand, believe that they have gained much and
do not wish to see those gains jeopardized by American actions such as the
invoking of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union over its role in Poland
and Afghanistan. Among these perceived gains are the political stability of
the continent, the decline of the internal communist threat, and the growth
of East-West trade.
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These differences in interests and perceptions reveal that a profound psy-
chological distancing is taking place between the United States and Western
Europe. This crisis of mutual confidence can be observed in many different
ways. For example, many West Europeans exhibit a strong tendency to equate
the United States and the Soviet Union as immoral, imperial, and irresponsible
superpowers. Statements by high-ranking Europeans have proposed that Eu-
rope position itself equidistantly between the superpowers and play a middle
role between the two giants.
Americans are also criticizing the West Europeans in new and more fun-
damental ways. West Europeans are seen as thinking only of their own im-
mediate concerns, failing to support American policies vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, and leaving the defense of Western interests solely up to the United
States. West Europeans also are criticized for not being willing even to defend
themselves. Furthermore, the United States is frustrated with the European
opposition to American policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus,
despite frequent demonstrations of unity, this political and psychological es-
trangement between the United States and Western Europe is significant and
widening. It is in part a generational conflict and, therefore, promises to
become worse as the younger generation of West Europeans and Americans
comes to power. In combination with security and economic issues, these
political differences, if they are not resolved, threaten the future of the alliance
between the the United States and Western Europe.
Turning toward the Pacific, despite a general improvement in American
and Japanese economic and political relations, profound conflicts exist over
trade and other economic issues. Resentments also abound on both sides in
the security area, especially the Japanese response to American pressures on
Japan to assume a larger defense burden. Nevertheless, American and Japa-
nese policies toward the Soviet Union have moved closer together. The Japa-
nese have taken a very serious view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
despite their reluctance to follow the American lead in applying economic
sanctions. The fact that the first use of the Red Army outside the postwar
boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence occurred in Asia was more omi-
nous for the Japanese than for the West Europeans. More generally, the
continuing expansion of Soviet power in Asia threatens the Japanese most
seriously, at least in the short run. It was undoubtedly in recognition of this
that the Japanese, over strong Soviet protests, signed the 1977 bilateral Treaty
of Peace and Friendship with China containing the implicit condemnation of
Soviet hegemonism. Like the Chinese, the Japanese deeply resent continued
Soviet occupation of their territory and are profoundly concerned over Soviet
expansionism in East Asia.
Despite these growing concerns over Soviet policy, however, the Japanese
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remain very reluctant to follow American political leadership, particularly
when the latter pursues a confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union. For
the Japanese, the more prudent course of action is one that avoids unnecessary
generation of Soviet wrath. Japan is in no position to challenge Soviet power
directly; Japanese worry that the United States may provoke a conflict into
which they will inevitably be drawn. This leads to American charges that the
Japanese, like the West Europeans, are failing to take a stand and carry their
share of the responsibility for containing Soviet power in the Pacific. By the
same token, however, American pressures on Japan to increase its military
role in the Pacific for American (and not necessarily Japanese) reasons cause
deep resentments.
The fundamentally differing attitudes of the two countries toward their
relationship constitute a powerful potential for a serious breakdown in Ameri-
can-Japanese relations. For Americans, security and economic issues are in-
timately related; for the Japanese, they are not. Although the United States
benefits economically from its partnership with Japan, American economic
policy is strongly conditioned by American security interests in the Pacific.
Whereas the Japanese believe that the security and economic spheres should
be kept totally separate from one another, Americans tend to regard their
concessions in the economic realm as the necessary price for present or future
Japanese security concessions. Consequently, more recent American demands
in the economic realm as well place a double burden on the Japanese and, at
the same time, intensify American resentments over Japanese economic and
security policies. Possibilities of intense ill will are inherent in this situation.
The differences between European-Japanese political relations and Ameri-
can-Japanese relations are worth noting. The political and psychological gap
between Western Europe and Japan has widened over the past several de-
cades.6 Although for Americans the phenomenal economic success of the
Japanese is one to be studied and if possible emulated, for West Europeans
it is a darkly looming and mysterious threat of gigantic proportions. Western
Europe appears to want as little as possible to do with Japan and has made
little effort to understand or learn from Japan's economic success.7 Moreover,
intensifying anti-Japanese resentments and the West European fear of Japanese
competition are not leavened by common security concerns as they are with
the United States. Contrary to the pronouncement of Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro at the Williamsburg Summit (1983) that the defense of the West
was indivisible, the opposite may very well be the case.8 For example, in the
negotiations over intermediate missiles, an important trade-off for the Soviets
was the deployment of SS 20s against Asian targets to balance those removed
from Western Europe. Rather than see their fate tied to that of Asia, many
West Europeans might actually prefer the Soviet Union to turn its attention
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and massive military machine eastward. Thus, perhaps even more than in the
earlier postwar period, the United States finds itself allied to two sets of
nations, one of which wants as little as possible to do with the other.
On the other hand, American response toward Japanese protectionism and
trade expansionism may be more damaging in its effects. European trade
restrictions deny the Japanese what they have never had, but recently imposed
American barriers, on the other hand, are taking away something that they
have enjoyed. More important, the Japanese can tolerate West European pro-
tectionism more easily than they can American pressures to liberalize their
economy and change their traditional ways of conducting business. It is pos-
sible, then, that American economic and security policies toward the Japanese
could undercut the political basis of the relationship.
Over the past several decades, the security relations among the allies have
changed dramatically. The primary cause of this transformed environment is
the tremendous growth of Soviet military power in the nuclear, conventional
land, and naval spheres. This profound shift in the international balance of
power underlies the changes in political attitudes and perceived national in-
terests already discussed.
With the growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional power, the West Eu-
ropeans have vacillated between contradictory fears. The first has been that
the United States would not use its nuclear weapons to protect them if it meant
risking a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. The second fear has been
that the United States would use its nuclear weapons, thus precipitating a
totally destructive nuclear war. This second concern requires that the United
States constantly reassure the West Europeans of its nuclear prudence through
the pursuit of detente and arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Unfor-
tunately, as Soviet military power has expanded, the inherent contradiction
between the task of convincing West Europeans of the credibility of extended
deterrence and the task of reassuring them of American prudence has become
increasingly sharp and is driving a psychological wedge between the United
States and Western Europe.
A second, and in some ways greater, challenge to the policy of extended
deterrence has also developed in the United States itself where the American
public has discovered nuclear war. The "nuclear war righting" rhetoric of the
Reagan administration and the growth of Soviet nuclear capability have made
Americans aware of the logic of the policy of extended deterrence as applicable
to themselves. As French president Charles De Gaulle predicted, Americans
are changing their collective mind regarding their willingness to risk the
destruction of their own country in order to safeguard Western Europe. This
discovery by Americans of the terrible dangers of nuclear war has given rise
to a powerful peace movement in the churches, in the middle classes, and in
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all sections of the country. Consequently, despite the resistance of the Reagan
administration, the national consensus appears to be moving in the direction
of abandoning, or at least drastically modifying, the policy of extended de-
terrence.
The solution to the problem of West European security proposed by an
increasing number of American strategic experts is the outright abandonment
of the policy of extended deterrence in favor of a conventional defense of
Western Europe. Unfortunately, this course of action is strongly rejected by
West European political leadership. It would be very expensive, and, perhaps
more important, it raises the other West European fear that a weakening of
extended deterrence would increase the probability of a limited war fought
in Western Europe. For West Europeans, a third world war on their continent,
even if fought only with conventional weapons, would be an unmitigated
disaster.
In the Pacific area as well, the growth of Soviet military power has had
important consequences for political relations. Over the past decade or so,
the Soviet Union has greatly increased its land forces along the Chinese border.
Soviet naval and air power have expanded, establishing a strong presence in
both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Although these developments do not yet
threaten the American position in the Pacific, they have undercut the policy
of extended deterrence and have raised substantially the cost of containing
the growth of Soviet power in that part of the world. Furthermore, the Pacific
area is increasing in political and economic importance to the United States
so that it cannot overlook the Soviet challenge in Asia or continue an overall
military strategy that assumes the abandonment of Asia in the event of a war
with the Soviets.9
The fundamental problem caused by the growth of Soviet military power
is an increasing disjuncture between America's overseas commitments and
its ability to meet these commitments. Until recently, reliance upon the policy
of extended deterrence enabled the United States to meet its global commit-
ments vis-a-vis Japan and Western Europe at a relatively low cost. Now
increasing numbers of influential Americans support abandonment of the
policy of extended deterrence and a shift to a conventional defense of these
commitments. Such a change in strategy would be very expensive, assuming
continuing growth of relative Soviet power. Therefore, more and more Ameri-
cans argue that either greater assistance must be forthcoming from America's
allies or the United States must considerably reduce its overseas commitments.
April 15,1971, marked the end of the postwar era of international economic
relations. On that date President Richard Nixon announced a new foreign
economic policy for the United States. He imposed a surcharge on American
imports, suspended the convertibility of the dollar, and took other remedial
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actions, thus dramatically altering the relationships and understandings that
had characterized the world economy since the establishment of the Bretton
Woods System.
President Nixon's decision was both cause and consequence of a profound
transformation in the structure and functioning of the world economy. A series
of far-reaching changes in the areas of trade, money, and technology are
eroding the postwar foundations of the Bretton Woods System and threatening
to pull the three poles of the postwar economy farther and farther apart. The
most significant structural change is the altered position of the United States
in the world economy. An important shift has taken place in the distribution
of economic and industrial power among the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan. Western Europe and Japan have regained the economic and in-
dustrial positions that they lost because of the destruction and distortions of
the Second World War, and there has been a general decline in the economic
and industrial preeminence of the United States. Moreover, this relative eco-
nomic decline and the consequent increase in the size of the foreign sector
in the American economy have made the United States more sensitive to
imports and are undermining the domestic free trade alliance, giving rise to
increased protectionism.
A second and related structural change is that the economies of the OECD
countries and certain other developing economies have become increasingly
similar in their industrial sectors and the composition of exports. Western
Europe, Japan, and the NICs (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, Mexi-
co, etc.) can now engage in import-substitution and can export goods once
available only from the leading industrial countries, especially the United
States. As a consequence, a global overcapacity exists in a number of im-
portant industrial sectors: steel, petrochemicals, automobiles, textiles, con-
sumer electronics, shipbuilding. This surplus capacity is leading to the
cartelization of international markets and other forms of market-sharing ar-
rangements. An increasing portion of international trade is characterized by
what the French euphemistically call organized free trade. With trade patterns
and the distribution of world market shares becoming more and more a func-
tion of intergovernmental bargaining, the crucial question for economic and
foreign policy is who is to be included, who excluded, from these market-
sharing arrangements.
A third structural change is the energy revolution that occurred initially
during the winter of 1973 and repeated itself in 1978-79. Effective control
over the supply and pricing of world petroleum (and by implication other
forms of energy) was transferred from American and other multinational oil
companies to the producing countries themselves as represented by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The cost of petroleum
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increased multifold. And the United States, for the first time in its history,
became dependent upon foreign suppliers for a vital resource. The energy
revolution also increased global inflationary pressures and economic inse-
curity, made much of the world's industrial plant obsolete, and reversed the
terms of trade for most energy-importing economies. The cost of adjusting
to these profound changes and the massive financial redistribution wrought
by the energy revolution have imposed an immense burden on the world
economy. This transfer of global wealth and power have in turn intensified
protectionism and international competition as individual countries seek to
cushion the effects on their economies.
Yet another major change in the world economy is the increasing role of
the state in the economy and the consequent growth of interstate economic
competition. The reasons for this greater government participation in the
private sphere range from the increased importance of welfare concerns to
the perceived need to finance research and development. This change in the
role of government has numerous economic consequences; it tends to politicize
international economic relations. The tendency is for the free market to give
way to interstate negotiations regarding such matters as orderly marketing
agreements and market shares for domestic industry.
An additional structural change is that inflation, or at least the fear of
inflation, has become an inherent feature in most OECD economies, especially
the United States and Western Europe. Several inflationary factors are embed-
ded in most economies today: energy cost concerns; an enhanced capacity of
workers to raise real wages faster than advances in productivity; the increasing
concentration of industry and the substitution of administered for market-
determined prices; rising expectations with respect to social welfare, housing,
medical care, environment; and the leveling off of increases in industrial and
agricultural productivity. Such inflationary pressures, it is feared, cannot be
kept in check by traditional Keynesian techniques, and therefore economic
growth must be constrained. Too rapid a rate of economic growth could trigger
a new wave of double-digit inflation. This contraction of the growth rates of
the major industrial economies is encouraging a retreat from the postwar trend
toward increasing global economic interdependence.
Another structural change is that the factors and assumptions underlying
America's postwar commitment to liberalized trade have been greatly eroded.
The American industrial, technological, and financial superiority upon which
this commitment rested has been weakened and in certain important areas
actually eliminated. The domestic political alliance behind America's free
trade policy has also been weakened. Large sections of organized labor and
import-sensitive businesses are now actively opposed to free trade. Further,
the assumption that a strengthened Europe and Japan would make greater
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contributions to the anti-Soviet alliance is increasingly questioned. Some be-
lieve that an economically strong Europe and Japan have made it more difficult
and costly for the United States to compete politically and militarily against
the Soviet Union. Also, the fact that China is no longer considered to be an
enemy is leading to a reassessment of policies fashioned in an earlier era. All
of these political and economic changes encourage the forces of protectionism
in the American economy.
Perhaps the most important cause of the powerful resurgence of protec-
tionism taking place in the United States and Western Europe is that the
technologies that previously propelled economic growth and international
trade are decreasingly able to do so, at least in the developed countries.
Comparative advantage in steel, consumer durables, and other areas is shifting
to the developing countries. For the developed countries, economic growth
and exports must increasingly depend on the development of new products
in emergent areas of high technology. It is precisely in these areas that Japan
is staking its claim to world economic leadership and posing a powerful
challenge to the United States and particularly to the West European economy.
This Japanese challenge and the West European response to it are of crucial
importance for global economic interdependence and for the future of the
American System.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the formation of the European Common
Market was one of the major factors accounting for the rapid growth of world
trade, increasing economic interdependence, and the success of the Bretton
Woods System. Now, as the European economies continue to stagnate, fall
behind technologically, and become more and more protectionist, the effects
of EEC trade policies are changing.
Undoubtedly the most significant structural change is that the center of
gravity of the world economy is shifting toward the Pacific basin. Although
the United States still has a trade surplus with Western Europe, America's
Pacific trade surpassed Atlantic trade for the first time in the mid-1970s.
Americans see their economic future in the Pacific area and in Latin America.
In the Sunbelt, the emergent center of political power and economic growth
in the United States, this is particularly true. As one American economist has
put it, the United States is rapidly developing a complementary set of economic
relations with the economies to its west and south.11 Because the Pacific
basin, including Japan and the Asian NICs, now surpasses the rest of the
world in rates of economic growth, this ongoing shift in American trading
patterns will most surely continue and have a profound impact on America's
future determination of the location of its national interests.
In summary, the world economy is undergoing a profound transforma-
tion. The contemporary shift in the nature and location of global economic
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activities is comparable in scale and importance to the tranformation that took
place in the first half of this century when the United States displaced Western
Europe as the center of the world economy.
These political, security, and economic developments raise a fundamental
question: Can the American System continue to survive intact or will it dis-
integrate under the impact of these new sets of forces? As previously detailed,
the foundations of the system have greatly eroded over the past decade. Po-
litical recriminations, strategic differences, and economic conflicts have dam-
aged relations among the industrial democracies. These challenges to the
American System raise major policy issues for the United States.
The first issue is whether the United States can maintain its present set of
international commitments and, if not, where it should cut back on its overseas
commitments. This issue must be faced because American power and its global
commitments are no longer in a state of equilibrium. The growth of Soviet
power and the relative decline of the American economy have made it more
costly and difficult for the United States to maintain its military commitments
in Western Europe, the Pacific region, and the Middle East. Although this
imbalance has been developing over the better part of the past decade, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's massive expansion of the American military budget,
the new emphasis on a nuclear war-fighting strategy, and the intense debate
over intermediate range missiles have placed strategic issues once again on
the national political agenda.
The second policy issue is the challenge posed for the United States and
other industrial countries by the continuing growth of Japanese and, increas-
ingly, of NIC trading competitiveness. Under the best of circumstances, the
adjustment to this trade expansionism would be difficult. Until recently, the
incorporation into the world economy of Japan with its export-led growth
strategy was eased by the rapid rates of economic growth enjoyed by most
other industrial economies; with growing economies there was room for all
to expand their exports. In an era of reduced growth rates and increased
protectionism, however, Japan's rapidly increasing competitiveness, now
joined by that of the export platforms of South Korea and Taiwan, among
others, raises the crucial issue of where these Pacific basin economies will
fit into a slower growing and more protectionist world economy. Similarly,
the rapidity with which comparative advantage has shifted in the direction of
these economies places inordinate adjustment costs on the United States and
other economies. The result has been the rise of powerful protectionist forces
in the American economy and the increasing demand of American political
leaders that Western Europe open its borders to these exports, thereby relieving
competitive pressures on the American economy.
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The issue of where Japan and the Asian NICs fit into an increasingly
protectionist world is compounded by the knowledge that the international
trading system is also becoming more and more a negotiated one. Because
of the retardation of growth rates and the global overcapacity in a number of
industrial sectors, the distribution of market shares among national producers
is becoming to a considerable extent a function of international negotiations
rather than letting the market decide who produces what and how much. The
multifibre agreement, the "voluntary" restraint on Japanese automobile ex-
ports, and the cartelization of the steel industry are prime examples of this
tendency. As these sectors are the traditional high-employment blue-collar
industries, this subject is politically very sensitive as every government seeks
to maximize its market share.
The question raised by this increasing politicization of the world economy
is who gets left out. Because the United States and Western Europe have the
most bargaining leverage, they have the greatest influence on the determination
of national shares of the world market. Together they obviously seek to main-
tain their own relative positions and the status quo. Yet the sectors involved
in the negotiations over market shares are frequently the ones in which Japan
and the Asian NICs have, or are gaining, a comparative advantage. Thus, it
is precisely those countries that, in terms of world economic efficiency, should
have an increasing share of the market that tend to get left out in the nego-
tiations.
The third issue facing the United States is an outgrowth of those already
discussed. Will it be possible for the United States indefinitely to maintain
its traditional and on the whole evenly balanced relations with both Western
Europe and Japan? The political, security, and economic foundations upon
which American foreign policy has rested are in a serious state of disrepair.
Although the issues faced by the United States and Western Europe are divi-
sive, the most vulnerable aspect of the American System, at least in the
immediate future, may be the increasing economic tension between West-
ern Europe and Japan.13 As a consequence, the problem of holding together
the interdependent world economy could become increasingly acute. As
West European political and security concerns become more parochial and
the West European economies become more fearful of foreign competition,
the West European and Japanese poles of the American System threaten to
move farther and farther apart and into opposition to one another. Also, one
cannot discount the significance for the system of the recent growth of anti-
Japanese sentiment in the United States and of Japanese resentments of Ameri-
can pressures.14 In brief, the problem facing the United States and its allies
in maintaining the American System has become immense.
In part, the problem is a transitional one, that is, the transition from a
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declining global economic structure to its successor. Therefore, one may hope
that the problem will ease in the future. As the traditional industrial sectors
decline in the developed countries and are replaced by new, more competitive
industries, protectionist pressures may ease. Yet this hopeful view may be
much too sanguine. The solution to the global economic crisis ultimately
requires a major rejuvenation of the American and European economies.
Although there is evidence to suggest that this is beginning to happen in the
United States, there is little basis to believe the same of Western Europe.
Unless greater efforts are made to revitalize the economy of Western Europe,
it threatens to become a drag on world economic growth and an increasing
impediment to the further liberalization of international trade.
These centrifugal and divisive forces within the American System are
posing increasingly complicated choices for the United States. The interest
of the United States lies more and more in the economic development of the
Pacific basin. This requires that world markets be kept open to Japan, the
NICs, and an industrializing China. The American economy by itself would
find it very difficult, however, to provide an adequate market for their exports;
and for economic, political, and cultural reasons the United States still requires
ties to Western Europe. Yet unless Western Europe becomes once again what
it was in the 1950s and 1960s—that is, a positive factor in the growth of
international trade—the economic ambitions of Japan, China, and the Asian
NICs as well as the interests of the United States in the Pacific region and in
the world more generally are bound to be thwarted. Without exonerating the
United States for its protectionist policies or excusing Japan for its failure to
exercise economic leadership commensurate with its growing economic
power, the critical issue is the future course of Western Europe's foreign
economic policy. Unless this policy changes in a more liberal direction, the
United States may one day be forced to choose between its European and
pacific allies.
Throughout the postwar period, American policy has tended to be Euro-
centric. The United States has given primacy to its European interests in the
resolution of political, security, and economic matters. In the light of con-
temporary developments, however, one must ask whether this can continue.
As the world economy moves westward toward the Pacific and American
interests follow in the wake of this movement, should the United States give
higher priority to its relationship with Japan and the Pacific than it does to
its relationship with Western Europe? This is the question that will increasingly
face American economic and political leaders.
It would be foolhardy to suggest that the future course of American-Japa-
nese relations will run smoothly. The political, security, and economic con-
The Global Context 19
flicts between the two countries are complex, and the issues that divide the
two allies are profound indeed. Whether America and Japan will be partners
or opponents in the economic development of the Pacific basin is a matter
yet to be decided. With the exercise of prudence and restraint on both sides,
there is no fundamental reason why a working partnership cannot continue
to evolve. The costs of any other outcome would be exceptionally high for
both countries.
I conclude with a hope and plea. The hope is that the United States and
its two sets of allies can resolve the pressing issues that threaten to rend the
American System. For over three decades this system, despite its many and
serious imperfections, has provided these allies security and prosperity. It is
highly doubtful that any conceivable substitute would do as well. Fortunately,
despite the relative decline in its power, the United States still has the resources
to provide international leadership and, in cooperation with its allies, find a
substitute for the American System. The American market remains the world's
largest; its engine of growth, the dollar, is still the basis of the monetary
system, and the American nuclear umbrella retains its credibility. The plea
is that the United States assume this leadership task but in so doing give
greater attention to the interests and deep concerns of its allies. Unless present
trends are overcome, however, it will be too late either to turn back the forces
undermining the American System or to find a satisfactory alternative.
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From the Yoshida Letter
to the Nixon Shock
CHIHIRO HOSOYA
Soon after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951,
Japan recognized the Nationalist government in Taiwan as the legitimate gov-
ernment of China and opened diplomatic relations with that government. But
almost two decades later, Japan drastically changed her China policy and
normalized relations with the government in Beijing, the People's Republic
of China (PRC). This essay will examine the development of Japan's China
policy between 1951 and 1972, focusing particularly on its relation to the
East Asia policy of the United States.
Through the "Yoshida Letter," written only three months after the signing
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan professed her intention to conclude
a peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Subsequently, the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed on April 28, 1952, establishing dip-
lomatic relations between Japan and the Nationalist government of Taiwan.
From the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty the
issuance of the Yoshida Letter, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, partly in-
fluenced by the British, pursued an equidistant diplomacy vis-a-vis both Bei-
jing and Taibei.1 He originally thought that the Beijing government would
become a Titoist regime. In this respect his reading of mainland China's
political future was closer to that of the British than of the American gov-
ernment. Furthermore, Yoshida, a diplomat pursuing a British-type merchant
diplomacy, anticipated sizable growth in Japan's trade with mainland China.
For this reason, we may conclude that the Yoshida Letter did not represent
his real intentions but instead a sacrificial offering that Japan had to give for
the prompt restoration of national sovereignty, a sovereignty that would be
possible only when the Peace Treaty took effect. He also presumably antici-
pated an early fulfillment of Japan's role in democratizing China. But Yoshida,
bearing in mind Japan's total dependence on the United States for economic
recovery and military security, found no alternative but to align his country
with the United States' containment policy toward China.
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The National Security Council defined the basic U.S. policy toward Japan
after independence. It stipulated that it was the U.S. objective "to assist Japan
rapidly to develop (1) the means for its defense, and (2) the capability to
contribute to the defense of other free nations of the Pacific area." NSC 2/
125 further stated that the United States "should encourage collective security
arrangements in the Pacific area which would include Japan." At the same
time, the document maintained that the United States should "seek to prevent
Japan from becoming dependent on China and other communist-dominated
areas for essential food and raw material supplies [and to] encourage Japanese
contribution to the economic development of countries of South and Southeast
Asia.
In July 1952, Japan joined the Coordinating Committee for Export to
Communist Areas (COCOM), which in the same year established the China
Committee (CHINCOM) as its subsidiary to control export to China. The
CHINCOM was designed to prohibit the exportation of strategic commodities
to China by applying more strict criteria than the simple trade restrictions of
strategic materials regarding other communist countries.
This kind of American containment policy toward China was not well
received by the Japanese business community and the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), both of which hoped to promote
trade with mainland China. Reflecting their desire to open such trade, the
first nongovernmental barter trade agreement was signed between Japan and
the PRC one month earlier. Although this move was not welcomed by the
American government, the Japanese government tried to ameliorate the situa-
tion by introducing a policy of separating economy from politics (seikei bunri).
The Eisenhower administration however, began to show some signs of
loosening the rigid American policy toward trade restrictions between Japan
and the PRC. This relaxation of American policy stemmed partly from several
auspicious phenomena in international relations, such as the death of Josef
Stalin in March 1953 and the bright prospects of an armistice in Korea. The
administation also hoped that the China market could soften the economic
impact of Japan's loss of the special procurements which would disappear
with peace in Korea.
On April 8, 1953, the National Security Council reevaluated the NSC 4/
125 document on U.S. policy toward Japan. The council's discussion revealed
President Eisenhower's favorable attitude toward Japan's trade with China.
The president believed that "there was no future for Japan unless access were
provided for it to the markets and raw materials of Manchuria and North
China." According to NSC 4/125, the president also believed that "even on
the short hand a certain amount of Japanese trade with Communist China
should be permitted in place of the complete embargo and blockade which
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now exists."3 Eisenhower's attitude toward Japan's trade with communist
countries became more favorable in the following year. He not only used the
word "permit" but also used the word "encourage."4
In contrast to Eisenhower's positive attitude, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles's posture continued to be stiff and resolute. For example, at the April
1953 NSC meeting, Dulles said, "It was not practicable to envisage any revival
of Japanese sovereignty and physical control over Manchuria, but we could
do a lot to assist Japan by encouraging Japanese trade with the Philippines
and Malaya." He believed that the United States should limit Japan's trade
with mainland China as much as possible and strengthen Japan's economic
ties with Southeast Asia.
As the Korean armistice was being signed on July 27, 1953, the Japanese
Diet passed a resolution for the "promotion of Sino-Japanese trade." This
Diet resolution demanded that the Japanese government temporarily bring
down the trade restrictions to a level "as low as the Western European coun-
tries'." The truce in Korea no doubt heightened the expectations of Sino-
Japanese trade in Japanese economic circles, and the Sino-Japanese trade
question increasingly became one of the important issues in Japanese domestic
politics. Just two months later, Diet members and businessmen formed the
first Dietmen's group to inspect Japan's trade with China (Chugoku tsusho
shisatsu giin-dan) and announced their plans to visit mainland China.
The overall thawing of the international situation, coupled with the above-
mentioned domestic developments in Japan, necessarily had a subtle influence
on Dulles's containment policy toward China. During a press conference on
September 3, 1953, he revealed his intention to relax control over Japan's
export trade with the PRC, stating, "It is quite possible that the Japanese
might want to put their relationship on a basis more nearly that of other
countries such as Britain, France and so forth."
Although Japan had increased her interest in promoting trade with the PRC,
the Japanese government's official negotiations with the United States about
restrictions on trade with the PRC did not begin until October 1953, when
Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato conducted a series of talks with Walter Rob-
ertson, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs. During the talks,
Ikeda and his delegation asked the United States to bring the COCOM and
CHINCOM lists of prohibited commodities down to the level applied to Eu-
ropean countries. The United States approved this request on October 21,
1953.7 Following the American approval, MITI took measures, on thirteen
different occasions by September 1954, to remove a number of commodities
from the COCOM-CHINCOM lists, thus bringing the number of items on
the lists closer to those applied to Western European countries.
While these talks were being held between Ikeda and Robertson in Wash-
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ington, a nongovernmental trade agreement was being negotiated in Beijing.
This resulted in an agreement on October 29 for an exchange of trade rep-
resentatives between the two countries. This arrangement was strongly op-
posed by Dulles.
The American amabassador to Japan, John M. Allison, wrote to Wash-
ington on September 3, 1954: "Tokyo with visible reluctance followed the
American lead in maintaining its relations with the Nationalist Government,
although it was originally inclined to the British approach and still basically
holds to the theories of the durability of the Communist capture of China and
of the possibility of facilitating the alienation of Peking from Moscow. Re-
cently the Japanese have seemed increasingly disposed to a theory of 'Two
Chinas." Allison's observation indicates his sharp insight into Prime Minis-
ter Yoshida's China policy, which had not changed fundamentally since 1951.
In contrast to Yoshida's policy toward the PRC, Dulles's basic diplomatic
strategy was to strengthen the Japanese defense capability against Communist
threats in East Asia and to draw Japan into regional collective security ar-
rangements. When the United States, during the Ikeda-Robertson talks, asked
Japan to increase its ground forces to between 325,000 and 350,000 men,
Japan responded by enlarging its current forces of 110,000 to only 180,000
in five years. Yoshida continued to dodge the issue by making minimum
concessions to Dulles in the buildup of Japan's defense capability.
At the time of the first Dulles-Yoshida talks, Dulles had a "Pacific Pact"
idea. This pact aimed at the establishment of a regional collective security
system by island chain countries located in the periphery of China. Dulles's
idea eventually materialized in three separate mutual security treaties
(ANZUS, U.S.-Philippines, and U.S.-Japan security treaties) rather than in
a single security treaty organization by those countries. But the original Ameri-
can plan to incorporate Japan into a more comprehensive collective security
system would remain alive.
Because Yoshida wished to pursue an equidistant diplomacy toward Beijing
and Taibei from the outset, he tried not to follow the U.S. military containment
policy toward the PRC. Yoshida was willing to go along with Dulles's con-
tainment policy toward the PRC in terms of an economic embargo. But even
this relatively mild policy met with vehement criticism from Japanese who
held that Yoshida was subserviently following American policy.
Despite Japanese domestic opposition to Yoshida's China policy, the
United States held fast to the idea of making Japan cooperate with the Ameri-
can military containment policy toward China. This American intention is
seen in NSC 125/6, which indicated that the United States would "continue
to explore the possibilities of collective security arrangements in the Pacific
area which would include Japan."9 It is also evidenced in one of the conclu-
sions of the U.S. House Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia and the
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Pacific. The report stated that it was desirable for the United States to "broaden
these bilateral arrangements [a network of mutual security treaties that the
United States concluded with the countries in East Asia and the Pacific area]
into a regional pact [Pacific Pact]."10
Dulles took the initiative in forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) to fill the power vacuum likely to be created by the French military
withdrawal from Indochina. Furthermore, when Communist Chinese forces
began shelling Quemoy and Matsu islands, precipitating a crisis in the Taiwan
Strait, Dulles resolutely signed a U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Security Treaty on
December 2, 1954.
With events unfolding rapidly, Dulles presumably thought that his urgent
task was to commit Japan to some kind of regional security arrangement. On
his return from signing the SEATO treaty in September 1954, Dulles may
have elicited Yoshida's opinion on Japan's commitment to some regional
security treaty organization; or he may have made such a proposal during the
Dulles-Yoshida talks on September 10. The Department of State, for instance,
optimistically hoped that Japan would go along with the American plan. On
October 12, acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. reported to the
American Embassy in Tokyo that he believed Yoshida would be "eventually
willing [to] lead Japan into Pacific defense arrangements despite constitutional
muddle."11
In spite of American expectations, however, Yoshida had no intention of
committing Japan to the kind of regional security arrangements the United
States envisioned. In Yoshida's judgment, the Japanese Constitution and do-
mestic political situation would not allow him to pursue such a course of
action. Moreover, it was against his political philosophy to pursue a con-
tainment policy that was chiefly military in nature.
On September 26, 1954, Yoshida began his trip to Western Europe and
the United States. He used this opportunity to try to forestall cooperation in
the military collective security arrangements by proposing a "Yoshida Plan,"
which aimed at nonmilitary cooperation with the United Kingdom and, es-
pecially, with the United States. The Yoshida Plan, which he proposed to
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in London and subsequently to President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in Washington on November 9,
1954, had two salient points: (1) In order to cope with the Communist "peace
offensive" in East Asia, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States should
establish a joint organization in Singapore, to be headed by British High
Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald. Further, the three countries should
launch a "peace counteroffensive" and share information on Communist ac-
tivies;12 (2) There should be a $4-billion "Marshall Plan" for Asia in order
to develop the countries of Southeast Asia.
This Yoshida Plan represents another instance of Yoshida's characteristi-
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cally spontaneous diplomatic style. But it can also be viewed as his counter-
offensive against or resistance to Dulles's militaristic diplomacy.
Although Dulles regarded Yoshida's political initiative as "a very inter-
esting suggestion," he maintained that it would be better for Japan to cooperate
with the SEATO nations, and he refused to give serious consideration to the
Yoshida Plan. Dulles observed that "this kind of thing is something which
should be handled within the framework of that Pact [Manila Pact]," and he
maintained that "we want Japan drawn into collective activities in that area."13
During his stay in Washington, Yoshida tried to persuade Dulles by offering
the wisdom and experience of the Japanese with regard to the China question.
But Yoshida's political career was about to end: his cabinet resigned en masse
soon after his return to Japan. When Hatoyama Ichiro replaced Yoshida
as prime minister on December 10, 1954, Japan began a new era in its diplo-
macy.
The Japanese government headed by Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan
was somewhat different from other cabinets of the postwar period. For one
thing, both political leaders made diplomatic efforts to restore friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, while si-
multaneously maintaining friendship with the United States. Their attempt at
this so-called multidirectional diplomacy (zen-hoi gaiko) stands out in the
political history of postwar Japan. Prime Minister Hatoyama, in particular,
tried his best to distinguish himself from Yoshida, who had been criticized
for his "follow-the-United States" diplomacy. For this reason, Hatoyama had
a strong desire to normalize Japan's relations with the two major communist
countries.
While Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to improve Japan's relations with
these Communist neighbors, both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China had their own reasons for exploiting the situation to their advantage.
Both searched for opportunities to mount an active peace offensive toward
Japan to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States. Such oppor-
tunities seemed to have arrived when Japanese conservatives became involved
in intra-and interparty rivalries over the issue of foreign policy and when
various peace movements were gaining momentum. On October 12, 1954,
the Soviet Union and the PRC announced a joint declaration proposing the
promotion of extensive trade with Japan, the establishment of close cultural
ties, and the normalization of diplomatic relations".14 The two powers sent
one message after another to the newly formed Hatoyama cabinet, expressing
their hope for the normalization of relations with Japan (e.g., the Molotov
statement of December 16; an editorial in Izvestia of December 22; and an
editorial in People's Daily of December 30, 1954).
Japanese-Soviet negotiations for the normalization of relations began in
London on June 3, 1955. Although the talks stalled many times, particularly
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over the question of the Northern Territories, and the original objective of
concluding a peace treaty was not achieved, Japan and the Soviet Union did
agree on October 19, 1956, to reopen diplomatic relations between the two
countries.
Although Prime Minister Hatoyama achieved one of the diplomatic ob-
jectives he had set forth, the process unfortunately aroused domestic political
problems, such as interparty and interfactional struggles and feuds among
major political leaders. Conservative parties reorganized themselves, and this
major political reorganization culminated in the establishment of the Liberal
Democratic party (LDP) in the fall of 1955. Moreover, American Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles did not welcome Japanese diplomatic attempts to
normalize relations with the Soviet Union, and he often tried to restrain such
efforts. From the beginning, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had not been
enthusiastic about the negotiations, partly because Prime Minister Hatoyama
dealt directly with the Soviet Union, bypassing the Japanese Foreign Min-
istry,15 and partly because Foreign Ministry officials did not wish to initiate
negotiations against the wishes of the U.S. government and former Prime
Minister Yoshida.
Nevertheless, two events contributed to the creation of a climate favorable
to improving relations between Japan and the Soviet Union—the four-power
summit conference at Geneva in July 1955, and the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany in September.
These events necessarily helped lessen the intensity of the Cold War on a
global scale. In contrast, the situation in East Asia remained tense, particularly
in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty hampered
attempts for better relations between Japan and the People's Republic of
China. Consequently, Japan had fewer diplomatic options in dealing with the
PRC than with the Soviet Union.
In this environment, it was uncertain whether the Hatoyama regime could
pursue a China policy different from that of the preceding cabinet. One of
the first tests came in March 1955, when Japan had to negotiate a third
nongovernmental trade agreement. Late in the month, the PRC was about to
send its delegation to Japan for the negotiations, but the Japanese Foreign
Ministry expressed strong disapproval of the invitation extended to the Chinese
delegation. Furthermore, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations
(Keidanren) announced that they had to take part in the invitation and in trade
negotiations with this group. At just this time, Secretary of State Dulles
reportedly sent a message to Japan, warning that if Japan's major corporations
were considering making positive moves to expand trade with the PRC, the
United States would have to reconsider its economic relations with Japan.16
The agenda for Japan-PRC trade negotiations, scheduled to begin on April
1, 1955, included the establishment of trade representative offices and the
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arrangements for direct settlement of accounts in the respective currencies.
But the most important thing was that both parties hoped eventually to raise
this nongovernmental agreement to the level of an intergovernmental agree-
ment. Premier Hatoyama shared this hope. If the scenario had been realized
as he wished, Japan would have extended de facto recognition of the PRC,
thus entering an entirely new stage of Sino-Japanese relations. It is said that
Hatoyama had to give up his diplomatic efforts to achieve this objective
because of vehement opposition from the United States.17 (Minister of In-
ternational Trade and Industry Ishibashi reportedly advised Hatoyama to ig-
nore the American opposition.)
While the Sino-Japanese trade negotiations continued in Tokyo, Takasaki
Tatsunosuke, director of the Economic Deliberation Agency forerunner of the
present Economic planning Agency, held a secret meeting on April 22 with
the PRC's Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who was then attending the Bandung
conference. It was the first meeting of high governmental officials from Japan
and the PRC. The meeting centered on the normalization of relations between
the two countries. Chou En-lai emphasized the necessity for both countries
to solve one problem after another through the establishment of a semi-
governmental agency.
What is worth noting here is a statement made by Takasaki during this
meeting: "Japan at present is under the 'supervision' of the United States,
and the Japanese Government may not be able to comply with the proposal
of your Government. But for the purpose of improving relations between our
two countries even a little bit further, the Japanese Government wishes to
begin with trade as a first step. Takasaki's statement revealed the forbidding
constraints on Japan's relations with the PRC.
Despite these constraints, Prime Minister Hatoyama on April 27 expressed
his intention to extend the "support and cooperation of the Japanese govern-
ment" to the agreement under negotiation, hoping to expedite the trade ne-
gotiations. It was only after both delegations exchanged letters confirming
Hatoyama's statement that a third Sino-Japanese nongovernmental trade
agreement was signed on May 4, 1955. As a result, the total trade volume
between Japan and the PRC increased from $35 million in fiscal year 1953
to $150 million in fiscal year 1956. In accordance with the terms of the third
trade agreement, both countries held trade fairs in 1955-56. Moreover, the
two countries actively engaged in cultural exchanges. On the governmental
level, the consuls general of the two countries residing in Geneva opened
official channels on July 15, and discussed the problem of Japanese repatriates
in mainland China.
American relations with Communist China were quite different. Secretary
of State Dulles obstinately refused to relax the embargo on the PRC begun
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during the Korean War. The Department of State did not allow even a single
panda to be imported to the United States. Moreover when Chou En-lai pro-
posed exchange of journalists in August 1956, the Department of State refused
to grant exceptions to the rule prohibiting all travel to mainland China.
Japan's policy of separating economy from politics had obvious limitations.
Substantial expansion of trade with the PRC would eventually come into
conflict with the trade restrictions imposed by the COCOM and CHINCOM,
and the establishment of trade representative offices would turn an economic
issue into a political one. Consequently, in spite of the support and cooperation
that the Japanese government had provided the third Sino-Japanese nongov-
ernmental trade agreement, Japan had to postpone implementation of the
agreement. And this was the atmosphere in which Hatoyama resigned from
his premiership.
Ishibashi Tanzan, who took over on December 23, 1956, felt it his mission
to break the stalemate over the China policy. Ishibashi was a liberal with a
special concern with Chinese affairs. It is conceivable that, if the Ishibashi
cabinet had remained in power, Sino-Japanese relations would have taken a
somewhat different course. But illness forced Ishibashi to resign after only
two months in office. On February 25, 1956, he was succeeded by Kishi
Nobusuke.
Japanese relations with the People's Republic of China during the Kishi
cabinet were the worst since the Yoshida cabinet. Provoked by the May 2,
1958, national flag incident at Nagasaki, involving the hauling down of a
Chinese flag by Japanese right-wingers the Beijing government announced
that it would terminate all economic and cultural exchanges with Japan. It
seemed that all the efforts made for normalization of relations under the "piling
up system" would come to nothing and that they would have to start all over
again.
Prime Minister Kishi delineated his foreign policy objectives as follows:
to repair strained relations with the United States which had been caused by
Japan's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the PRC; and to satisfy the
demands of Japanese nationalism by turning the U.S.-Japan security treaty
into a more equal arrangement. Furthermore, the Kishi cabinet sought Ameri-
can capital for Japanese advancement into Southeast Asian markets. For Kishi
the Chinese market had only secondary importance. In short, his foreign policy
was much closer to that of Dulles. It is ironic that, although Kishi had criticized
Yoshida for his servility to American policy, as prime minister he found
himself more pro-American than Yoshida had ever been.
Prime Minister Kishi's statements and actions elicited disappointment and
suspicion from the PRC. When Kishi visited Taiwan and publicly supported
Chiang Kai-shek's declared determination to recapture the Chinese mainland,
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the Beijing government was issued a statement in July 1957 bitterly censuring
the Kishi government.
Thus, Sino-Japanese political relations deteriorated, and an abortive at-
tempt in September 1957 to negotiate a fourth Sino-Japanese nongovernmental
trade agreement was an important factor in terminating various nongovern-
mental exchanges between the two countries. The most difficult issue was
again the question of establishing offices of trade representatives. Although
the Chinese proposed to make the trade representative offices quasi-govern-
mental agencies, the Japanese wished to preserve their nongovernmental char-
acter. One of the most important questions in this connection was whether
the trade offices had the right to fly their national flags. The Japanese gov-
ernment ultimately decided to deny this right on April 9, 1958. The Beijing
government rebuked the Japanese for not providing definite assurances to
carry out the terms of the agreement under negotiation. The proposed fourth
trade agreement never materialized.
One of the dominant factors that hurt Sino-Japanese relations was the
domestic situation in the PRC. China was about to make major policy changes,
launching into its Great Leap Forward and establishing people's communes.
These changes in domestic policy made Chinese policy toward Japan less
flexible and more aggressive. In addition, the PRC's exchanges with the
United States assumed an increasingly militaristic character; the large-scale
Chinese shelling of Quemoy and Matsu islands in late August 1958 eloquently
revealed the extent to which the relations between the United States and the
PRC had deteriorated. On the other hand, the reemergence of the PRC as a
military threat further facilitated cooperation between Japan and the United
States.
Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s went forward and backward in re-
peated movements, reflecting the character of each cabinet of the postwar
period. When Sino-Japanese relations improved, Japanese-American relations
deteriorated. Conversely, when Japan sought to strengthen its ties with the
United States, Japan's relations with the PRC became strained. This basic
pattern of trilateral relations during the 1950s remained essentially intact
through the 1960s.
In the 1960s, lkeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku assumed the leadership of the
Japanese government after the fall of Kishi Nobusuke. Dceda's China policy
resembled Yoshida's equidistant diplomacy vis-a-vis both Beijing and Taibei.
In contrast, Sato regarded the PRC as a threat and was instrumental in wors-
ening Japan's relations with Beijing. In short, Sato was a successor to Kishi.
The most urgent task in foreign policy for lkeda, who became prime mini-
ster in July 1960, was to mend Japanese-American relations, which had
deteriorated because of the political turmoil caused by the revision of the
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U.S.-Japan security treaty. (See Tadashi Aruga's essay, chapter 4.) Therefore,
for the Ikeda cabinet, the improvement of relations with the PRC had to come
after restoration of friendship with the United States. Although the interna-
tional political situation became increasingly multipolar, and France made
diplomatic moves that eventually led to recognition of the Beijing government
in January 1964, Prime Minister Ikeda had no intention of exploiting the
situation to improve political relations with the PRC. Instead, he held to his
basic position of seeking political cooperation with the United States with
regard to China policy. This is evidenced by Japan's attitude toward the
question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. In the General
Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1961, Japan and the United
States jointly proposed a resolution designating the Chinese representation
question as a substantial question. Ikeda maintained his commitment to co-
operate with the United States.
So far as Japan's diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with the PRC
were concerned, Prime Minister Ikeda's basic principles were: Japan would
not recognize the Beijing government before the United States did so; and
Japan would mediate between the United States and the PRC with a view to
persuading Washington to improve relations with the PRC. Ikeda hoped to
create a situation that would enable Japan to recognize the Beijing govern-
ment. But during his June 1961 meeting with President John F. Kennedy
in Washington, Ikeda was surprised to find that President Kennedy and Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk shared the view that Beijing was more dangerous
than Moscow. Given Washington's animosity against Beijing, Ikeda thought
it out of the question for Japan to seek normalization of Japan's relations with
the PRC.
Ikeda, however, made an exception in Japan's trade with the PRC, some-
thing that had been promoted on the principle of separation of economics
from politics. As Ikeda told Kennedy, "Japan historically and traditionally
has had special relations with the Chinese Continent. I think it would be
reasonable for Japan to engage in at least as much trade as the Western
European countries are currently doing."21 Ikeda hoped to adopt a deferred
payment system, as West European countries had, in order to expand Japan's
trade with the PRC, and by May 1962, there was a consensus on this point
within the Japanese government. But William Averill Harriman, assistant
secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, replied, "I am opposed to the ex-
pansion of Japan's trade with Beijing. It is desirable for Japan to take a wait-
and-see attitude toward Communist China, which is experiencing economic
difficulties." The Japanese Foreign Ministry, however, ignored Harriman's
warning, arguing that "there would be no problem for Japan to promote trade
with China under the same conditions as the Western European countries."22
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In September 1962, Japan began negotiations for a new nongovernmental
trade agreement in Beijing. Matsumura Kenzo a senior member of the Liberal
Democratic Party, engaged in preliminary discussions with Chou En-lai. The
series of talks between Matsumura and Chou resulted in a basic agreement
on the "promotion of trade" and the "normalization of relations, including
political and economic relations, under the gradual and piling-up system."
This agreement was instrumental in producing a "memorandum concerning
Sino-Japanese trade," which was signed by Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Liao
Ch'eng-chih on November 9, 1962. The Sino-Japanese trade, which came to
be known as "L-T trade," continued to increase. Because of the major figures
involved in the making of the agreement, the memorandum was regarded as
a quasi-governmental agreement. In addition, the memorandum stipulated that
deferred payments could be made for part of the commodities traded. The
Chinese responded to the establishment of trade offices more flexibly than in
the past, and a memorandum of agreement, including the exchange of news-
paper reporters, was agreed upon in April 1964.
Although the Chinese adhered to the principle that economics cannot be
separated from politics, they began to take a more flexible attitude. One
contributing factor was Beijing's deteriorating relations with Moscow. In the
1950s, China depended on the Soviet Union for 60-80 percent of its foreign
trade. As relations between the two countries became increasingly strained,
China, while emphasizing the policy of self-reliance, sought to import needed
industrial goods and technology from other advanced countries. Western Eu-
ropean countries and Japan as exporters were precisely the countries to meet
such needs. Moreover, observing a certain trend for U.S.-Soviet detente grow-
ing since the late 1950s, Beijing began to suspect that the United States and
the Soviet Union were conspiring together against China. In order to cope
with the two superpowers and also to frustrate the United States' containment
policy, the Chinese saw that it would be to their advantage to seek a rap-
prochement with Japan and Western Europe.
Under the agreement on the "L-T trade," Japan adopted a deferred payment
system. Japan went as far as to allow the Export-Import Bank to finance the
export of a vinylon plant. But the United States expressed strong opposition
to this scheme. During the meeting of the U.S.-Japan joint trade and economic
committee on December 3, 1962, President Kennedy warned Japan: "The
major question facing us today is the growth of Communist forces in China,
and how to contain Communist expansion in Asia. I hope [this committee]
will consider what the United States and Japan as allies can do, and what
roles they can play in order to prevent Communist domination of Asia."
Several days later, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman also addressed a
note to Japan, saying that the United States did not favor Japan's decision to
extend deferred payment arrangements to Communist China.
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Despite American opposition, in August 1963 the Japanese government
decided to grant deferred payments, using the Export-Import Bank loans to
finance Kurashiki Rayon's export of a vinylon plant to the PRC. This bold
move distinguished the Ikeda government from its successor, the Sato gov-
ernment. But the decision of the Japanese government worsened relations
with the Nationalist government in Taiwan, and the Ikeda cabinet had to repair
relations with Taibei by sending another "Yoshida Letter" (addressed to
Chang Ch'iin) in May 1964.
After Prime Minister Ikeda resigned because of illness, Sato Eisaku a
younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, organized his cabinet on Novenber 9,
1964. Shortly before Sato's assumption of the premiership, however, the PRC,
successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb. By beginning the bombing of
North Vietnam in February 1965, the United States on its part escalated its
military intervention in the Vietnam War. To counter this, the PRC increased
its aid to North Vietnam. Thus, the confrontation between the United States
and the PRC in the Indochinese peninsula was taking an increasingly ominous
form.
Furthermore, parallel to the Great Cultural Revolution that began in late
1965, the PRC launched a "revolutionary diplomacy," advocating radical
revolutionary slogans. Although China opted for a foreign policy to isolate
itself, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the partial nuclear test
ban treaty in August 1963, and the U.S.-Soviet detente gathered momentum.
Moreover, during the latter half of the 1960s, Japan also promoted friendship
with the Soviet Union through various administrative agreements (consular
affairs, aviation, etc.) and discussions on Siberian development (especially
the Tyumen oil field).
China viewed this situation as dangerous, possibly leading to a political
situation in which Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union would
together confront the People's Republic of China. An editorial appeared in
the People's Daily, as early as 1966, saying that Japan was a party to the
"U.S.-Soviet Holy Alliance," and some Chinese leaders also made similar
remarks in February 1969.
In November 1967, Prime Minister Sato and President Lyndon B. Johnson
announced in Washington that "it is important to create a situation in which
countries in Asia may not be influenced by the threats from Communist
China."25 During the latter half of the 1960s, Japan's China policy thus came
closer to the American policy, and Japan's relations with China deteriorated.
Whereas the Sato cabinet prohibited the use of the Export-Import Bank fi-
nancing and deferred payments for Japanese trade with the PRC, the latter
cast an ominous shadow over cultural exchange when it expelled Japanese
journalists.
Despite the apparently intensifying conflict between the United States and
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China during the latter half of the 1960s, however, there was an undercurrent
searching for a way out of the Chinese isolation. For instance, at a hearing
of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1966, A. Doak
Barnett proposed a "containment policy without isolation." On the govern-
mental level also, the United States in mid-1968 took measures to moderate
restrictions on travel and trade with China. With Richard Nixon's election to
the presidency in January 1969, the United States made more serious moves
to improve relations with China. The first indication of such moves was the
American suspension of the Seventh Fleet patrol of the Taiwan Strait. Soon
after this, China and the United States resumed the ambassadorial-level con-
ferences in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, after an interruption of two years.
Trapped by the rhetoric of a "shared recognition of Communist threats,"
the Japanese government overlooked the subtle but important signals ex-
changed between the United States and China, and President Nixon's an-
nouncement in July 1971 of his scheduled visit to Beijing came as a total
surprise. Hence the "Nixon Shock." And the trilateral relations among Japan,
the United States, and China that defined the political environment in postwar
East Asia assumed a completely new aspect.
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China in
Japanese-American
Relations
WARREN I. COHEN
The way in which Japan and the United States worked with differences in
perception of and policy toward China from 1950 to 1972 provides a useful
case study of how friendly nations of unequal power cope with disagreement.
Assuming the persistence of a shared estimate of the threat posed by the Soviet
Union over the next decade, the manner in which they dealt with their disparate
views of China allows for considerable optimism as Americans and Japanese
struggle with a host of conflicts over economic policy.
In the course of negotiations for a treaty of peace that would end the
American occupation of Japan, Japanese leaders yielded on a secondary issue,
policy toward China. They yielded in order to ensure ratification of the treaty
by the U.S. Senate and to enhance friendship with the nation upon which
Japan depended for economic aid and military protection. In the years that
followed, an increasingly independent, stronger Japan chipped away at the
American position on China and, with the support of other friends of the
United States, most obviously Great Britain, undermined American policy—
without alienating the United States. In the 1970s, the United States moved
rapidly to adopt policies similar to those of Japan, and the issue disappeared.
Although Ambassador Edwin Reischauer argued to the contrary in 1966, at
no time did the differences over China constitute a danger to the alliance.
There is ample evidence to indicate that some Americans and some Japanese
were intensely unhappy at various points, but the issue was only one of a
host of commonplace irritants of the sort that have provided employment for
diplomats for centuries.
From the end of World War II until June 1950, China was not an issue
between the United States and Japan. Early in the year the United States was
encouraging Japanese trade with the newly proclaimed People's Republic of
China. Dean Acheson was still thinking of trade as a means of weaning a
Communist China away from the Soviet Union, still assuming the United
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States would recognize Mao's regime eventually. American trading policy
was more liberal toward China than toward the Soviet Union.1 Japanese
leaders and American leaders seemed alike in their ability to conceive of a
Communist China independent of the Soviet Union and constituting little threat
to the vital interests of their country.
In March 1951, after the People's Republic allied itself with the Soviet
Union, trade policy distinctions in its favor ceased, and Beijing was thereafter
treated like Moscow and its East European satellites. Acheson, however, had
not yet surrendered his fundamental policy of seeking to prevent China from
becoming an adjunct of Soviet power. Even after war broke out in Korea, he
was still looking for a way to develop a differential trade policy more favorable
to China than to other Soviet bloc nations.2
China's intervention in Korea undermined Acheson's policy of moving
toward accommodation with China. By December 1950, the United States
had chosen to pursue economic warfare against China and was urging its allies
to do the same. Of its friends and allies, Japan, occupied by American troops,
was the most responsive. Japanese traders, in the Osaka region in particular,
were eager to maintain and expand trade with China. The Japanese govern-
ment, however, assessing its interests in light of existing internal and external
pressures and those that might be brought to bear, followed the American
lead.
Speculation about Japanese decision making in the winter 1950-51 is un-
necessary, given the ease with which we can study the evolution of China as
an issue in the course of 1951. Center stage was occupied by John Foster
Dulles, special advisor to the secretary of state, and Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru. Dulles, Republican party spokesman on foreign policy, had been
brought into the department in hope of containing Republican harassment of
the administration. As his specific assignment, he undertook the drafting and
negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty.
The principal issue confronting Dulles and Yoshida was that of future
arrangements for Japanese security. Questions about China intruded in the
process of developing a peace treaty largely because of differences between
the United States and Great Britain. The United States and five other members
of the Far Eastern Commision (FEC), nominal overseers of occupied Japan,
continued to recognize the Guomindong regime on Taiwan as the government
of all of China. Great Britain and five other members of the commission had
chosen to recognize the Communist regime on the mainland. The American
government chose to bypass the FEC, draft a treaty acceptable in Washington
and Japan, and negotiate bilaterally with the nations represented on the com-
mission. At least in the drafting of the treaty, the United States intended to
circumvent the question of choosing between the two Chinas. The British
government, however, persisted in forcing the issue.
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The focal point of the Anglo-American dispute in the early months of 1951
was the British demand that the People's Republic of China be invited to the
peace conference. A related issue was the matter of Japanese trade with China.
Sir Oliver Franks, British ambassador to the United States, argued that, for
Japan to function on a self-sustaining basis, it would have to have good
relations with Beijing. He insisted its trade with China was most important.3
Dulles, however, was looking for alternative markets and sources of raw
materials for Japan, apparently thinking about Southeast Asia. The British
government, however, indicated its unwillingness to see Japan move in any
direction but toward China.4 The British government refused to commit itself
to granting most-favored-nation treatment to Japan and opposed Japanese
participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), even
as a nonvoting observer. Fearing Japanese competition in traditional British
markets and unwilling to open its home markets to Japan, London candidly
sought to channel Japanese trade toward China. Japanese recognition of Mao's
regime would facilitate that trade as well as provide endorsement of the earlier
British decision to break ranks with the United States and abandon Guom-
indong China.
Yoshida raised the issue in January 1951.5 He spoke of the long-term
necessity for Japan to trade with China and his belief that before long the
Communist government would minimize political obstacles to trade. He also
advanced an idea with which many Japanese remained enamored throughout
the 1950s and 1960s: that Japanese, because of their long experience with
China, were best suited to spread democracy there. The views Yoshida ex-
pressed in January 1951 never changed and reflected the view that prevailed
among Japanese leaders for the next two decades. Japan was willing to come
to terms with the rump regime of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)—most Japa-
nese leaders were intensely anticommunist. The fact that the United States,
the nation upon which Japan would be dependent for some time after the
occupation, wanted Japan to recognize the Republic of China made that de-
cision relatively easy. But neither Yoshida nor many of his colleagues were
willing to abandon the right to trade with the People's Republic. Few Japanese
feared that contact with the Chinese Communists would subvert Japan; on
the contrary they were confident, as Yoshida indicated, that the contact would
change China. Pushed in different directions by the United States and Great
Britain, Japan sought to antagonize neither, while exploiting Anglo-American
differences to maximize Japan's freedom to pursue a two-Chinas policy. It
was not an easy task, but Yoshida and his successors managed well.
For Dulles the task was complicated by a domestic political context bor-
dering on national hysteria after the recall of General Douglas MacArthur and
by his own mistrust of Acheson's steadfastness on the China issue. Dulles
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had to draft a treaty, satisfactory to the Japanese and the British, which would
also be acceptable to a U.S. Senate ridden with hostility to the administration
and a people intensely hostile to a Communist China that was killing Ameri-
cans in Korea.
To keep British support, the Americans were forced to devise a compromise
by means of which neither claimant to legitimacy in China would participate
in the peace conference or sign the treaty. Instead provision was made for
Japan to negotiate a bilateral peace treaty along the lines of the original treaty
with the China of its choice. The British were not happy with the compromise.
Jiang was outraged, but Dulles succeeded in pacifying Jiang's friends in
Washington—demonstrating the wisdom of the decision to bring him into the
government.
Before working out the agreement with British Foreign Secretary Herbert
Morrison, Dulles was determined to learn where Yoshida stood. He asked
Ambassador William J. Sebald to confront Yoshida with various alternative
means of arranging a peace settlement with China, including the possibility
that Japan might sign a treaty with the People's Republic. What were Japan's
preferences?7
Yoshida's reply, presented by Vice Foreign Minister Iguchi Sadao, was
everything for which Dulles might have hoped. Iguchi stated categorically
that Japan intended to seek peace with the Republic of China (ROC) and did
not desire the signature of the People's Republic (PRC). Japan preferred to
have the ROC sign at the ceremony during which the multilateral treaty would
be signed but was agreeable to a separate concurrent ceremony or, if that
proved impractical, to a later ceremony. Iguchi also indicated his awareness
that postponement of a treaty with the ROC "might unduly delay ratification
[by the] US Senate."8
Armed with this assurance, which he did not share with his British col-
league, Dulles offered and Morrison accepted a proposal that no Chinese
government would sign the multilateral treaty but that Japan would be free
afterward to do business with the China of its choice. The British cabinet,
wanting assurance that the Japanese would never sign with the ROC, balked
briefly. Dulles informed Acheson that Clement Attlee opposed giving Japan
the right to conduct its foreign relations with China and wished to reserve
that power for the FEC. The British position was untenable, and they quickly
yielded the point in return for minor concessions on other points in the draft
treaty. The Japanese would be free, after the treaty was signed, to sign a
bilateral treaty with either Chinese regime. In the months that followed, Dulles
struggled to hold Yoshida in line while the British worked frenetically to steer
Japan toward the PRC.9
For Yoshida, the ideal situation would have been one in which the Ameri-
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cans and British, agreeing on a two-Chinas policy, would urge him to trade
with both. Then he could have done as he pleased and disarmed his critics
among ROC or PRC enthusiasts in Japan by alleging that he had yielded to
force majeure. Instead he had a delicate situation in which a misstep might
jeopardize the peace treaty—or at minimum, its ratification by one or more
important powers.
Acheson and Yoshida met shortly after Yoshida landed in San Francisco
to attend the peace conference. Yoshida asked how he might respond best to
questions about China, and Acheson suggested that he reply that the matter
was being studied—that no decision had been reached. Dulles, eager to assure
the ROC and its friends in the Senate, pressed for Japanese establishment of
an overseas agency in Taibei as soon as possible. Acheson seemed less con-
cerned.14
Dulles was not happy with Acheson's handling of the China question in
the meeting with Yoshida and quickly reported the tone to Senator H. Alex-
ander Smith (R-NJ), one of the more respected friends of the ROC. Dulles
led Smith to believe that "Acheson left the door open for Japs to recognize
and make a treaty with Communist China and not Nationalists."11 Dulles was
so disturbed that a meeting was arranged between Smith and Yoshida at which
the Japanese prime minister assured Smith he had no intention of signing a
treaty with the PRC. He might postpone signing with either the ROC or the
PRC, but he implied his intent to sign with Jiang's government.12
British efforts failed to persuade Dulles of the undesirability of a Japanese
treaty with the ROC. Morrison spoke of problems he would face in Parliament
if Japan recognized the ROC. His successor, Anthony Eden, reiterated British
opposition to Japanese recognition of Jiang's regime—especially before the
multilateral treaty came into force.13 From Dean Rusk, in Tokyo, Dulles
received indications that the British were urging Yoshida to reassess his policy
toward China. Ambassador Sebald believed British efforts were bearing fruit,
that Yoshida was reluctant to offend either power before Japan regained its
sovereignty, and that he was unwilling in any event to accept an agreement
with the ROC that would jeopardize trade possibilities with the mainland.14
Churchill and Eden were coming to Washington after Christmas, and Dulles
was not confident of Acheson's steadfastness on the issue. Having spent over
a year manipulating Acheson, the British, the ROC, the Japanese, and the
U.S. Senate, Dulles was not going to lose the game at this juncture. He flew
to Tokyo to force a commitment from Yoshida.
Yoshida and Dulles met on December 13, and a record of that meeting
alleges that, before Dulles addressed the issue, Yoshida handed him a draft
of an agreement to establish relations with the ROC.15 Then Dulles read him
a memorandum stating that the American people would want to know prior
to ratification if Japanese foreign policy would be compatible with American
China in Japanese-American Relations 41
foreign policy, especially toward China. He suggested that Japenese interests
would be served best by negotiating a treaty with the ROC that would come
into force after the multilateral treaty. The treaty with the ROC would be
applicable only to territory under actual control, leaving Japan free to do as
it pleased later about the rest of China.
Yoshida replied on the following day. He had no objection in principle
but was reluctant to act as Dulles wished if the British were strongly opposed.
Dulles suspected Yoshida was fearful that British dissatisfaction would result
in obstacles to Japanese trade in sterling bloc areas of Southeast Asia and
Africa. Yoshida also resumed his theme on the role Japan might play in
weaning China away from the Soviet Union.
Dulles decided to force the issue. The Senate, a majority of whose members
were on record as disapproving ties between Japan and the PRC, was his
principal instrument, including Senator Smith and Senator John Sparkman
(D-Alabama), who were in Tokyo to assist in his efforts. On December 18,
he presented Yoshida with a draft of a letter, "essentially embodying the
present Japanese position," which Dulles wanted Yoshida to send to him.17
He told Yoshida that Smith and Sparkman "felt that such a letter from Mr.
Yoshida would be the minimum without which it would probably be impos-
sible to obtain ratification of the treaty." Forced to yield, Yoshida tried to
gain something in exchange, stressing the importance of a loan to Japan from
the American government, a matter to which he returned several days later.
Also on December 18, Acheson met with Franks who expressed British
objections to Dulles's memo to Yoshida. Cabling Dulles, Acheson professed
to having argued the American case but stressed the desirability of maintaining
agreement with the British. Clearly, Anglo-American amity had a higher
priority on Acheson's agenda than it did on Dulles's. Dulles professed that
his draft letter for Yoshida, now known as "the Christmas present," was
consistent with Acheson's desires and asked Sebald to let Yoshida know he
wanted it on December 23 and would then hold it "subject to future deter-
mination."18
Fending off ROC demands for a bilateral treaty prior to Senate ratification,
Dulles then cornered Acheson. Advising the secretary of state that he had
learned on 26 December that Yoshida was sending him a letter, the text of
which he had not yet seen, he reported that Senators Smith and Sparkman
knew of Yoshida's position. In a scarcely veiled threat, Dulles wrote: "It
would therefore be extremely awkward, from the standpoint of Senate rati-
fication, if the Executive as a result of the Churchill talks, were to agree to
seek to get Yoshida to retreat from the position toward China which he ex-
pressed to the two Senators and which no doubt they will report to their
colleagues."19
Whether his letter to Dulles expressed views that Yoshida held freely can
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never be determined absolutely. What is clear, without a shadow of a doubt,
is that the letter was drafted by Dulles and that Yoshida was forced to send
it, under threat that the U.S. Senate could withhold ratification of the peace
treaty. Yoshida might have called Dulles's bluff but chose instead to request
a loan as a quid pro quo.
It will be no surprise to the student of American-East Asian relation that
in 1951 Japan defined its policy toward China under pressure from the United
States. What is most interesting is that the Yoshida letter was designed pri-
marily to box in Acheson and Truman so that they would not be tempted to
yield to Churchill and Eden. Dulles accepted Iguchi's and Yoshida's assur-
ances of their intentions to recognize the ROC and saw British pressures to
the contrary as the only obstacle to that outcome. He was prepared to use the
power and influence of the United States to insist on the outcome he wanted,
to ride roughshod over the sensibilities of a British government he did not
trust and whose interests in East Asia he did not see as congruent with those
of the United States.
From the perspective of Dulles and many of his Republican colleagues,
the weakness in the American posture was Acheson, a man known to be
intensely hostile to Jiang and the ROC, a man who certainly was more in-
terested in propitiating the British than in appeasing the Nationalist Chinese.
The specific purpose of the Yoshida letter was to commit the Japanese to a
treaty with the ROC before Acheson could compromise with the British. The
threat of the Senate withholding ratification, or at the very least of another
ugly fight between Senate and Executive, closed the circle on the Truman
administration.
In 1951, the Japanese government yielded to American pressures and com-
mitted itself to a bilateral treaty with the Republic of China. In so doing, it
retained American goodwill at minimal cost, given all indications that Yoshida
had intended to do so of his own free will. At the same time, Japan retained
the freedom it desired to work out its economic relations with China, especially
those territories not under ROC control subject of course to the overwhelming
exception of the price it might have to pay in its relations with the United
States and other friends hostile to the PRC. Moreover, by playing the British
against the Americans and stressing his own domestic political problems,
Yoshida could suggest, as he did, that the Americans owed him something.
Even the British won a little, thanks to Acheson and Yoshida, including delays
in the signing of the bilateral treaty and limitations on its scope. If it had not
been for Dulles's efforts, they might have accomplished much more. Although
Jiang clearly thought otherwise, the ROC also fared reasonably well. In short,
the diplomacy of 1951 demonstrates how nations sharing similar fundamental
security interests can work out a reasonable compromise on discordant issues,
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despite extreme disparities in power. Both Dulles and Yoshida had reason to
be proud of their efforts.
After the peace treaty was ratified and the Japanese had signed a bilateral
treaty with the ROC, trade with the PRC became the issue. For those American
allies and friends who had not recognized the PRC before the Korean War,
recognition was inconceivable in the 1950s: the political climate in the United
States was too explosive, especially during the frenzied days when Senator
Joseph McCarthy held sway.
The United States maintained a total embargo on trade with the People's
Republic. The Truman administration had begun economic pressure as a way
of calling Beijing's attention to the importance of trade with the West—part
of Acheson's effort to prevent the Chinese Communists from allying with the
Soviet Union. During the Korean War, that pressure was intensified, and then
all trade halted as punishment for Chinese intervention. The embargo was
maintained by the Eisenhower administration initially as a bargaining chip
during negotiations for a settlement in Korea. After the war, the administration
continued the embargo as a means of delaying the modernization of the PRC
and of increasing the burden on the Soviet Union. It was continued long after
evidence indicated its ineffectiveness and after impressive arguments that the
policy was counterproductive, forcing greater PRC dependence on Moscow.
Despite a growing demand from American businessmen and changing public
attitudes toward the PRC in the mid-1950s, the Eisenhower administration
held fast because of military insistence, pressures from Assistant Secretary
of State Walter S. Robertson and the Republican right, and the low priority
the issue had for the president.
At no time was Washington able to get its major allies to agree to a complete
embargo. American diplomats wheedled and cajoled, but neither the Truman
nor the Eisenhower administration was willing to exert the pressure necessary
for compliance. Despite military demands for maximum pressure, Truman
and Acheson and Eisenhower and Dulles placed a higher premium on good
relations with their allies than on compliance.
The impossibility of a complete embargo even by NATO countries meant
the next step was to work out lists of strategic items that would be denied to
the Soviet bloc. Ultimately two lists emerged, one directed at the Soviet Union
and its East European satellites and a second, markedly more restrictive list,
aimed at the PRC. The difference between the two was known as the China
differential. In the years that followed initial agreement on the two lists, there
was constant tension between the United States and its allies, with the latter
arguing for a less restrictive list of items to be sold to the Soviet Union and
for elimination of the China differential. In 1951, Congress passed the Mutual
Defense Assistance Control Act—or the Battle Act—which, in effect, denied
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American aid to any nation trading in strategic materials with the Soviet bloc.
For those dependent on American largesse, the message was clear.
The Japanese government, under Yoshida and his successors, persisted in
the desire for a two-Chinas policy. Japan was eager for more trade oppor-
tunities with the PRC. Some businessmen with ties to the ruling party pressed
within its councils for trade expansion, and the Japanese Socialist party used
the government's reluctance to offend the United States as an issue with which
to embarrass it. Within the bureaucracy, especially within the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), there was a demand for more trade
to bolster a very frail economy. For some Japanese, policy toward China
became a nationalist issue, a way of asserting independence from the United
States.
One striking feature of the debate within the American government was
President Eisenhower's persistent and open expression of sympathy for Ja-
pan's position and his disdain for both the China differential imposed on allied
exports and the United States total embargo against China. In private inter-
views, cabinet meetings, and press conferences, the president expressed con-
cern for the Japanese economy and the thought that trade with China might
be more helpful than not. In the critical period of 1956-57, the president
deliberately undermined efforts to force the allies into line on the China
differential but acquiesced in the continuation of the American trade embargo.
Once again, as the issue of policy toward China reemerged between the
United States and its allies, it was Great Britain and not Japan that took the
lead. Japanese leaders were content to sail in Britain's wake. Like Eisenhower,
they were probably confident that, when trade restrictions were eased, Japan
rather than Great Britain would be the primary beneficiary.
In December 1955, however, the British warned that if the China differ-
ential was not eliminated by agreement, they would remove it unilaterally.
Admiral Edwin T. Lay ton, deputy director for intelligence of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) reacted strongly in a memorandum for Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, chairman of the JCS. Layton warned that the proposed British action
was the "equivalent of directly supporting an expansion of Communist China's
military forces." It would lead to economic and then political recognition and
elimination of the differential by nearly all the other countries involved, and
then the British would seek to emasculate COCOM controls, allowing un-
restricted trade with all communist countries. For Japan in particular, Layton
prophesied doom. Noting rising trade between China and Japan, he feared it
was "problematical if the two mutually compatible economies can be kept
separate in absence of restrictions. Once joined, the Japanese economy would
become dependent upon Chinese supplies, vulnerable to Communist with-
holding of raw materials, and thereby susceptible to induced industrial and
labor unrest."20
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Trade controls were discussed at a National Security Council meeting two
weeks later. Dulles reported that he had asked the British to postpone unilateral
action until after the pending visit to Washington by the prime minister.
Eisenhower reminded the others of an earlier agreement that it was not sensible
to hold to "our prior rigid position" in view of the ability of the Soviet Union
to supply the PRC with items on the differential list. Secretary of Commerce
Sinclair Weeks and Dulles both spoke in terms of looking at the problem in
relation to Japan rather than Great Britain. Weeks saw that easing restrictions
on trade between Japan and the PRC might ease Japan's export problems
without rousing protectionist demands in the United States. Eisenhower re-
marked that, if the United States continued its embargo, "the Japanese could
be expected to drive the British out of all competition for trade with Communist
China." Brushing aside objections from Robertson and the Pentagon, the
president lectured the NSC on the history of international trade. He insisted
that efforts to dam trade always failed, to the detriment of those who tried.
"Our trouble," he persisted, "was that our domestic political situation com-
pelled us to adopt an absolutely rigid policy respecting trade with Communist
China and the Soviet Union." Disparaging existing policy, the president in-
sisted he was not afraid of the PRC—certainly "not in this decade."21
The British agreed to the delay requested, and the NSC agreed that the
United States should be prepared to acquiesce in the "absolute minimum"
liberalization of the China differential necessary to retain mutual agreement.
Eisenhower was not satisfied. For the next year and a half he worked spo-
radically for more radical change in American policy. Most of his thinking
on the subject was spelled out in an interview he gave to journalist Robert J.
Donovan. The president thought that the idea that a trade embargo would
"defeat" China was naive. Instead, "to the detriment of the free world," the
trade embargo would force China to rely more on the Soviet Union. It would
also weaken the economies of nations which customarily traded with China.
He argued that trade with the Communists would be of mutual benefit. Elabo-
rating, he decried the political climate in the United States that hampered
efforts to draw the Chinese away from the Soviet Union, and he spelled out
his concern for Japan. He insisted that at least part of the solution to the
problems faced by the Japanese economy "must lie ultimately between Japan
and China." The alternative, he warned, would be "endless subsidization of
the Japanese economy by the American taxpayer."22
Before Eisenhower discussed the trade issue with Eden, the president
pushed hard against a reluctant Dulles. Once again he insisted that the United
States would be in for serious trouble if it did not let Japan trade with China.
He demanded information regarding the items that might be decontrolled to
the benefit of Japan. He left no doubt of his desire to have the Japanese
represented in the development of a formula for easing restrictions. As Dulles
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fretted, the president turned to him and said "get in everyone, get in the
Defense people and the others, and see what we can do to back away from
this thing."13
Eden arrived in Washington in January 1956, and the president encouraged
him to believe that relaxation of restrictions on trade with China was likely.
Eden added an arrow to Eisenhower's quiver with the argument that freedom
to trade with the Chinese was important to countries like Ceylon, Maylasia,
and Indonesia—who might otherwise be forced to turn to the Soviet Union
for aid. The British, faced with domestic demands for more trade, reported
that the Americans had begun a step-by-step easing of restrictions. The Ei-
senhower administration, faced by opposition in the Senate, insisted that it
had offered only minor concessions.
For he next several months the review demanded by the president pro-
ceeded. Bureaucratic opponents of Eisenhower's desire to ease trade restraints,
at least between other free world countries and China, stalled and leaked
information to their allies in the Senate. Senators John McClellan (D-Arkan-
sas) and Joe McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) led the attack. Within the Council on
Foreign Economic Policy, agreement could not be reached on a recommen-
dation to the president. All participants were willing to make minor conces-
sions, especially to the advantage of Japan rather than of Great Britain, but
they could not agree on the extent of the concessions. As before, the Defense
Department was least willing to ease economic pressures—and in this instance
received support from Treasury. An Office of Naval Intelligence summary of
the "US Position on China Trade Controls," prepared early in April 1956,
noted Navy preference for the minority Defense-Treasury position—but
warned that even the majority position was "known to fall far short of UK
and Japanese desires."25
Confronted by "a hostile, even rebellious Congress and a divided admini-
stration," the president's thoughts turned elsewhere. British impatience grew,
however, and in May Great Britain announced that it would act unilaterally
to increase trade with the PRC. Publicly, Dulles declared that British actions
were not significant, that strategic items were not included, but that the United
States could not approve because it was "morally" wrong. In the New York
Times, Arthur O. Sulzberger suggested that the administration, preparing for
the November election, was fearful of appearing soft on Chinese communism.
A more important observation was that countries like Great Britain and Japan
were caught in the American political process. When Eisenhower and Dulles
were unwilling to pay the political price for easing relations with China, the
British and the Japanese were caught out front and became the objects of
congressional wrath.26
The British announcement—and awareness that Belgium, France, and Ja-
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pan were not far behind—induced the Eisenhower administration to agree to
negotiations. Defense intelligence denounced the British as the most persistent
and unreasonable of those countries generating pressure but noted that even
strong supporters of the American position such as Italy and Turkey were
having trouble with their business communities. The Joint Chiefs were given
little reason to hope for a successful outcome, but with the Suez crisis inter-
vening, the United States induced the British to wait a year, until May 1957,
before all the concerned parties met to discuss the reduction or elimination
of the China differential.
In the interim, the American government carried out a careful assessment
of its relations with Japan, "The Present and Projected Foreign Relations of
Japan (1956-1961)." Japan was expected to become increasingly nationalistic
and assertive. The Department of State Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)
contribution to the assessment warned that Japan's association with the West
would become peripheral unless changes toward greater equality in the re-
lationship were accepted by the United States. Reference was made to the
Ryukyus and Bonins, the security treaty, and trade restrictions as areas in
which the United States would have to make concessions. In addition, OIR
noted that "the one major area in which U.S. policy is firmly opposed by
virtually all segments of Japanese opinion . . . is in Japan's desire for closer
trade and eventual diplomatic relations with Communist China." OIR reported
that "Prime Minister Hatoyama was testing the limits of American patience
on the trade issue" and warned that the issue of policy toward China threatened
to become "a serious irritant" in Japanese-American affairs.28
From Tokyo, Allison, now ambassador, sent a report similar to the OIR
paper, stressing the need for more consultation with Japan. Although trade
and general relations with the PRC were not the most important issues in the
eyes of the embassy staff, Japanese resentment was detailed. It was clear that
Allison and his staff viewed Washington's behavior on the China differential
issue as damaging. They urged their government not to ask more of Japan
than other countries were willing to do, not to allow other countries to seize
trade opportunities the Japanese needed and saw as their own. The Japanese
were reported to be upset by the failure of the United States to respond to an
urgent Japanese request to sell certain items to the PRC under the exceptions
procedure, despite the knowledge that several European nations were using
the exceptions procedure without prior notification.
To the limits of its power, the Department of State did respond to Japanese
pressures. Defense intelligence sources informed Admiral Radford that State
had already taken an interim policy and informed the Department of Defense
and the NSC "post facto." The State Department had offered to agree to
specific items the Japanese had listed in return for Japanese support in holding
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the line on other items. Japan did not agree, and the American negotiators
settled for a promise of more discriminating use of the exceptions procedure.
Radford was warned of a strong element within State eager to abolish the
China differential. But Secretary Dulles was not interested in doing anything
to strengthen Hatoyama ("We don't think much of him."), and Japanese
concerns about trade imbalance with the PRC did not move him.30
In December 1956, the American government's hopes for a Japanese pre-
mier more sympathetic to American policy toward the PRC were dashed when
the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) selected Ishibashi Tanzan—the candidate
least favored in Washington. Ishibashi, former MITI minister, had been an
outspoken proponent of increased trade with the PRC. Robertson met with
Ishibashi to remind him of American policy and to ask for his cooperation.
Ishibashi said all the right things, promising to abide by Japan's international
agreements, but there was every reason to assume that his government would
attempt to modify those agreements to eliminate the China differential.31
Simultaneously, the American government worked to defend Japan's share
of the American textile market. At a cabinet meeting in January, Secretary
of Commerce Sinclair Weeks reported on his successful efforts and his warn-
ings to the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute.32 The president indicated
his pleasure, and Dulles remarked that, if negotiations had broken down, "the
Japanese would almost assuredly have begun to develop closer relations with
Communist China." As a weapon against American protectionists, Japan's
desire for trade with the PRC proved most effective.
A few days later, at another cabinet meeting, Eisenhower asked again for
a study and review of policy on control of exports to communist countries.
He was reminded that such a study was under way. Still the bureaucracy
stalled. In March, Japan's new prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke, preferred by
the American government to his two predecessors, pushed. He publicly an-
nounced his desire to go to Washington to discuss his "long cherished idea"
of expanding trade with the PRC. Before the month was over, Eisenhower
was in London, where talks with British leaders reinforced his determination
to get action on the issue. Leading American businessmen, such as Henry
Ford II, indicated an interest in trade with the PRC. At a news conference
on April 10, Eisenhower "presented a strong argument for increased trade
with Communist China by friendly nations, particularly the economically hard
pressed Japanese and the British." He delivered a lecture on Japan's economic
dilemma and offered one of his favorite arguments, that a nation's economic
well-being is as important to its security as is its military power.33
British and Japanese pressure on the United States mounted and the ad-
ministration defended itself against sniping from within by indicating that it
was yielding reluctantly under pressure. America's embargo against trade with
the PRC would not be compromised. The New York Times offered editorial
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support, favoring relaxation of the American position on allied trade to avoid
forcing the British to act unilaterally and to set a favorable tone for Eisen-
hower's first meeting with Kishi.34
The allied control committee met in Paris in May, and quickly "the British
and several other allies were reliably reported to be extremely unhappy with
the United States proposals." The United States was prepared to relax controls
but fought to retain a significant China differential. The British, French,
Japanese, and Belgians were reported to be pushing hard. On May 23, a
deadlock was announced, and a week later the British acted unilaterally to
eliminate the differential. The majority of America's allies, including Italy,
Norway, and West Germany, soon followed suit, but not Japan. The Japanese
chose to wait at least until Kishi travelled to Washington to take Eisenhower's
measure.35
In the United States, the response to British action was fascinating. Senator
Lyndon Johnson (D-Texas), majority leader, called for a new look at American
policy toward China. There were reports of various moves in the Senate to
neutralize Senator William Knowland and other friends of Jiang and the ROC.
Powerful southerners voiced the view that it would be useful to redirect Japan's
textile exports toward China. Others spoke of the value of Japanese trade with
China in terms of relieving the United States of the burden of sustaining the
Japanese economy. Finally, the president spoke in support of Britain's de-
cision to act unilaterally and stepped up his efforts within the government to
ease pressures on Japan. James Reston of the New York Times criticized
Eisenhower for allowing his administration to perpetuate policies rejected by
the allies and in which he did not himself believe.
Dulles called Eisenhower and referred to talk that the secretary and the
president had split on the question of trade with China.37 He received no
comfort, Eisenhower reiterated his arguments against antagonizing allies and
attempting to obstruct trade. Dulles noted that the president was unaware that
it was an executive order, not a legislative act, that prohibited American trade
with the PRC. Reston's point was underscored: the president's views were clear,
publicly and privately stated, but he was unwilling to use any more of his
political capital to force a policy change on the rest of his administration.
Kishi moved well in this context. Dulles had provided Eisenhower with a
favorable assessment of the new Japanese premier, indicating that trade with
China was one of seven items he wished to discuss. Curiously, Dulles's memo
ignored the trade question, although arguing in unyielding terms on most of
the other points. Publicly, Kishi promised to abide by the American-dictated
controls on trade with China, asking that the controls be reasonable. At the
same time he asked for fair access to American markets and for a long-term
low interest loan. He would not go home empty-handed.
Dulles, with Assistant Secretary Robertson pushing hard behind him, tried
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to indicate that the administration was holding the line. In San Francisco he
discussed the type of communism practiced in China, calling it a "passing
phase" in Chinese history—an obvious attempt to put aside the argument that
the regime had established itself beyond doubt and that the logic of the situation
required accommodation with it. In hearings generated by Senate interest in
a more flexible American policy toward the PRC, Secretary Weeks argued
against the relaxation of the trade embargo. If Eisenhower had intended to
shift policy, it seemed that his cabinet was neither ready nor willing. On the
other hand, it is likely that Dulles and Weeks were covering the president's
right flank as the administration prepared to acquiesce, despite strong Pentagon
opposition, in the total elimination of the China differential by its allies.
In July 1957, allied negotiations on trade controls resumed. A report from
Tokyo indicated that the Japanese negotiator hoped to win agreement on
relaxation and that Japan hoped to "win a fair share of mainland market."
However, the Japanese did not want to alienate Americans by acting unilat-
erally, as the British had done. A subsequent article on the effects of inflation
on Japanese exports also indicated that MITI would propose to the cabinet a
solution in the form of elimination of the China differential—a posture ap-
proximating that of Great Britain. Again, MITI officials declared that Japan
would not act unilaterally. Two days later came the announcement that "the
Japanese Government today lifted certain restrictions on trade with Communist
China." Japan was now "in line with Britain and other European countries
already trading with the Peiping Government." The cabinet had approved a
list identical to that of the British. A probably inspired story declared that
Kishi had planned to move slowly, in deference to the United States but that
the pressure had become too great as Japan's trade imbalance grew. Two
weeks later a report from Paris revealed that the fifteen nations negotiating
on trade controls had reached almost complete agreement. Finally on August
6, word came that the United States had yielded to pressure from its allies to
ease still further controls on trade with the PRC. The American delegates in
Paris had surrendered "under instruction from Washington. " ^
As Knowland, Robertson, and others of their ilk had feared, eliminating
the China differential was only the beginning. A few months later, the Gai-
musho informed the Department of State that the Japanese government had
agreed to the exchange of trade offices or missions between private Japanese
trade organizations and the official trading corporation of the PRC. The Gai-
musho assured the United States that Japan's action was not a step toward
recognition. The State Department warned that the Chinese would exploit the
opportunity for political purposes, but the United States was unwilling to exert
serious pressure. A National Intelligence Estimate in December 1957 indicated
American uneasiness over Japanese links with the PRC but concluded that,
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despite the attractions of China, "the Japanese generally recognize the primary
importance of their defense and economic ties with the United States and the
West; fears that these ties may be jeopardized inhibits them from seeking too
close a relationship with the Chinese Communist regime.41
In sum, American pressure on its allies, including Japan, to restrict trade
with the PRC significantly more than trade with the Soviet Union, failed in
1957. Subjected to countervailing pressures by the British, with whom the
Japanese were in discreet collusion, the Eisenhower administration yielded.
Keeping friends happy was more important than maintaining a policy that
was only marginally effective. Moreover, in 1957 the president, having been
reelected, was willing to take the political risks necessary to end efforts to
isolate the PRC-—efforts he deemed unrealistic and unwise. He surrendered
to internal opposition on the more emotion-laden issue of American contacts
with the PRC, despite indications of support in the Senate and the American
business community. The Japanese played the game with considerable skill,
allowing the British to bear the brunt of American irritation, basing their own
case on the desperate conditions of their economy. Although Eisenhower
demonstrated his sympathy for the Japanese position throughout the mid-
1950s, it was clearly easier for the Americans to yield to the trusted Kishi in
1957 than earlier to Hatoyama or Ishibashi.
From 1957 to 1971, China declined in importance as an issue in Japanese-
American relations. There is no doubt that there were differences, deceptions,
and misunderstandings in these years, but they were never very serious, nor
was great pressure brought to bear by either side upon the other. The Japanese
aggressively pursued a two-Chinas policy and commercial opportunities on
the mainland. Some Japanese actions displeased some American officials, but
American leaders outside the Pentagon were moving toward what was later
called a policy of "containment without isolation" toward the PRC. President
Kennedy's obessions about China, fear of domestic repercussions, fear of
sending the wrong message to China, distractions with other issues, and the
war in Vietnam all delayed changes in American policy, but Washington
generally found it easier to acquiesce in allied contacts with the PRC.
The subsiding of American pressures, however, was only part of the story
for Japan. Neither ROC nor PRC leaders were pleased with Japan's blatant
two-Chinas policy, and they used every means available to them to force the
Japanese to choose. Within Japan, businessmen, politicians, and diplomats
lined up in support of the demands of one or the other Chinese claimant. In
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States found itself in the curious
role of putting pressure on the ROC to accept Japan's growing ties with the
PRC.
Jiang and his aides in Taibei were shaken in the mid-1950s by Japan's
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unofficial agreements with the PRC on trade, fisheries, cultural exchanges,
and the repatriation by China of Japanese war criminals held by the Beijing
regime. Tensions rose after the Kishi government renounced the China dif-
ferential. A visit to Taibei by Kishi soothed Jiang a little, but in March 1958
Japan signed its fourth unofficial trade agreement with the PRC. After long
and difficult negotiations, each side agreed to allow the other to fly its national
flag over its trade mission office. Jiang was outraged by the symbolism of
the PRC flag flying in Tokyo and threatened the total cessation of ROC trade
with Japan. Although American analysts thought such a step would have
disastrous results for Taiwan, they also knew that the issue was one on which
he might not yield.42 For the Japanese, trade with Taiwan exceeded their
immediate hopes for trade with the PRC. American good offices were used
to devise a face-saving arrangement. The Japanese government declared that
the flags had no legal significance. Neither trade mission had diplomatic or
official status. The American government persuaded Jiang to settle for this
gesture. In fact the trade missions contained government officials on both
sides, with Gaimusho and MITI personnel serving in Beijing, as their coun-
terparts did in Tokyo.
In March 1959, an American assessment of relations with Japan found
them "relatively close." Major problem areas listed were the need for revision
of the security treaty, settlement of the Ryukyus issue, bilateral trade relations
(especially "adequate and expanding export opportunities" for Japan in the
United States), Japan's defense effort, and Korean-Japanese relations. Even
among the lesser problems mentioned, relations with China were not included.
A few days later, the NSC was offered an operations plan for Japan which,
while stressing other issues, did mention the Japanese expectation of American
acceptance of a PRC-Japan modus vivendi short of political recognition. The
American government was advised to continue to use its good offices to hold
the ROC and Japan together and to "foster a Japanese awareness" of the
dangers of expanding trade with the PRC.4
By 1960, Beijing was showing considerable flexibility. The growing rift
with the Soviet Union required the PRC to find alternative sources of needed
technology and alternative markets for its goods. Although political goals
were never far from the surface in Maoist China, economic needs for trade
with Japan were more pressing than they had been in the 1950s. At the same
time, Japan's spectacular economic recovery was becoming apparent to the
world. In May 1960, NSC papers on Japan shifted from fretting about the
frailties of the Japanese economy to expressions of wonder at its rate of
growth.44 PRC efforts to block the renewal of the Japanese-American security
treaty and support of opposition parties in the Japanese elections heightened
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tensions briefly. After the fall of Kishi, however, overtures by Zhou Enlai
(Chou En-lai) to sympathetic LDP faction leaders brought results.
In 1962, Matsumura Kenzo, an LDP leader, and Zhou negotiated an agree-
ment to facilitate long-term trade arrangements. Out of this agreement came
the establishment of liaison offices in Tokyo and Beijing. Trade between the
countries began to grow again, surpassing the previous high in 1958. Japan's
two-Chinas policy seemed to be paying off. However displeased, the Ameri-
cans went along. Jiang, on the other hand, was intensely unhappy. A series
of incidents in late 1963 led to a new crisis in Japanese-ROC relations and
American good offices were again necessary.
In August 1963, the Ikeda government approved Export-Import Bank fund-
ing, a five-year deferred payment plan, to allow the Kurashiki Rayon Company
to sell a $22 million vinylon plant to the PRC—the kind of project Dean
Rusk decried as "aid not trade." Vigorous protests from the ROC were re-
jected. In the months that followed, tension was raised by reports that Prime
Minister Ikeda Hayato had declared that the ROC could never recover the
mainland and by Jiang's public denunciation of Japan, blaming Japanese
aggression for the loss of the mainland—his first such attack since the end
of the war. The crisis was precipitated by Japan's handling of a PRC defector.
Jiang's government chose to focus on the defector issue—the one over
which the Japanese government probably had least control. Japan could hardly
force the man to go to Taibei if he wanted to go elsewhere. But in Taibei the
Japanese ambassador was subjected to intense harassment, including the ston-
ing of his residence. Recalled to Tokyo in November, he warned Ikeda that
the ROC would not hesitate to break relations if the defector was allowed to
return to the PRC. Admiral Jerauld Wright, American ambassador to the ROC,
urged Chen Cheng, Jiang's vice president, not to take strong action against
Japan.45 Chen replied with a litany of ROC grievances against Japan. At the
end of the year, the defector chose to go home and the Japanese allowed him
to return. Jiang immediately recalled his ambassador from Tokyo, suspended
all government procurement from Japan, and indicated his intention to break
relations.
The American government sprang into action on December 31, 1963. In
Washington, Roger Hilsman, assistant secretary of state, called in the Chinese
minister (the ambassador was ill) to express serious concern. He advised him
that Secretary Rusk wanted the ROC government informed that the action
already taken would affect the Japanese public adversely and make it more
difficult for Rusk to win Japanese support for the ROC, especially in the
United Nations. On the same day, Ambassador Wright met with Jiang to warn
that the United States would not like to see the ROC break relations with
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Japan and that such an action would have a "serious if not disastrous effect"
on the ROC's position among friendly nations and result in an increase of
PRC-Japanese ties. Jiang, as was his wont, blamed the United States for the
problem: the Americans coddled Japan, and the defector case was a direct
result.46
Jiang restrained himself, and the Japanese did what they could to smooth
things over. Yoshida flew to Taibei to discuss the issues with Jiang and his
aides. Upon his return, with authorization from Ikeda, Yoshida wrote a private
letter assuring Jiang that Export-Import Bank funds would not be used to
provide credits to finance exports to the PRC. A subsequent mission to Taibei
by the Japanese foreign minister helped, but probably not as much as the
angry reaction from Beijing. In November 1964, when the new Japanese
prime minister, Sato Eisaku, indicated that he would honor the assurances
offered by Yoshida, the PRC cancelled a series of contracts with Japanese
firms and withdrew from negotiations with others. Tokyo could not keep
everybody happy, and now it was Jiang's turn to smile, however briefly.
By the time Sato became prime minister, Japan's recovery was well under
way and a number of bilateral trade problems began to plague Japanese-
American relations. Japanese tolerance of remnants of the American occu-
pation, such as continued United States control of Okinawa, was ebbing. As
the Japanese recovered their self-confidence, pressure mounted on successive
Japanese governments to assert independence from the United States. Policy
toward China was a relatively minor issue among many.
Sato was no less interested than most other Japanese leaders in increasing
exports to the PRC. Trade was hardly an issue in Japan. The real question
was the extent to which various advocates were willing to offend the ROC
and the United States. Sato was more sympathetic to Jiang's regime than
Ikeda and others among his predecessors had been. His position reflected the
dominant position among LDP faction leaders and big business in Japan.
Moreover, Sato's agenda gave priority to items that required concessions from
the United States. As a result, he was quick to demonstrate his support for
the United States, even on issues that were highly unpopular in Japan, such
as policy toward Vietnam. His strategy was to have the American government
view him as a loyal friend and to grant concessions to Japan to keep his
government in power. For precisely these reasons, he was unpopular in Beij-
ing. The PRC would do nothing that might strengthen him, hoping that after
his fall, a leader more responsive to its interests would take power. Unhappily
for the PRC, Sato managed to retain power for a long time, and PRC needs
were too great in the absence of Soviet bloc support to refuse to trade with
Sato's Japan. Indeed, it was during Sato's premiership that Japan became the
principal trading partner of the PRC, with minimal carping from the United
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States. Perhaps the greatest injustice, however, was perpetrated by the United
States, when it betrayed Sato in 1971.
A CIA analysis of "The China Problem in Japanese Politics," prepared
while Ikeda was still premier, indicated American awareness that Japanese
moves were going beyond trade and pointed to the eventual establishment of
diplomatic relations.47 The only issues were "the manner and the timing" of
Japan's "inevitable approach to Peiping." Sato's victory over Ikeda probably
slowed the process and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution required
postponement.
One example of how Sato could exploit American hopes and fears was
indicated during negotiations over Japan Air Lines' landing rights in the United
States. In a memorandum prepared for President Lyndon Johnson, Assistant
Secretary of State Thomas Mann recommended American concessions to
break the deadlock.48 He informed the president that the issue had political
importance in Japan where Sato was under fire for being subservient to the
United States. Mann mentioned Sato's support on Vietnam, on relations with
the PRC, the Chinese representation issue at the U.N., and respect for the
ROC. Sato had put himself on the line for the United States. Here was
something the United States could do for him.
Ambassador Reischauer played on the image of Sato as a supporter of
American efforts toward China. In February 1966, he reported that Sato had
created new machinery for examining Japanese shipments to the PRC in an
effort to prevent materials of strategic value from slipping through.49 He
forwarded information indicating that Sato had denied the use of Export-
Import Bank funds to facilitate trade with PRC and had stepped up intelligence
collection as evidence of growing awareness of the PRC threat.
By 1966, however, American leaders had little time to think about Japan
and any of the issues that existed on a bilateral level. Increasingly, they were
consumed by the war in Vietnam. Within the United States, pressures mounted
for changes in American policy toward China. In March a meeting of Ameri-
can chiefs of mission throughout East Asia called upon their government to
"mitigate the impression of inflexibility and rigidity in our approach to
China." They called for lifting the embargo on nonstrategic trade and for
increased cultural contacts. A CIA report in June, "Economic Benefits to
Communist China of a Removal of U.S. Trade Controls," confirmed that
U.S. sales of machinery to the PRC would make little difference to the de-
velopment of the Chinese economy: "the Chinese can usually satisfy their
needs by buying in Western markets or Japan."50
In this. atmosphere of intense concern over Vietnam-related issues and
renewed consideration of American policy toward trade with China, Rusk
went to Japan in July 1966. Talking to American correspondents in Kyoto
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("a Deep Press Backgrounder—no attribution of American sources"), he
indicated that Vietnam issues had dominated his agenda. Asked about Japan
and the PRC, Rusk was characteristically vague on the U.N. question, but
he did indicate that, despite some unhappiness with easy credit terms Japan
was allowing the PRC, trade "wasn't a matter that was pressed very hard."
The American government still went through the motions of complaining about
allied trade with the PRC for fear that making it too easy would lead to
demands for even fewer restrictions.51
Probably the loudest warning on the seriousness of policy toward China
as an issue in Japanese-American relations was sounded by Reischauer in
August 1966.52 He argued that the danger areas in the relationship were not
bilateral problems but Japanese apprehensions about Chinese-American ten-
sions. The Japanese, he contended, believed that, as the stronger of the two
adversaries, the United States could take the steps necessary to ease tensions
with Beijing. The Sato government had given strong support to the United
States, but the Japanese people were decidedly unhappy and a large part of
the LDP was restive on the issue. The illogic of American insistence that
Taibei alone represented China focused attention on the issue as one on which
Japan should assert itself. Reischauer expressed his support for the contain-
ment of China, self-determination for Taiwan, and other tenets of American
faith, but argued that the United States paid too high a price for its position
on the issue. Clearly American policy toward China was a burden for its
diplomats.
Hearings in the Senate underscored shifts in American elite opinion. The
time had come for change, but Johnson and Rusk, who understood this, were
trapped by the war in Vietnam and their rationalizations for it. When overtures
to Beijing were made in May 1968, in the form of an invitation for Chinese
journalists to cover the American elections and a conciliatory speech by Un-
dersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, it was too late. Little changed
before Richard Nixon became president.
Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, understood both
Sato's support for the United States and his needs. In addition, Nixon needed
help from Sato on an unrelated issue—textiles. In November 1969, Sato met
with the president in Washington and achieved the desired agreement on
Okinawan reversion, to occur in 1972. In return Sato agreed to a communique
that declared Japan's support for American policy toward Vietnam and
China—as unprovocatively as Sato could get the Americans to state the point.
He promised support on the textile question, but no progress was made in
1970.53
In December 1970, in his year-end report, Ambassador Armin Meyer in
Tokyo warned Washington that, unless issues such as China were handled
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properly, the American-Japanese partnership might be damaged. He rec-
ommended a coordinated Japan-American approach to the China issue in 1971.
Sato, on his part, was confident of his longtime friendship with Nixon and
of American intention to cooperate with Japan. He was unconcerned by the
Japanese nightmare that the United States would steal a march on Japan by
suddenly recognizing the PRC. But in March 1971, a major dispute over
textiles broke out between Japan and the United States. Nixon and Kissinger
were convinced that Sato had not kept his part of the bargain. The president
sometimes seemed obsessed with demonstrating that he was not a man to be
crossed, and anger over the inability of Sato to deliver the concessions Nixon
needed to meet his campaign promise to American textile interests boded ill
for the partnership.
Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger were moving toward extraordinary
changes in American policy toward China. A series of signals had been ex-
changed with Zhou Enlai, and both sides were prepared to meet to bring about
a rapprochement. Analysts in the Department of State stressed the importance
of keeping Japan informed. A series of Japanese leaders had restrained their
own desire for normalization of relations with the PRC and, at the urging of
the United States, had taken unpopular stands on the question of China's
representation at the U.N. Sato had probably risked more than any of his
predecessors to support American policies. Nixon and Kissinger were aware
of his vulnerability. On July 15, 1971, Nixon had his revenge, announcing
Kissinger's visit to China and his own forthcoming trip-—without prior con-
sultation with Sato, without giving Sato warning sufficient to protect himself.
The first of the Nixon "shokku" constituted the last instance in which China
served as an irritant in Japanese-American relations. Hardly more than a year
later, Sato's successor Tanaka Kakuei was in Beijing, announcing the nor-
malization of Japanese-Chinese relations. Japan asserted itself with finality
on the issue, and Americans and Japanese found other, probably more en-
during, issues with which to irritate each other.
In a number of way s, China was unquestionably an issue in Japan-American
relations from 1950 to 1972. Japan wanted unrestricted access to mainland
markets and was usually willing to pay the price the PRC demanded. But as
is often the case, relations between Japan and the PRC had to be worked out
in a multilateral context. Japan could not advance its interests with the PRC
without sacrificing interests on Taiwan or endangering advantages obtained
from good relations with the United States. The object of Japan's diplomacy
was, obviously, to maximize opportunities to expand trade with the PRC
while minimizing the price to be paid on Taiwan and in the United States.
This is the stuff of international politics, and Japan played the game well.
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Chalmers Johnson has called Japan's strategy toward China prior to 1972
"one of the most skillfully executed foreign policies pursued by Japan in the
postwar era—a clever, covert adaptation by Japan to the Cold War and a
good example of Japan's essentially neo-mercantilist foreign policy."55
In the 1950s, when Japan appeared to have little leverage, Japanese dip-
lomats won everything they needed. They succeeded in opening and expanding
trade with the PRC while enlarging their trade and investments with the
ROC—and maintaining excellent relations with the United States. In the
1960s, as Japan grew stronger, it continued to gain in all directions. To be
sure, Jiang tried to punish the Japanese and caused some minor difficulties,
and PRC authorities squeezed hard from time to time, but for every step
backward there were at least two steps forward. Often ungraciously, some-
times with stern lectures, the United States steadily acquiesced in Japanese
demands. Most striking is Eisenhower's strong sense that Japanese trade with
the PRC was appropriate and good for the United States as well as for Japan.
It is also obvious that American acquiescence in Japanese trade with the PRC
was often a substitute for greater liberalization of the American home market.
At no time was China per se a dangerous issue in Japanese-American relations.
American policy toward the PRC was tragic, especially for the Americans
and Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians killed along
the way. There was no tragedy for Japan—only a nuisance that Japanese
leaders managed to maneuver around quite well—until American policy, in
what was otherwise its most sensible hour (Nixon's move toward accom-
modation with China), undermined Sato. Japanese leaders, like all national
leaders and most people generally, would have preferred complete freedom
of action. In practice, nations and friends are confronted by each other's needs
and desires, rational or otherwise, and must compromise. Americans and
Japanese did this well on the China issue from 1950 to 1972, and there is
every reason to expect them to do as well on the issues that irritate these
friends in the 1980s and 1990s.
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The Security Treaty
Revision of 1960
TADASHI ARUGA
In 1960, a new security treaty was concluded between Japan and the United
States, and its ratification caused a political turmoil in Japan. The episode
obviously belongs to the past era of U.S.-Japanese relations, during which
the United States continued to play the role of the powerful, confident, and
generous protector of the "Free World." Since then, great change has taken
place in both countries, in their mutual relations, and in the international
context of their relations. The security treaty of 1960, however, has survived
despite these twenty-five years of drastic change. It may, therefore, be worth
reviewing the episode of 1960 in historical perspective, reflecting on such
questions as how the treaty was negotiated and why the treaty generated such
strong opposition in Japan.
When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, it began a new national
career without consensus on defense and security issues. The Socialist parties,
representing the neutralist-antiarmament segment of the public, stood for a
policy of unarmed neutrality. Because Article IX of the Constitution of 1947
seemed to many Japanese to be the embodiment of new national identity, the
Socialists were able to claim legitimacy for their stand. For them, unarmed
neutrality was not only a matter of better security but also a matter of principle.
They were more critical of the security alliance than of the peace treaty itself.
They were split into the right and left wings over the issue of approving the
partial peace treaty, but both groups were opposed to the security treaty.
Although the conservative parties accepted security ties with the Unites States,
some conservatives were discontented with the unilateral character of the
security treaty of 1951, considering it unbecoming for a sovereign nation.
Many conservatives, especially Prime Minister Yoshida's rivals, desired to
begin rearmament and to negotiate treaty revision with the United States as
soon as possible.
The security treaty of 1951 gave the United States the right to position its
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military forces in and around Japan without imposing any legal responsibility
to defend Japan. The treaty provided merely that these forces "may be utilized
to contribute" to the security of Japan. Furthermore, the United States, while
assuming no definite defense responsibility, could use its forces in Japan for
purposes not directly related to the defense of Japan. If the purpose was "to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far
East," the United States could freely use Japanese bases for offensive op-
erations. This unilateral character was the major source of dissatisfaction for
conservative nationalists. The treaty contained an article providing that U.S.
forces could be utilized "at the express request of the Japanese government"
to put down "large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan." Although
many Japanese conservatives were afraid of indirect aggression by their com-
munist neighbors, they were not comfortable with this provision, which re-
minded them of the impotence of their nation. Premier Yoshida's conservative
rivals, expressing conservative nationalism, advocated rearmament through
constitutional revision, reexamination of reforms introduced under the oc-
cupation, and a quest for more independent diplomacy, which included re-
visions in the security arrangement with the United States.
Yoshida and his followers had ascended to power during the occupation
and had brought forth the peace settlement of 1951. On the other hand, his
rivals, mostly outsiders under the occupation regime, had been "purged" for
several years, and some had been imprisoned as war criminals or suspects in
Sugamo prison. Naturally, they were more critical of the legacy of the oc-
cupation, especially of its earlier phase, and took a more critical attitude
toward the present security arrangement. They tended to represent conserva-
tive nationalism in their challenge to Yoshida's leadership. Hatoyama Ichiro
was their central figure. His illness had delayed his challenge to Yoshida, but
he finally succeeded in reaching the seat of power in December 1954.
The new premier emphasized a "spirit of friendship and love" as the
spiritual basis of his domestic and international policies. He took a positive
attitude toward improving Japan's relations with its communist neighbors,
contending that ways should be sought for peaceful coexistence with com-
munist nations. He enjoyed great popularity for a while; in February 1955,
Hatoyama's Democratic party considerably increased its seats in the lower
house at the expense of the Liberals. In spite of the increases, however, the
governmental party still remained a minority in the lower house. This lack
of majority support for the government, and the prospect of a Socialist power
challenge, stimulated a merger movement among the Democrats and the Lib-
erals. In the fall of 1955, the two parties merged to form the Liberal Demo-
cratic party (LDP). Almost simultaneously, the left wing and right wing
socialist parties united to form the Socialist party (JSP). Thus emerged a
situation that Japanese political scientists often call the "system of 1955."3
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Premier Hatoyama favored rearmament and the removal of Article IX from
the Constitution. But constitutional revision was impossible, since the So-
cialists occupied more than one-third of the seats of the lower house. Besides,
it was financially difficult for the Japanese government to expand significantly
the size of the defense budget. Partly motivated by a wish to demonstrate to
Washington the scope of its efforts toward rearmament, the Japanese gov-
ernment prepared a six-year plan, which envisaged an increase of ground self-
defense forces to 180,000 within three years.4 With this plan in his pocket,
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru visited Washington in August 1955 to
negotiate on such matters as revision of the security treaty and return of
Okinawa and the Bonin Islands.
When Shigemitsu proposed revision of the security treaty, however, he
met a blunt rejection by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Shigemitsu
explained that the treaty was thought of as unequal and therefore was not
popular among the Japanese. Referring to the Vandenberg resolution, how-
ever, Dulles pointed out that the United States could commit itself to defend
Japan only within a genuinely collective security arrangement. In such an
arrangement, he said, Japan would have to assume military obligations beyond
its own territories.5
Spurned by Washington, Hatoyama intensified his effort to score a dip-
lomatic point in Moscow. After negotiations for a peace treaty were dead-
locked, Hatoyama himself visited Moscow in 1956, where he normalized
Japan's relations with the Soviet Union by way of a joint declaration. This
opened the way for Japan to join the United Nations in December 1956. When
Hatoyama retired after this diplomatic achievement, Ishibashi Tanzan was
elected as his successor in December. Like Hatoyama, Ishibashi advocated
improvement of Japan's relations with communist neighbors and hoped to
develop economic and political relations with the Beijing regime. But he
became ill soon after the start of his administration and resigned in February
1957. The premiership was passed to Vice Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke.
Kishi, a former bureaucrat who had served as a minister in General Tqjo's
wartime cabinet, was a statesman of considerable ability. Held in Sugamo
Prison after World War II, he had made a phenomenal comeback to become
an important political figure in postwar Japan. Kishi was a nationalist, but
he was also acutely aware of American power. His vision was of a rising
new Japan in a firm partnership with the United States. This partnership would
enable Japan to play the role of a major power in Asia. Thus Kishi visited
South Asian countries in May 1957 for his first overseas trip as prime minister,
and in November, made his second trip to Southeast Asia, which included a
visit to Australia and New Zealand.
The itinerary of one of his Asian trips included Taibei where he had talks
with Chiang Kai-shek. Kishi emphasized Japan's close ties with Nationalist
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China, and although he also favored developing trade relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic, his intimacy with Taibei irritated Beijing. In May 1958, just
before general elections in Japan, the Beijing regime suspended all trade with
Japan, bitterly criticizing the policy of the Kishi cabinet.8 This certainly
dismayed Fujiyama Aiichiro, who had become foreign minister in July 1957.
He entertained an earnest hope to develop Japanese relations with Beijing.
Kishi hoped to put U.S.-Japanese relations on a more equal basis by re-
vising the security treaty, the unilateral character of which he regarded as a
legacy of the occupation. Remembering, however, Dulles's cold response to
Shigemitsu's plea for revision in 1955, Kishi approached this issue cautiously
in public statements.10 Washington showed a much higher regard for Premier
Kishi than it had shown for his two predecessors. He seemed to be more pro-
American and more eager than Yoshida to make Japan a positive partner of
the United States. He was also relatively young and was expected to continue
his leadership role for some years. "Mr. Kishi gives every indication of being
the strongest government leader to emerge in postwar Japan," Dulles wrote
in a memorandum for President Dwight D. Eisenhower just before Kishi's
visit to Washington. "He has emphasized that he desires the establishment
of a full partnership with the United States." With his coming to power,
Dulles thought, "a period of drift" was over in Japan. Official Washington
welcomed Kishi warmly and gave him wide publicity. Dulles remarked that
his visit opened a new era in the relations of the two nations, an era that
would be much more "on a basis of cooperation than on a basis of the exercise
by the United States of unilateral rights."12
Dulles understood Kishi's desire to revise the security treaty. "I feel that
the time has come," he wrote to Eisenhower, "to take the initiative in pro-
posing a readjustment of our relations with Japan and to suggest to Mr. Kishi
that we work toward a mutual security arrangement which could, we would
hope, replace the present Security Treaty."13 When Kishi conferred with
Eisenhower and Dulles at the White House on June 25, Dulles said, "We all
believe that the important thing is to develop a relationship of real mutuality
and real cooperation and our best chance to do that is under the leadership
of the present Prime Minister . . . in whom we can have confidence and who
has a genuine dedication to the principles of the free world."14 Eisenhower
praised Kishi's public address in Washington and said to him, "Now that you
have achieved this personal trust we can move constructively."15 The only
concrete result relating to the security treaty was the decision to set up an
intergovernmental committee to study "problems arising in relation to the
Security Treaty."16 But Kishi was impressed by Washington's friendliness
and was encouraged by its understanding reception of his ideas for revising
the security treaty. Another result of his visit was an agreement on the with-
drawal of U.S. ground combat troops from Japan.17
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A joint committee was soon organized of the Japanese foreign and defense
ministers, the U.S. ambassador, and the U.S. commander in the Pacific re-
gion. Although the terms of the agreement allowed the joint committee to
discuss treaty revision, the committee limited its practice to discussing matters
relating to the execution of the existing treaty.18 Meanwhile, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was studying how the existing security arrangement would
be revised. Anticipating the difficulty of inducing the United States to assume
a treaty obligation to defend Japan unless the latter were prepared to assume
a similar obligation for U.S. Pacific possessions, Foreign Ministry officials
did not plan to revise the treaty itself. They thought of supplementing the
treaty with several agreements, which would include an American assurance
of military cooperation with the Japanese self-defense forces in case of an
act of foreign aggression upon Japan. They also sought an American promise
to consult with the Japanese government before undertaking combat operation
initiated from Japanese bases and directed outside Japan. Such supplementary
agreements, they considered, would be enough to remove basic Japanese
grievances. They tended to feel that this was the maximum Japan could hope
to achieve.19 An exchange of letters on September 14, 1957, between Foreign
Minister Fujiyama and Ambassador Douglas Mac Arthur II, clarified the re-
lationship of the treaty with the U.N. Charter and was a step toward piecemeal
modifications of the treaty.
In July 1958, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro conferred several times
with Ambassador MacArthur (nephew and namesake of General MacArthur)
on security matters. In their meeting of July 30, MacArthur stated that there
were two ways to modify the existing security arrangements: one was to
supplement the present treaty by a series of new agreements on particular
issues, and the other was to replace it by a new treaty of greater mutuality.
Understanding that the Constitution prohibited Japan from sending armed
forces overseas, the ambassador asked whether the Japanese government
would prefer a new treaty of the mutual assistance type if it was possible to
devise such a treaty compatible with the Constitution. After Fujiyama's return
from the U.N. General Assembly, he and Prime Minister Kishi held a meeting
with MacArthur on August 25, in which Kishi expressed his preference for
a new treaty, observing that only a new treaty could put U.S.-Japanese re-
lations on a firm and stable basis.
In early September, Fujiyama left Tokyo for Washington to confer with
Dulles. Dulles indicated his willingness to explore the possibility, and joint
communique, issued on September 11, announced, "It was agreed that the
two governments would consult further on this matter through diplomatic
channels following Mr. Fujiyama's return to Tokyo."20 According to Fuji-
yama's report in the Diet and his later recollection, he outlined for Dulles the
main points of revision desired by the Japanese government: (1) the treaty
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should be revised in such a way as to conform to the new international status
of Japan; (2) the United States should assume the obligation to help defend
Japan against attack; (3) Japanese obligations should be limited to those com-
patible with the Constitution; (4) Japan should be consulted before the United
States changes the disposition and/or equipment of its forces in Japan, or uses
bases in Japan for operational purposes for the peace and security of the Far
East; and (5) the treaty should be effective for a limited period.21 Dulles knew
the United States could not expect much from Japan. He told Fujiyama that
he was willing to negotiate a new treaty that might require the United States
to concede much for an insufficient gain because he regarded the spirit of
friendship to be much more important than legal privileges and obligations.22
Beginning with the meeting of October 4, in which Kishi himself partici-
pated, Fujiyama, Mac Arthur, and their respective aides met often to discuss
treaty revision during the fall. An American draft treaty was offered for
discussion, which includes these terms: (1) the treaty would be called the
"treaty of mutual cooperation and security" and would define mutual coop-
eration broadly, including political and economic as well as security matters;
(2) the parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of
self-help and mutual aid, would maintain and develop their capacities to
exercise the right of individual and collective defense against armed attack;
(3) each party would agree to recognize that an armed attack against either
party in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
to declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional provisions and processes; (4) the existing executive agree-
ment regarding the use of Japanese bases by U.S. forces would be continued
under the new treaty; and (5) after ten years, each party could give notice to
the other party of its intention to terminate the treaty one year later. The
American negotiators also submitted two supplementary documents, one of
which provided that prior consultation with the Japanese government was
required when the United States made major changes in the deployment of
armed forces in Japan or when the United States used bases in Japan for
military combat operations not directly related to the defense of Japan. This
American proposal showed that the American side had made an effort to
consider the Japanese position stated by Fujiyama in his conference with
Dulles.
The Japanese negotiators proposed several revisions to the draft. First, they
wanted to delete the term "collective defense" from the text, because the
Japanese interpreted their Constitution as prohibiting Japan from exercising
the right of collective defense. It took some time to explain this to the Ameri-
can side, but finally the phrase was dropped. Second, the Japanese side could
not agree to extend the treaty area to include the Pacific region. This extension
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of the treaty area was a key to the mutuality envisaged by the Americans.
Although, the provision did not envision sending Japanese armed forces out-
side Japan under the existing Constitution, the possibility of such an extension
of the treaty area was too drastic for Japan. MacArthur soon understood the
political infeasibility for the Japanese government of agreeing to such an
extension and appeared ready to begin to persuade Washington on the mat-
ter. Prime Minister Kishi and other Japanese officials thought of including
Okinawa and Ogasawara (the Bonin Islands) in the treaty area. Kishi defended
the idea in the Diet on October 23, but public opinion strongly opposed the
inclusion of these islands, and there was doubt about the constitutionality of
such an arrangement. Within the government, the minister in charge of the
Defense Agency also took a negative attitude. Thus Foreign Minister Fujiyama
stated on November 23 that the new treaty would not include these islands,
adding that it could therefore be primarily characterized as a kind of base-
lease treaty.25
In other respects, the American proposal was largely satisfactory to Japa-
nese governmental leaders. It is likely that the Japanese negotiators did not
insist on writing the "prior consultation" clause into the treaty itself, satisfied
with the American proposal to put it into a supplementary document. Once
the U.S. negotiators took an understanding attitude regarding the points to
which the Japanese had objected, there emerged a basic agreement on the
nature of the treaty. By the time the Japanese government asked the United
States to suspend the negotiations temporarily because of disunity within the
LDP in late November 1958, basic agreement had apparently been reached.
It may be said that the revisions Kishi and Fujiyama intended were less matters
of substance than of face and national sentiment. If the United States assumed
the obligation to defend Japan against attack, then the security arrangement
would no longer be one-sided. If Japan could have a voice regarding certain
activities of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, then its national prestige would
be honored and the national feeling satisfied. Such revisions could be carried
out by supplementing the existing treaty with joint declarations, but govern-
mental leaders wanted a new treaty precisely because the revisions were
matters of face and sentiment.
Kishi's leadership over the party was limited because he was primarily a
boss of one faction and had to negotiate with other leaders, those within as
well as those outside his coalition. In an effort to weaken faction leaders who
were not in partnership with him, Kishi excluded the opposition from the
important party posts and largely barred members of their factions from his
second cabinet. This move was counterproductive for his leadership, because
faction leaders outside his coalition tended to refuse to cooperate in carrying
controversial pieces of legislation in the Diet. Their refusal to support the
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police practice bill in December 1958 is a case in point.26 Kishi's attempt to
enact the bill at that time was a tactical mistake, if his primary aim was the
conclusion of a new security treaty. Because there was no national consensus
on security matters, and because the Socialists had always mounted spirited
opposition to important security bills in the past, he should have carefully
mapped out the strategy of overcoming their expected opposition. Although
the Socialists had sometimes appeared to support certain kinds of treaty re-
vision, they adopted the policy of outright opposition soon after the beginning
of negotiations was announced. He should have avoided raising such a
minor, but politically very explosive, issue without the united support of his
own party. The issue dramatized disunity within the LDP, provided opposition
parties and associations with an experience of vigorous mass protests and a
taste of victory, and gave a large segment of the public misgivings about the
nature of his policy.
It was when factional cleavages over the police practice bill began to be
apparent that Kishi and Fujiyama explained their plan of a new security treaty
to the LDP chieftains and asked for their support. Responses were without
enthusiasm. Faction leaders did not want to see Kishi's hand strengthened by
getting credit for what now seemed to be an easy task. They were also afraid
that Fujiyama, a wealthy businessman who had entered politics, might become
a powerful leader in the near future, and they did not want to give him an
easy diplomatic success. Some faction leaders, such as Ikeda Hayato and Miki
Takeo, suggested that it was too early for the government to open such ne-
gotiations. Even Kono Ichiro, an influential boss who was then in partnership
with Kishi, caused much trouble for Kishi and Fujiyama by criticizing the
treaty plan. Just when they decided to eliminate Okinawa and Ogasawara
from the treaty area, Kono began to argue strongly for the inclusion of these
islands. Kono and his supporters maintained that such an arrangement would
strengthen Japan's voice in matters concerning these islands. Some members
even declared that the Japanese government should get some promise from
the United States regarding the return of these islands to Japan.28
After Kishi reshuffled his cabinet in January 1959, hoping to consolidate
his power, the foreign minister submitted the so-called Fujiyama Plan to a
policy discussion meeting of the party. The plan enumerated the provisions
to be written in a new treaty. Because the Fujiyama Plan outlined fairly
accurately the major features of the treaty to be concluded the following year,
we may assume that U.S. and Japanese negotiators had reached basic agree-
ment on the major features of the new treaty.29 This illustrates why Fujiyama
said several times in the early months of 1959 that the treaty could be con-
cluded very soon. But the plan was not accepted by the party members.30
After lengthy discussions between the governmental leaders and the party
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elders, the two documents, "The LDP's Principles on Treaty Revision" and
"The LDP's Principles on the Revision of the Executive Agreement," were
approved by the party council in mid-April. The first document accepted the
principles enumerated in the Fujiyama Plan. The second document, however,
called for negotiating simultaneously for substantial revision of the executive
agreement, which Kishi and Fujiyama had wanted to postpone.31 Although
Kishi thus secured the formal support of the party, a number of party members
still expressed misgivings on the nature of the projected treaty. For example,
Kono insisted even then that the ten-year term of the treaty was too long.
Occasionally others still revealed their lukewarm attitude,32 but on April 23,
Foreign Minister Fujiyama was able at last to reopen negotiations with Am-
bassador MacArthur. In the fifth meeting, held on May 23, agreement was
reached regarding the provisions of the new treaty. Thus Fujiyama was able
to outline its details in a public address two days later. The negotiators
continued to meet regularly until January 1960, but these meetings were
devoted to negotiations for a new executive agreement.
In October 1958, the Socialist party (JSP) decided to oppose the security
treaty revision that Kishi intended to negotiate.35 At that time, the JSP was
primarily concerned with blocking the passage of the police practice revisions
bill. A national headquarters was established through the JSP's initiative in
cooperation with labor and other progressive organizations for the purpose of
encouraging and coordinating a mass movement to oppose the bill. When
Kishi was forced to back down mainly because of disunity among the LDP,
the JSP wanted to switch the focus of the national organization to a mass
movement opposing the security treaty revisions. More moderate, less poli-
ticized labor organizations did not support the JSP's proposal.36 But in March
1959 Sohyo (the Japanese General Council of Trade Unions), the largest labor
organization, took the initiative to organize a mass movement against Kishi's
security treaty revisions and Japan's security tie with the United States. The
JSP, having lost the initiative, decided to join the organization proposed by
Sohyo, and reluctantly agreed to cooperation with the Communists (JCP) in
the organization. Because the JCP had considerable influence in peace or-
ganizations, it was impossible for the JSP to insist that the JCP be excluded.
The JSP did succeed in denying the JCP full membership in the top decision-
making body of the organization. The JSP also insisted that the organization
be called the National Conference for Joint Struggle against Security Treaty
Revisions, limiting its immediate purpose to opposing the treaty revisions the
Kishi cabinet was proposing.37 Although the JSP's ultimate aim was to dis-
solve Japan's security ties with the United States, it was opposed to including
this aim in the name of the new national organization. In this way, the So-
cialists hoped to win the support of more moderate elements of the public.
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Although a national organization was thus established to conduct an anti-
treaty revision campaign and coordinate mass movements, there was rivalry
and infighting between the Socialists and the Communists. The two parties
were different in strength, organization, and ideology. As a parliamen-
tary party, the JSP was by far stronger than the JCP. The JSP was a compo-
nent of the two-party system created in 1955, although its Diet members were
only a little more than half of the LDP's members in the Diet.38 The JCP, on
the other hand, had only one member in the Lower House and another in the
Upper House. It had not recovered from the setback it had experienced in the
days of underground violence. As a party, however, the JCP had more or-
ganizational strength than the JSP.
In elections, the JSP depended on the votes of nonmembers and on or-
ganizational and financial help by labor organizations. To block legislation it
opposed in the Diet, it had to depend on mass media support and mass
movements, and on manipulating factional rivalries within the LDP. The JSP's
dependence on labor unions explains why the party had to follow Sohyo's
initiative in organizing national opposition to security treaty revision. The
party's dependence upon mass media and public opinion explains why it
wanted to delete the phrase "Abolition of the U.S.-Japanese Security System"
from the name of the national organization. The Socialists did not want to
look overly radical; at the same time they tended to take a tolerant attitude
toward radical activist students and workers, for they depended on nonparty
activists for mass movement.
The Socialists had their own internal disunity. Intraparty friction between
the right and left had continued after their merger in 1955. Because the left
wing was strong among the party workers, there had been pressure to keep
party discipline along the left-wing lines. Nishio Suehiro was the left wing's
major target; when they tried to discipline Nishio for his rightist deviation in
the fall of 1959, he and his followers left the JSP with the intention of
organizing a new moderate socialist party. He wanted to take all of the right-
wing elements from the JSP, but the major right-wing faction, led by Ka-
wakami Jotaro, decided to remain in the JSP. The Nishio group first organized
the Socialist Club in November 1959 and then launched the Democratic So-
cialist party (DSP) in January 1960. This split of the JSP foretold its gradual
decline in the 1960s and 1970s, but the DSP has not made any remarkable
growth, either. The birth of the new moderate socialist party did not benefit
the Kishi cabinet, because the DSP, which today supports the security treaty,
was then opposed to it. The defection of the Nishio group drove the JSP to
put more effort into the anti-treaty movement and to look for a chance to
bring down Kishi, whom they regarded as the most reactionary of the LDP
leaders.39
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The Communist party had its own mass party organization composed of
devoted party members. Their number was not enough to elect communists
to the Diet, but they were a powerful asset for the party in conducting a mass
movement. Both the JSP and the JCP were opposed to treaty revision, but
the JCP emphasized the purpose of abolishing the whole security arrangement
with the United States, whereas the JSP emphasized opposition to a new
treaty, deferring to the future the dissolution of all security ties with the United
States. Behind this tactical difference, there were ideological and strategic
differences between them. The Socialists aimed to move Japan toward a
neutral position and thus to stimulate a global trend toward peace and dis-
armament. They wanted to take an equidistant position toward the two su-
perpowers. If they had strong sympathy to the Chinese People's Republic, it
was primarily because of their sense of war guilt and their sympathy with the
Third World; they had little sympathy with the Soviet Union. They observed
that the Kishi government was trying to achieve the status of a more active
partner within the anti-communist alliance and that it would create new in-
ternational tensions in the Far East. Therefore, their target was the Kishi
government, not the United States.40
The Communists, on the other hand, held that Japan was still under U.S.
control and that negotiations for a new security treaty had been initiated by
the United States. Therefore, their primary enemy was not the Kishi govern-
ment but the United States. They wanted to make the mass anti-treaty-revision
movement anti-American rather than anti-Kishi. Because their enemy was
formidable, the movement must be a persistent one. Thus they were opposed
to excesses in violence, especially violence committed by antiparty radical
students. The major student organization, Zengakuren, was largely controlled
by radicals of the Communist League (Bund), who did not follow the JCP.41
Coordinated by the National Congress, the anti-treaty-revision movement
gradually intensified in 1959. The congress sponsored ten mass-meeting-and-
demonstration days in the year.42 Meanwhile, negotiations between the two
governments continued, and in January 1960 complete agreement was reached
on the texts of the new security treaty, the revised executive agreement, and
other related documents. The new treaty was signed in Washington by Premier
Kishi and Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had succeeded Dulles in
April 1959.
In the new treaty, as in the old one, the United States was granted the
privilege of using facilities and areas in Japan for its military forces for the
purpose of "contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East" (Article VI). It had been one
of the basic aims of the Japanese government in treaty revision to gain a voice
regarding the actions and equipment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
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The United States acknowledged this arrangement in a document attached to
the treaty. The treaty assigned to the United States an obligation to help Japan
defend itself in case of attack, which in turn pledged Japan to act against
attack on American forces in Japanese territory (Article V). Japan was to
maintain and develop its capacities to resist armed attack (Article II). Although
the treaty area was limited to territories under Japanese administration, Japan
was committed in some degree to cooperating with American policy in the
general area of the Far East: Article IV provided that the two countries would
"consult together . . . whenever the security of Japan or international peace
and security in the Far East is threatened." Thus the new treaty changed
Japan's role from a passive to a more active one in Far Eastern defense.43
The vocal public strongly criticized the published treaty. Many were afraid
that the new treaty would oblige Japan to develop large-scale armed forces,
and they did not show much appreciation for the U.S. commitment to the
defense of Japan. The United States promised, in an attached document, prior
consultation with Japan on certain activities of U.S. forces using Japanese
bases, but the Japanese wanted veto power, not mere consultation. They also
contended that the term Far East was not clarified geographically in the treaty.
Some considered a ten-year term too long for such a treaty. Many Japanese
publicists and intellectuals, who were not nesessarily leaning toward the left,
voiced doubts about the wisdom of concluding such a treaty in haste. No
major newspaper took a clear stand on the new treaty. Their editorials, how-
ever, stated that there were problems to be debated and recommended that
the Diet discuss them thoroughly. When the Foreign Minister gave con-
flicting answers to questions about the geographical definition of the Far East,
this episode was given wide publicity in the media.45 Government spokesmen
were failing to convince the public of the merit of the treaty. In an opinion
survey conducted in January 1960, 29 percent of those polled regarded the
new treaty as "good " and 25 percent regarded it as "bad." In another opinion
survey, conducted two months later, those who regarded the treaty as bad
increased to 36 percent, while only 21 percent regarded it as good.
Meanwhile, the U-2 incident and the subsequent cancellation of a U.S.-
Soviet summit conference increased anxiety over the propsect of a close
alliance between the United States and Japan. After the U-2 was shot down
in the Soviet Union, it was disclosed that three U-2s were stationed in Japan.
American authorities announced that the U-2s operating from Japanese bases
had been engaged in weather observation only, and Prime Minister Kishi
stated that, as far as he knew, U-2s based in Japan had never invaded the air
space of other countries. But most Japanese would not be satisfied with such
assurances. The Soviet Union warned of possible retaliation against Japanese
bases because U-2 planes had invaded the Soviet Union.47 The Japanese public
was filled with anxiety over the danger accompanying a military alliance with
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the United States. In the atmosphere of May 1960, risks involved in the treaty,
rather than its merits, tended to be dramatized. Opposition to the new treaty
was gaining momentum.
Confronted with this, Prime Minister Kishi and most of his party members
were determined to extend the Diet session scheduled to end on May 25 and
to push the treaty through the lower house quickly, overcoming any possible
opposition. The treaty was approved on May 20, but at a cost of great con-
fusion. The opposition parties angrily denied the validity of the endorsement
and demanded an immediate dissolution of the Diet. Leading newspapers
bitterly criticized the prime minister and his party. The press did not overlook
the sitdown tactics taken by the Socialists, but they regarded the tactics of
the Liberal Democrats as a far more unpardonable violation of the spirit and
procedures of parliamentary democracy. The vocal public was indignant at
the extraordinary way in which the government handled such an important
issue. Opposition to the treaty itself was now joined by opposition to the open
disregard by the government of the spirit of parliamentary democracy. Various
groups and associations, mostly nonpolitical, joined in the demand for the
resignation of Premier Kishi and the dissolution of the Diet. Antigovernment
demonstrations were repeated almost daily in Tokyo, and demonstrations
spread into provincial cities. Important labor unions, including the National
Railroad Workers Union, began short-hour strikes in protest against the gov-
ernment.48
If Kishi had called for a general election in the spring, he would have
succeeded more easily in securing the Diet's approval for the new treaty and
without much public criticism. Again, he had made a tactical mistake.49 If
Premier Kishi had been willing to postpone the vote on the treaty to the next
session and had announced his intention of calling a general election before
the vote, he might have secured its approval without bringing on political
disaster. But he desired to secure ratification by June 19, the day President
Eisenhower was to arrive in Japan. According to the Constitution, a treaty
approved by the lower house is automatically given the approval of the Diet
after one month, even if it is pending in the upper house. This explains why
the Liberal Democrats pushed the treaty through the lower House early on
the morning of May 20.
Informed of the political turmoil in Japan, President Eisenhower and Sec-
retary of State Christian Herter considered postponing their visit for about
two months until after the Republican national convention.50 In Tokyo, Am-
bassador MacArthur told Vice Foreign Minister Yamada Hisanari that he
thought postponement "made sense."51 The Kishi administration, however,
strongly desired to have the presidential visit in June as scheduled, and when
told of this the president was willing.52
Opponents of the prime minister and of the security treaty were against
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the visit of the president, especially because they now suspected that Kishi
would use Eisenhower's visit to escape the current political crisis. When
Presidential press secretary James Hagerty arrived in Japan on June 10 to
arrange schedule details, he was surrounded at Haneda airport by demon-
strators shouting their opposition to Eisenhower's visit. Washington was
shocked by this incident and instructed the U.S. embassy to reopen the issue
of postponement. Secretary of State Herter noted that the incident had caused
"grave misgivings among those who had staunchly supported the visit." It
was feared, he stated, "that if a serious incident or rioting should take place
when the President was in Japan, there could be a strong revival of anti-
Japanese feeling in the United States, with resultant grave adverse effects on
Japanese-American relations."53
Even before he received this message, Ambassador MacArthur, who had
been with Hagerty at Haneda, met with Vice Foreign Minister Yamada on
June 11 and warned him that the Japanese government had "the heaviest
imaginable responsibility" regarding the presidential visit. The next day he
met with Kishi and expressed his misgivings. But Kishi continued to en-
courage the visit as scheddled, noting a new tone of welcome in the Japanese
press. The media, horrified by the prospect of great confusion at the time
of the presidential visit, began to call for the public to calm its temper and
to welcome the important guest.55
The president left Washington for his Far Eastern tour on June 12, but
Herter repeatedly directed MacArthur to report Kishi's latest evaluation and
also the embassy's own assessment of the feasibility of Eisenhower's visit.
As late as June 15, Fujiyama conveyed the administration's desire for the
scheduled visit and stressed that the government was taking all necessary
measures to guarantee the safety of the presidential party. Thereupon the
ambassador cabled that the embassy believed "the balance of advantage clearly
lies in going ahead with the visit as planned."56 But the antigovernment
movement was coming to a climax.
That night, student radicals invaded the yard of the Diet building. One
female student was killed, and many other students were injured in an ensuing
battle with the police. Kishi and his close associates thought of mobilizing
ground troops of the self-defense forces to protect the American visitors
against possible violence by student radicals. But Akagi Munenori, the mini-
ster in charge of the Defense Agency, did not agree to their use for such a
purpose. If the self-defense forces were employed to suppress violent but
unarmed activists, he feared it would damage their public image.57 On the
following day, having heard the opinion of the chairman of the Public Safety
Commission, the Kishi cabinet finally concluded that the government must
ask President Eisenhower to postpone his trip to Japan.58
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The treaty automatically became effective on June 20 without any action
being taken by the upper house. The government completed ratification pro-
cedures the next day. The United States Senate, which had been watching
the situation in Japan, ratified the treaty on June 22. The exchange of rati-
fication documents was made the next day in Tokyo, and the new treaty
became effective immediately, Premier Kishi and his cabinet resigned on July
15. Three days later, Ikeda Hayato was elected premier in an extra session
of the Diet attended by all parties, including the opposition. The political
confusion that had shaken Japan for two months now subsided. The general
elections held in November returned the LDP to power with a large majority
in the lower house and stabilized Japanese politics.
Given the subsequent history of the security treaty, it may seem rather
strange that opposition to the treaty could mobilize such mass protests in early
1960. To be sure, consensus did not exist with regard to security and defense
issues, but if Kishi had carefully mapped out his strategy for getting Diet
approval of the treaty, he might have gained it without bringing forth such
political turmoil. He should have tactfully consolidated his party first. More-
over, he committed several tactical mistakes; his attempt to enact the police
practice bill and his failure to call general elections in early 1960 are examples.
There was also the personal factor. As many observers noted, the antitreaty
fever was primarily anti-Kishi rather than anti-American. Among the Japanese
public there was considerable distrust of Kishi, who had been a member of
the Tojo cabinet. This suspicion and fear, fueled by several international
events in the spring of 1960, precipitated the feverish anti-treaty movement.
In the larger historical perspective, the episode of 1960 affected changes
since then in Japanese domestic politics, Japan's international circumstances,
and the U.S.-Japanese relationship, especially its psychological aspect.
The security treaty revision of 1960 took place when the political system
of 1955, an unbalanced two-party system, was about to change. In its place
a system emerged that was composed of one dominant conservative party and
several small center and left-wing parties. With the advent of center parties,
sharp conflict over security and defense issues has been mitigated.
Changes in Japan's international circumstances also alleviated the intensity
of domestic conflicts over security issues. Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy toward
the two Communist giants drastically changed Japan's international environ-
ment. Washington's sudden rapprochement with Beijing was a shock to To-
kyo, because relations with China had been a big issue in Japanese domestic
politics. The Beijing leaders, however, wanted to improve China's relations
with Japan as well as with the United States and began to suggest that they
did not oppose U.S.-Japanese security treaty ties. In 1960, such ties had
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appeared to be incompatible with Japan's friendly relations with the People's
Republic, but since 1972, the two have been compatible with each other. This
change greatly weakened opposition to security ties with the United States.
Although Soviet-American relations changed from detente to a new cold war
in the early 1980s, this has not increased opposition to the ties.
The episode of 1960 belonged to an era in which there were wide gaps
between Japanese and American power. In 19&0 Japan was not a giant in any
sense. The Japanese themselves regarded their country as a defeated nation
just beginning to rise from the ashes. Thus they retained an inferiority com-
plex. This atmosphere underlay both Kishi's desire to replace the old security
treaty with a new one and the anti-security treaty fever as a form of national
self-assertion. Along with this inferiority complex, many Japanese, in 1960,
revealed a mentality of dependence, which Doi Takeo termed amae, toward
the United States.59 They presumed, because of the amae mentality, that
Japan could enjoy American kindness whatever they did in opposition to the
new security treaty. Their amae expectation was not misplaced. In 1960, the
dominant American self-image was still that of the protector of the "Free
World." The Americans therefore could be indulgent toward Japan. Not only
did official Washington continue to express friendship toward Japan, but the
American public also showed few signs of anti-Japanese feeling. The U.S.
government attributed everything that happened in Japan to the conspiracy of
international communism; and journalists and scholars knowledgeable about
Japan explained that most of the demonstrators were not anti-American but
anti-Kishi. The American public seemed to be satisfied by these explanations.
Such indulgence can no longer be expected in American attitudes toward
today's issues in U.S.-Japanese relations.
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Southeast Asia in
U.S.-Japanese Relations
AKIO WATENABE
In August 1955, the world consisted of eighty-two independent countries, of
which sixty-nine existed before World War II (Japan, China, Thailand, and
Nepal included) and thirteen were postwar creations (Republic of Korea,
Philippines, Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, South Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos among them). These fourteen countries (four old and
ten new) formed, for the first time in history, an Asian international society
of independent nations.
The emergence of this Asian international society was a direct result of
the Japanese war in the Pacific and Asia. Japan contributed to the emergence
of this society first by its militaristic expansion and then by its defeat. Nothing
was certain, however, about Japan's relations with Asia even after the con-
clusion of the San Fransisco peace treaty in September 1951. Japan was, more
than anything else, a former enemy not only to most of the Asian countries
but also to the rest of the world. In addition, Britain and other European
countries were not sure about their future in Southeast Asia. Asian peoples
had just realized their cherished dreams of independence or were on the verge
of their fulfillment, but political situations in many of their countries were
almost boiling. All of these conditions made Asia an ideal arena for new
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Against this background, it is remarkable that Japan successfully restored
its former influence in Asia. The economic dependence of many Asian coun-
tries on Japan today is so great that some people argue that Japan has realized
the dream of a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, despite its wartime
defeat. How has this process come about? What factors have determined
Japan's role in postwar Asia? What role did the Japanese themselves envisage
for their country after their defeat? How did the Americans respond to the
Japanese desire in the early postwar years? This essay will outline changing
American attitudes toward the question of Japan's role in Asia and will discuss
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reactions of Japanese policymakers to shitfting international circumstances
with particular reference to U.S.-Japanese relations in Southeast Asia.
A position paper of the Japanese government "On the promotion of eco-
nomic cooperation with Southeast Asian Countries" (20 May 1953) charac-
terizes the economic status of Asian countries as follows:
Southeast Asian countries did not occupy a very large place in world
trade in 1949 with its share in the exports being 9.6 percent (as compared
with 13.1 percent in 1937) and in the imports 10.9 percent (9.3 percent
in 1937). However, with regard to such special products as rubber, tin,
tea, vegetable oil, and jute, they used to get an exclusively large share
in world exports, and there existed before the war so-called triangular
patterns of trade in which Southeast Asian countries had a favorable
balance of trade with the United States, which had a favorable balance
with Europe and Japan, both of which in turn had a favorable balance
with Southeast Asian countries. This structure of triangular trading re-
lations has decomposed after the war, however, because the recovery
of economy in Southeast Asia was slow and also because man-made
substitutes for their products such as nylon and synthetic rubber con-
tributed to a decline of their exports, with the result that they have now
a trade deficit with the United States.2
The author of this position paper was obviously concerned with the changes
brought about by various developments during and after the war to the tra-
ditional structure of Asian international trade. Before we analyze the attempted
response to these changes by American and Japanese policymakers, it may
be appropriate to have a brief look at the triangular trade patterns that existed
between Southeast Asia, the United States, and Western Europe (plus Japan)
before the Pacific war. The multiple relationships between Asia, the United
States, and Europe in 1913, 1928, and 1938 may be represented by the three
diagrams in the accompanying figure, in which each vector indicates the
amount of trade surplus from one area to another, in terms of $10 million
(new dollars, i.e., 1934 to 1971). In 1913, India provides a typical example
of the triangular trade: it earned foreign money by selling its products to the
United States (and Europe and Japan as well), which enabled it to buy manu-
factured goods from the United Kingdom. While India's case remained un-
changed in 1928, a similar pattern emerged also with Southeast Asia, whose
exports to the United States showed a marked increase, helping finance its
imports of manufactured goods from the United Kingdom. In 1938, the effects
of the Great Depression were such that imports from the United Kingdom
into Asian countries remarkably decreased. Japanese trade with Southeast Asia
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Multiple Trade Relationships between Asia, the United States, and Europe
SEA
1928
C = China
E = Europe
I = India
J = Japan
SEA = Southeast Asia
US = United States
Source: Mukai Juichi, "Ajiya no boeki kozo to kokusai shushi" (Trade structure of Asia and
its international balance), in Ryotaisenkanki no Ajiya to Nippon (Asia and Japan in the interwar
period), ed. Ono Ichiichiro and Yoshinobu Shuku (Tokyo, 1979), 57; the article relies largely
on three works published by the United Nations in Geneva: Europe's Trade (1941), The Network
of World Trade (1942), and Industrialization and Foreign Trade (1945).
was more or less balanced in those days, and its place in the Asian trade is
not therefore visibly expressed in these diagrams.
The continuous decline of British trade and the gradual rise of Japanese
trade (and American as well) during the interwar period can be seen in table
5.1, which shows the changing pattern of Southeast Asian (and Indian) imports
from major industrial centers during that period.
In short, the triangular trade relationship which grew into existence in the
1910s and 1920s was seriously paralyzed by the Great Depression; in the
United States there was a sudden decrease in demand for the raw materials
that Southeast Asian countries produced. The shrinkage of trade surpluses of
these countries led inevitably to a decline in their purchasing power for manu-
factured goods. In the ensuing fierce competition among the industrial coun-
tries for markets, Japan, which was more quick than others to recover from
the depression, fared relatively well. These developments formed the back-
ground for the trade frictions between Japan and the United Kingdom and
some other European countries during the 1930s. The revival of the world
market for Southeast Asian products as a result of the war boom in the latter
part of the 1930s made it appear that the triangular trade of the good old days,
with Japan playing a more important role than before, was coming again, but
the outbreak of war in the Pacific gave the finishing blow to any dream of
restoring the old patterns of triangular trade.
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Table 5.1. Percentage Shares of Major Industrial Centers in the Imports of
Southeast Asia and India
India
SEA
Year
1913
1928
1938
1978
1913
1928
1938
1978
Japan
2.6
5.8
11.0
7.7
2.9
5.5
8.4
24.6
U.S.
2.5
6.2
7.5
11.9
6.9
12.0
16.6
14.2
U.K.
60.7
43.6
36.1
(8.2)
14.3
12.6
11.0
(4.3)
Europea
8.7
17.2
17.8
29.5
20.7
20.4
21.6
14.7
Sources: Figures for the prewar years are from Mukai Juichi, "Ajiya no boeki kozo to kokusai
shushi" in Ryotaisenkanki no Ajiya to Nippon, ed. Ono Ichiichiro and Yoshinobu Shuku (Toyko,
1979), 58-63. Those for 1978 are from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics,
1976-82.
aFor 1913, includes Germany, France, and Holland; for 1928 and 1938, the three above plus
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland; for 1978, the
nine EEC countries.
It would be tempting to conclude that the economic friction between Japan
and the European colonial powers (the United States included) was one of
the reasons for Japan's decision to enter into the war in 1941. It seems more
logical, however, to argue that Japan was, with little preparation, plunged
into the task of building a Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere, an im-
possible task in the eyes of any sensible man. Without the participation of
other industrial nations and especially that of the United States, how could a
still weak Japan afford to economically support the vast area of Southeast
Asia? Japan, by itself, could not, absorb all the products of Southeast Asian
countries, which were suddenly deprived of a large proportion of their tra-
ditional markets in the United States and Europe. If for this reason alone, the
concept of an East Asian Coprosperity Sphere as an exclusive economic zone
was doomed to failure. Japanese administrators in the occupied areas were
forced to adopt an industrialization policy to supply necessary goods to the
local population as well as to the occupying army. There was little possibility
for the success of the industrialization policy pursued under these extremely
unfavorable circumstances. The Japanese concept of the East Asian Copro-
sperity Sphere was premature in the sense that it lacked sound economic
foundations.
The chief concern of economic policymakers for postwar Japan was clearly
how to provide the Japanese people with food and clothing. What importance
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did they give to Japanese access to raw materials and markets in East Asia
for that purpose? A report prepared by a group of economists for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs immediately after Japan's surrender estimated the effects
of the loss of the former spheres of influence upon the Japanese economy:
Foreign territories and spheres of influence had been for some time
brought into a division-of-labor relationship with our country, whereby
they not only supplied us with food (rice, soy beans, grain, sugar, etc.)
and industrial raw materials (iron ore, coal, salt, cotton, etc.), but also
served as markets for our textiles and other industrial products, while
at the same time becoming outlets for our excess population. In recent
years particularly, industrial diversification underwent a marked devel-
opment; in the so-called Japan-Manchukuo-China Comprehensive De-
velopment Plan, projects were laid out for the distribution of industries
in accordance with the suitability of the various regions involved. For
example, steel and light metal foundries and electric power stations
were concentrated in outside territories and in Manchukuo and north
China, where natural resources are plentiful. Large amounts of capital
were invested for this purpose. Though the construction of various in-
dustrial facilities was closely linked to military aims, in the world of
the future, the foundation for the development of a peaceful Japanese
economy will be greatly weakened by the loss of profits from industrial
diversification within spheres of influence, unless it becomes possible
to trade freely, without regard for national boundaries.4
Apparently it was primarily continental Asia that the authors of this report
had in mind when they referred to former Japanese spheres of influence,
although they did not draw a clear line between continental and Pacific Asia.
In refuting the argument that severe limits should be placed upon Japan's
access to resources and markets in East Asia in order to prevent it from
regaining a predominant position in Asia, the report maintained that to hold
Japanese economic strength at an artificially low level would not only "reduce
the Japanese people to extreme penury" but also "hamper the economic re-
covery of other regions in East Asia (toa)."
The report went on to elaborate the ideal relationship between Japan and
East Asia, taking China as an example.
While China would be able to export such products as silk, tea, pighair,
tung oil, carpets, tungsten, etc., the earnings accruing from these exports
would be small. To Japan, however, China can supply the most needed
materials, such as salt, soy beans, coal, and iron ore, without depriving
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itself of the amount demanded for its own needs. In return, Japan can
supply China with manufactured goods, in particular, machinery and
chemicals. As for Japan, given a rather limited amount of exportable
products to American and European markets, it would be impossible to
finance its imports unless it could find markets for its manufactured
goods in Asia (toy6). Even if Japanese industrial products may compare
unfavorably in quality with those of the United States and Europe, they
would be welcomed to the Chinese consumers because of their low
price. Therefore, both from the Chinese and the Japanese viewpoints,
it would be only natural that China import Japanese industrial pro-
ducts. . . . A similar relationship can be also applied to Korea, French
Indochina, and other countries in Asia (toyo). The recovery of Japanese
industry would contribute to the prompt industrialization and the sub-
stantial improvements of living standards of East Asian peoples. It would
be most desirable, therefore, not to hold Japanese economic develop-
ment in check but to promote vigorously the industrialization of Asia
as a whole, including Japan. Moreover, if a poor and populous Asia
succeeded in industrialization, it would provide the United States and
Europe with vast markets and thus contribute greatly to the prosperity
of the entire world.
It is not known how the occupation authorities responded to this concept
of Japan's role in postwar Asia. From the very early days of the occupation
it was clear that the rehabilitation of Japanese commerce and industry would
be essential if the victorious countries wanted to avoid assuming the onerous
responsibility of supporting a defeated Japan for an indefinite period of time.
A logical conclusion would be to allow Japan to participate in international
trade. If a rigorous pruning or even a complete elimination of those Japanese
industries supposed to contribute to war-making potential was desirable on
security grounds, light industries, in particular textiles, would be the inevitable
answer to the Japanese economic problem. Even Great Britain, which was
averse to seeing the resumption of full-grown Japanese competition, would
be ready to leave Southeast Asian markets for cheap Japanese piece goods
as long as it was successfully engaged in more lucrative trade in Latin
America.6
The most benign vision of Japan's role in postwar Asia among the victorious
countries, however, was far from the view entertained by Japanese economic
planners of the day. They tended to emphasize long-term prospects for so-
phisticated products such as machinery and chemicals rather than short-term
prospects for products such as textiles and other consumer goods. One of
the reasons given was that industrialization in many "backward" countries
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(India and China, in particular) was expected to proceed to such an extent
that, although their light industries would become competitive with those of
Japan in due course, a great demand would be created for capital goods.
Japanese machinery would have to compete with American or European pro-
ducts, but according to the Japanese economic planners, the existing socio-
economic conditions in Asian countries would be more favorable for relatively
cheap Japanese machinery than for sophisticated and costly Western machin-
ery.
Another point emerging from the arguments of the Japanese economic
policymakers is their concern about the choice between access and possession.
According to them:
The tendency toward American domination of the world economy is
destroying autarchy and making possible a system of international trade
that can be carried on with a minimum of barriers. This will lead toward
full employment and higher standards of living throughout the
world. . . . There is some doubt as to the extent to which the defeated
nations and the backward nations will be allowed to share the profits
of increased world trade, and the effectiveness of the new system will
to some degree be reduced so long as the Soviet Union and those in its
sphere of influence do not participate, but at all events, this trend in
the postwar world economy bodes well for the future of Japan, which
is highly reliant upon trade for its subsistence.8
Implied in this line of argument is the notion of the economic vulnerability
of Japan. In 1938 the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Arita Hachiro, was
reported to have stated that if free access to foreign markets and raw materials
were denied Japan, it would be necessary for Japan to "acquire certain access
to necessary raw materials" by possessing its own spheres of influence9 The
policymakers of the postwar Japanese economy were now saying that, given
the failure of the old method of acquiring access to markets and resources,
the only conceivable way would be to have a chance to participate in "a
system of international trade that can be carried on with a minimum of bar-
riers." This is why they welcomed what they thought was the American
approach to "one world." And this is one of the important sources of the
globalism which was to characterize Japanese thinking in the postwar period.
Although the concept of free trade requires globalism, the immediate concern
of Japanese economic planners was whether Japan would be allowed access
to markets and raw materials in Asia.10
The United States also had its view of Japan's role in postwar Asia.11
Willian Sebald, chairman of the Allied Council for Japan, stated in 1947 that
the reconstruction of Japanese industry would be indispensable for the Far
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East, adding that full rehabilitation had to wait for the resumption of free
trade, which was to come after the peace settlement with Japan. General
Chang Chen, Chinese representative to the council, emphasized the impor-
tance of mutually beneficial arrangements between China and Japan, sug-
gesting that China would be ready to supply an increasing amount of raw
materials to Japan, but added that, given the poor state of production facilities
in China after many years of war, Japan should first assist China in recon-
structing mines, factories, and transportation.12
By the spring of 1947, officials in the various agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment who were concerned with Japan came to subscribe to the idea that
Japanese industrial capacity could and should be utilized for the positive
purpose of economic recovery of the entire region of Asia. There were dif-
ferences, however, among the State and Defense departments, the Economic
Cooperation Administration (ECA), and the General Headquarters in Tokyo
about the way in which this could be brought about. Apart from the ordinary
interbureaucratic rivalry over the pursestrings, they differed in substance about
the connection between China (continental Asia) and Southeast Asia (Pacific
Asia) and about the relationship between economic and military approaches.
In short, the dispute was between those who insisted that the Communists
should be contained on the Asiatic continent and those who thought that they
should be contained on its periphery. The former favored an active intervention
in Chinese affairs even by military means and were opposed to opening a
commercial window with China. The latter argued for a policy of securing
Southeast Asia for the West, while encouraging the new forces in China to
look west by maintaining certain social and economic contacts with them.
On the whole, the moderates in the State Department and the army, including
General MacArthur, prevailed over the militant faction until the outbread of
Korean hostilities.
What implications did these developments have for Japan's role in Asia?
First, irrespective of the differences among U.S. policymakers about specific
aspects of the containment policy, they all agreed on the strategic importance
of Southeast Asia in United States policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The
economic backwardness and anti-European nationalism in many countries of
the region provided, it seemed, an ideal opportunity for the Soviet design of
expanding its own influence. The Japanese experience in Southeast Asia before
1941 was now considered a valuable asset that could be utilized by the United
States for the purpose of promoting political stability and economic prosperity
in Asia. The prewar triangular patterns of the Asian trade were thus rehabili-
tated at least in the papers of the U.S. government, although one particular
side of the triangle, that connecting Southeast Asia with Europe, now seemed
precarious.
Second, although the emphasis in U.S. policy toward Asia shifted clearly
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from China to Japan, it still remained ambivalent about whether Japan could
be maintained without China—an element that seemed an essential condition
for its economic viability. It was now U.S. policymakers who asked the same
question that had intrigued Japanese economic planners in 1945. The authors
of The Basic Problems of Reconstruction of The Japanese Economy raised
the question of whether Japan could achieve a self-sustained economy without
its former colonies and spheres of influence, which had provided about 30
percent of its imports (mostly raw materials) and 37 percent of its exports
before the war.13 In the same vein, American policymakers now asked them-
selves with whom Japan could integrate in Asia, after the loss of Manchuria,
China, Korea, Formosa, and Sakhalin which had supplied Japan before 1941
with about 35 percent of its raw materials and absorbed 40 percent of its
14
exports.
The answer the Americans gave to that question was also similar to the
one given by the Japanese: an uninterrupted access to Asian markets and raw
materials would be essential for Japan. Well before the Japanese defeat and
the Cold War, an American expert on Japan wrote, "The real issue with
respect to Japan's economic future is rooted in postwar international com-
mercial policy. / / the United Nations move toward lessened impediments to
international trade rather than in the direction of intensified economic na-
tionalism and super-protectionism, Japan—without colonies—can live and
prosper" (emphasis in original).15
The new problem was, however, that the likely form of impediments to
international trade was neither the exclusion of the defeated nations (as the
Japanese feared) nor the revival of economic nationalism of the 1930s (as
envisioned perhaps by both American and Japanese analysts), but communist
expansion through Asia. The Americans, fearing communist domination of
the entire region of Asia, deemed it essential to secure Southeast Asia as a
vital segment in a "great crescent" of containment that ran from Japan through
island and mainland Southeast Asia, India, and Australia. The question
remained, however, whether continental Asia was already out of the reach
of Western influence. No final answer was given to this question until the
outbreak of the Korean War.
An ambitious idea for an Asian version of the Marshall Plan, which would
attempt to secure not only Southeast Asia but also at least parts of continental
Asia, gradually lost ground to the more modest version of containment. Ac-
cording to the latter approach, a commercial window with mainland China
should be kept open in the expectation that Beijing, even under a communist
regime, might take a course independent of Moscow. It was therefore per-
missible for Japan to have a certain level of commercial relations with China,
although an excessive dependence of her economy on the Asian continent
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would be dangerous. Japan should be encouraged to cultivate its economic
relations with Southeast Asia, maintaining at the same time low-key trade
relations with China. As a result of this policy, the volume of Japanese trade
with China in 1950 rose to $59 million despite the victory of the Chinese
communists in October 1949.17
Thus, in the evolution of American thinking about Japan's role in Asia, a
distinction existed between Southeast and Northeast Asia even before the
victory of the communists on the Asian continent. Although Southeast Asia
was regarded as the natural frontier for Japanese economic expansion, China
(or Northeast Asia in general) was not completely excluded in the American
concept of an Asia with which Japan could integrate economically. But Ameri-
can policymakers placed greater emphasis on Japan's regional role in South-
east Asia. It was often ambiguous whether keeping communism out of
Southeast Asia was the end and Japanese economic recovery was the means
for it or vice versa. American policymakers around 1950 were haunted, as
the Japanese war planners before 1941 had been, by the idea that Japan was
so economically vulnerable that it had to be assured access to markets and
raw materials in that part of Asia within its own political influence.
The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 changed the political and
ideological context in which Japan's relations with Southeast Asia were dis-
cussed. With regard to China, it shifted the advantage within the U.S. gov-
ernment from the moderate to the militant faction. China, at that time, was
clearly designated as an enemy to the West with whom trade was explicitly
prohibited. Following the American ban on the China trade, Japan's Ministry
for International Trade and Industry adopted measures in October 1950 to
strengthen the embargo of strategic materials to China.18 In December the
GHQ issued a directive by which all trade with China was prohibited. These
developments obviously added great weight to the argument that the Japanese
would need to be assured markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia.
The war also brought about a very important change in the general con-
ditions surrounding the Japanese economy. The effects of the war on the
economy were indicated dramatically in the sharp increase of Japanese dollar
exports: the first half of 1950 (i.e., before the effects of the war had appeared)
witnessed nearly a 30 percent increase in dollar exports as compared with the
preceding six months, and the second half saw as much as a 54 percent increase
over the preceding half-year period. This trend continued into the following
year although at a declining pace (a 33 percent and a 4.7 percent increase
during the first and the second halves). The offshore procurements—special
demand procurement orders (tokuju) placed by the U.S. forces in Japan in
order to support the fighting efforts in Korea—played an extremely large role
in these developments. The dollar earnings accrued from special demand
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procurements accounted for 19.3 percent of the total figures of exports and
14.8 percent of the total dollar earnings of Japan in 1950. The comparable
figures for the following year were 45.6 percent and 26.4 percent.20
Although these developments helped to fill the chronic dollar gap in Japan,
their effects were temporary. In fact, the economic boom caused by the Korean
War began to subside in 1952 when an agreement for a ceasefire in Korea
appeared imminent. Japanese exports saw a 1.4 percent decline during the
first half of 1952 and a 13.7 percent decline during the latter half as compared
with the preceding six months.21
It was under these circumstances that a new scheme, "U.S.-Japan Eco-
nomic Cooperation," was discussed in the early months of 1951 among U.S.
and Japanese officials who were closely involved in Japan's economic
policy. The program was intended to prolong the spending of U.S. dollars
in Japan for military purposes even after the immediate procurement needs
related to the Korean War ceased to exist. For this purpose economic poli-
cymakers in the GHQ in Tokyo recommended to Washington that Japan's
industrial capacity and manpower should be mobilized to the fullest extent
possible in support of the free world's military efforts in Asia. Military and
economic rationales were thus closely combined in the concept of economic
cooperation under which Japan was expected to receive special procurement
orders. This explains the continued dollar earnings from procurements, which
increased rather than decreased after the Korean ceasefire.
Southeast Asia weighed very much in the concept of U.S.-Japanese Eco-
nomic Cooperation. According to a GHQ position paper entitled "Japan's
Economic Recovery and Future Progress Toward Economic Cooperation with
the United States" (27 June 1951):
Japan has considerable excess industrial capacity and manpower
available for use in support of the free world economic programs. In
terms of index numbers on the industrial activity index it is about 50
points. In terms of the value of additional manufactured products it is
about $2.7 billion per year. From this capacity it should be possible to
accrue at least $1.0 billion in the form of special procurement—in-
creasing current special demand procurement to five times the present
level. It is clear that American policy is now dedicated to the fullest
possible utilization of this surplus capacity.
Utilization of this surplus capacity is limited currently by the availa-
bility of the necessary raw materials. Imported raw materials and food
valued at about $3.2 billion will be required for capacity operations.
This compares with estimated imports for 1951 amounting to $1.9 bil-
lion. . . . Ideally, Japan's position today can best be alleviated by find-
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ing new or underdeveloped sources of supply within economic shipping
distances which might be paid for in whole or part with finished products
needed in the source areas.24
The same document went on to describe the historical interest of Japan in
developing raw material sources and Japan's exploration of sources in South-
east Asia before 1941. In short, the program's intent was to combine Japan's
surplus industrial capacity with the underdeveloped sources of raw materials
in Southeast Asia for the purpose of supporting American military efforts
there.
Various steps were taken to implement this idea in 1951 and 1952. For
example, contact was made with Japanese engineers who had worked or
surveyed the mines in Southeast Asia before and during the Pacific War. On
the request of the GHQ, they submitted Southeast Asian development projects.
A Japanese export bank was established in February 1951 to aid in financing
such projects. Experts were sent from Japan to the countries in the region
(forty-three to Taiwan, thirty-six to Pakistan, fourteen to Thailand, six to
India, five to Indonesia, two to Burma, and one to Ceylon by the end of
February 1952). Preliminary negotiations for projects of mineral and marine
resources development were under way in early 1952 with the Philippines,
Goa, Taiwan, Indochina, India, Burma, and Macao.
It is probable that the concept of economic cooperation was virtually a
joint product of American and Japanese economic policymakers concerned
with the long-term prospects for Japan's economic self-reliance.26 The Eco-
nomic Stabilization Board of the Japanese government stated in February 1952
that Japan should establish a viable economy as quickly as possible by, among
other steps, "promoting and tightening her economic cooperation with the
United States, Southeast Asian countries, and other democratic countries in
order to contribute to their defense production and economic development. "2 7
The wording of this document closely resembles that of the American
officials of the day. It is questionable, however, to what extent the Japanese
committed themselves to the underlying philosophy of the U.S. policy. Two
things at least are worth mentioning. First, the Japanese talked about the
necessity for the strengthening of the defense production of Southeast Asian
countries and the self-defense power of Japan itself, but apparently with certain
reservations. It is well known that Prime Minister Yoshida offered stubborn
resistance to John Foster Dulles's pressure for larger defense efforts on the
part of the Japanese government. Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato presented
Japan's case when he met with Walter Robertson in October 1953.28 It is
significant that the ESB document cited above did not mention defense pro-
duction in Southeast Asia when listing the concrete measures to be taken.
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It simply said, "Japan will cooperate more actively with the economic de-
velopment of Southeast Asia along the lines of the economic assistance pro-
grams of the United States and the economic development programs of
Southeast Asian countries and thereby increase the imports of goods and
materials from this area and improve the balance of sterling trade."29 One
may conclude that the Japanese were interested in purely economic aspects
of the U.S. security program and other related programs in Asia, giving only
lip service to American beliefs about the military-strategic significance of
those programs.
The second point is concerned with the China problem. Given the wide-
spread feeling of Japan's economic insecurity in anticipation of the end of
American tutelage, many Japanese economic policymakers were unsure
whether raw materials and markets for their industrial products in Southeast
Asia would be a sufficient replacement for Chinese markets. They were also
well aware of the strong suspicion, if not outright hostility, among Southeast
Asian peoples toward Japan. Therefore, while accepting the idea that coop-
eration for economic development in Southeast Asia would be desirable in
the interest of political stability of the region as well as for a self-sustained
economy of Japan, Japanese policymakers recognized that such a policy ought
to be based on the "principle of mutually beneficial cooperative relationship"
and that importance to be given to Southeast Asian development projects
should be balanced against the long-term prospects for Chinese markets. They
were far from being naive about the American willingness to support Asian
development genuinely for economic purposes, reminding themselves of the
probable financial burden that would rest on their own shoulders for any
successful implementation of economic cooperation with Southeast Asia.
A similar view was expressed in a book by two prominent Japanese experts
on the Asian economy. They criticized the current trend of thought in which
Southeast Asia was pictured from an outsider's viewpoint, primarily as raw
materials sources or markets for Japanese goods. They specifically mentioned
the oft-quoted phrase, "economic development of Southeast Asia as an integral
part of U.S.-Japanese economic cooperation," which had also, according to
them, a similar connotation. The authors of the book were circumspect about,
if not opposed to, the integration of the Japanese economy with Southeast
Asia. They thought that Japan could do without Chinese raw materials except
for one important item—coal. They thought that the time would come "in
several years or in less than two decades" when a substantial amount of coal
had to be imported from abroad; then "Chinese resources would again assume
a very important role in Japanese industry." Japanese industrial products
would have to face severe competition from American and European products
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in Southeast Asian markets where Japan was only temporarily enjoying fa-
vorable conditions in price and quantity because products of the United States
and Europe were directed to other areas in the wake of the Korean War.31
The idea of economic integration of Japan with Southeast Asia was en-
visaged by some who entertained an ambitious idea of securing a great crescent
of Asia for the West by combining Japan's industrial capacity with raw ma-
terials in Southeast Asia. But that was only part of the picture. At least from
the Japanese viewpoint, the idea that Japan could and should have a role in
economic development in Asia was older than U.S. containment policy. When
amalgamated with the American version, the Japanese concept of its role in
Asia still maintained Japanese characteristics. China was excluded by cir-
cumstances, not design, and Southeast Asia failed to satisfy Japan's immediate
economic needs. It was some years later that the Japanese economy began to
have a significant impact on economic development in the region. The im-
mediate answer to Japan's economic needs had to be found in the opening
of markets in advanced industrial countries. After the mid-1950s, Japanese
economic policymakers adopted a new, two-front strategy: producing capital-
intensive goods that were exportable to developing countries on the one hand
(this part of the strategy was a continuation of the old concept of Japan's
regional role), and producing labor-intensive goods exportable to advanced
countries on the other.32 The success of this new strategy depended, of course,
on the attitudes of the other industrial countries, especially the United States.
What fate this new strategy was to have belongs to a different story. Suffice
it to say that it did succeed, and that consequently the Japanese economy
became closely involved in the global, rather than merely regional, network
of economic interdependence. Japan's regional role, which began to assume
some importance after the late 1960s, should, therefore, be examined in that
perspective.
1. The Communist portions of the four divided countries (Vietnam, Korea, China, and
Germany) and Mongolian People's Republic are not counted for the purpose of this paper.
2. Keizai shingicho, choseibu, "Tonan ajiyashokoku tono keizaiteikei no sokushin ni
tsuite," 20 May 1953, 4.
3. Hosoya Chihiro (ed.), Taiheiyo-ajiya-ken no kokusai keizaifunso-shi 1922-45 [A history
of international economic conflicts in Pacific-Asia: 1922-45] (Tokyo, 1983).
4. Gaimusho chosakyoku, Nihon keizai saiken no kihonmondai [Basic problems for the
reconstruction of Japanese economy], (September 1946), 42.
5. Ibid., 89-90.
6. An article by Sydney Cambell of Reuters, quoted in Shimamoto Toru, Nihon keizai no
saiken [The reconstruction of Japanese economy] (Tokyo, 1948), 158-59. For a broader survey
94 Akio Watanabe
of British opinion of Japan in the early postwar period, see Gordon Daniel, "Britain's View of
Postwar Japan, 1945-49," in Ian Nish, ed., Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952 (Cambridge,
1982), 257-78.
7. Gaimusho, Ninon Keizai, 138-42, 10-11. See also Shozaburo Sakai, "Ninon sangyo
saihensei no kadai" [Problems for restructuring Japanese industry], in Hamano Ichiro, ed., Nihon
keizai saiken no riron [Theory of Japanese economic reconstruction], (Tokyo, 1948), 288-302.
8. Gaimusho, Nihon Keizai, 88.
9. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941,
vol. I, 802. This passage of Mr. Arita's statement is quoted in Harold G. Moulton and Louis
Marlio, The Control of Germany and Japan, (Washington, DC, 1944), 78.
10. I have discussed the same topic in a somewhat different perspective in "From Bitter
Enmity to Cold Partnership, 1945-52," in Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 229-55.
11. For a more detailed account of this subject, see Michael Schaller, The American Oc-
cupation of Japan, (New York, 1985). This author has also benefited from reading Michael
Schaller, "Japan, China and Southeast Asia: Regional Integration and Containment, 1947-1950,"
a paper presented to the Norfolk Conference in 1982 on the occupation of Japan.
12. Asahi Shinbun, October 2, 1947. See also Asakai Koichiro, Shoki tainichi senryo seisaku
[Allied Policy toward Japan in the Early Years of Occupation], (Tokyo, 1979), vol.2, 259-65.
13. Gaimusho, Nihon Keizai, 41. Included in these areas were Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin,
the South Sea mandated islands (nanyo), Manchuria, the leased province of Kwantung, and China
proper.
14. Schaller, "Japan, China and Southeast Asia," 11.
15. Moulton and Marlio, Control of Germany and Japan, 84.
16. Policy Planning Staff (PPS) file 51, as quoted by Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great
Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," The Journal of
American History 69(2) (September 1982): 402.
17. Hagiwara Toru, Nihon gaikoshi [Diplomatic History of Japan], vol. 30, (Tokyo, 1972),
412.
18. Ibid.
19. Okurasho Zaiseishishitsu, comp., Showa zaiseishi: shusen kara kowa made [A history
of finance in the showa period: From the surrender to the peace treaty], vol. 19: Statistics (Tokyo,
1978), 107.
20. See Nakamura Takafusa, "Nichibei keizai kyoryoku kankei no keisei" [The formation
of economic cooperation relationship between Japan and the United States], in Nakamura, ed.,
Kindai nihon kenkyu, vol.4, Taiheiyo senso [A study on modern Japan, vol.4: The Pacific War]
(Tokyo, 1983), 284. Nakamura used both broad and narrow concepts of special demand pro-
curements. Figures cited here are in the broad sense, namely figures which include spending for
private consumption by U.S. military personnel and their familites in Japan in addition to military
orders in the strict sense.
21. Okurasho, Showa, 107.
22. See Nakamura's essay, cited in n. 20; also Hagiwara, Nihon gaikoshi, 99-106.
23. These post-Korean War procurements were called "new special demand procurements"
(shin-tokuju) and contributed to 63.9 percent of Japan's total exports and 36.8 percent of its total
foreign exchange earnings in 1952. The comparable figures for 1953 were even larger: 70.0
percent and 38.2 percent. After 1954 the importance of procurement earnings began to decline,
but their accumulated amount during the period 1950 to 1957 came to $5.2 billion. This figure
should be compared to $2 billion, the total amount of U.S. aid to occupied Japan. See Nakamura,
Nihon gaikoshi, 284-85.
Southeast Asia 95
24. The National Archives, Record Group 331, Box 8355. The author of this document is
unknown. Judging from the content and the date, however, it was probably written by someone
who worked for the Economic and Scientific Section of the GHQ in Tokyo. The Economic
Cooperation Program started officially in June 1951.
25. Keizai antei honbu (Economic Stabilization Board), "Tonan ajiya keizai kaihatsu ni
taisuru kyoryoku ni kansuru genjo no setsumei" ("An explanation of the present state of affairs
concerning economic cooperation with regard to Southeast Asian economic development), 27
February 1952. See also ESB, "Interim Progress Report on Southeast Asian Development," 4
January 1952. I have been unable to identify those Japanese engineers and other experts who
were mobilized for these projects.
26. See Senga Tetsuya's interview in Osanai Hiroshi and Kondo Kanichi, eds., Sengo san-
gyoshi e no shogen (Testimony on history of postwar Japanese industry) (Tokyo, 1978), 217.
Mr. Senga was an executive officer of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)
at that time.
27. ESB, "Establishment of a Viable Economy and Promotion of Economic Cooperation,"
12 February 1952, 1.
28. Miyazawa Kiichi, Tokyo-Washington no mitsudan [Secret talks between Tokyo and
Washington], (Tokyo, 1956), 250-54.
29. ESB, "Establishment of a Viable Economy," 2, 7.
30. ESB, "Tonan ajiya keizaikaihatsu ni taisuru kyoryoku sokushin no tameno mondaiten"
[Some problems in the way of the promotion of cooperation with Southeast Asia for economic
development], 25 February 1952, 1-2.
31. Okita Saburo and Hara Kakuten, Ajiya keizai to nihon [Asian economy and Japan],
(Tokyo, 1952), 1, 179-80, and 183-84. Okita was among the authors who wrote the Gaimusho
report on "The Basic Problems of Reconstruction of Japanese Economy" and was an ESB official
at the time of writing this book in 1952. He left the ESB to take up a post in the ECAFE
(Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) at Bangkok in April 1952.
32. This strategy is known as the "Okita Plan." See Okita Saburo, "Watashi no rirekisho"
(The course of my life), 23d in the series, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 1981.
6
Decline of Relations
during the Vietnam War
WALTER LAFEBER
At the beginning of the 1960 to 1975 era, expert observers characterized
United States-Japan ties with the term "inevitable harmony," or "a sense that
Japan's future was inseparably linked to that of the United States." At the
end of the era, Theodore Draper; a respected analyst, condemned the lack of
"mutuality and reciprocity" in the relationship, then concluded that "the
Japanese 'alliance' is either a courtesy title or a convenient fiction."1 After
allowing for overstatement, Draper's words indicated what had happened to
the relationship during the years of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. By
1975 the ties between the two nations approached a historical norm, a norm
that was closer to the relationship of the 1920s or the pre-1904 years than the
relationship of 1945 to 1960.
Some acute observers anticipated the change. In 1964 the U.S. Department
of State, with the aid of the American embassy in Tokyo, compiled a secret
policy paper on "The Future of Japan." It prophesied the following:
Looking ahead over the next ten years, we can expect to find our-
selves dealing with an increasingly strong, confident and nationalistic
Japan. Pro-Western, conservative elements will probably retain control
at least until 1969 or 1970, possibly alternating power thereafter with
socialist governments of considerably more moderate hue than today's
Japan Socialist Party. . . . Japan's economic and security relations with
the U.S. will remain vitally important to it—and scarcely less so to
us—but the relationship will become less predominant in Japan's foreign
relations and more pragmatic as Japan seeks its own way in the world
and attempts to reduce its present extraordinary dependence on the
U.S. China will remain an area of potential policy difference with us,
but with the odds against a major split on recognition and other basic
issues, partly because of the broad consensus in Japan in favor of self-
determination on Taiwan. . . .
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It is difficult to see how Japan's minimum economic goals can be
attained unless Japan is afforded opportunity to expand its sales in the
U.S. market at least in proportion with the growth of the U.S. GNP. . . .
This will require firm Executive Branch resistance of American industry
demands for curtailment of Japanese imports. . . . It is only less im-
portant that when the U.S. must act contrary to Japanese trading inter-
ests, time and effort be taken to put the best possible face on the
action . . . instead of the Japanese learning of the matter for the first
time through Washington press announcements, as so often in the past.
An attempt to predict Japanese developments ten years ahead should
allow sufficient of the saving element of the earthquakes and typhoons
that mark the natural scene.
Remarkably prophetic, especially on problems of trade, China, and prior
notice, the paper did miss several "earthquakes" that soon shook the rela-
tionship. The State Department notably failed to emphasize the two problems
that climaxed in the Nixon shocks of 1971 and pushed relations to a postwar
nadir: Vietnam and Okinawa.
These four policy issues (trade, Southeast Asia, China, Okinawa) reshaped
the traditional postwar relationship between Washington and Tokyo during
the 1960 to 1975 years. The pivotal turns in that course can be traced by
examining the four issues during two crucial junctures: 1965 to 1968 and
1969 to 1973.
As John Kennedy escalated the American effort in Vietnam, the United
States ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, understood that "inevitable
harmony" was giving way to a more painful "slow equalization of the part-
nership, " and, as he recalled, "I began using the word partnership" to describe
the process. Having survived the uproar over the security treaty fight in 1960,
the relationship soon centered not on large strategic policy issues, but on trade
and less important diplomatic problems. Kennedy helped salve the wounds
of the 1960 debate less by taking an active part in decision making (aston-
ishingly few references to Japan exist in the memoirs and histories of his
presidency), but by being personally popular among Japanese and allowing
experts such as Reischauer to handle relations. In Japan, Prime Minister Ikeda
Hayato similarly healed the fissures by adopting a so-called low posture that
created few political headlines and focused on economic development. By
1963 Ikeda's Liberal Democratic party won a resounding electoral victory.
In 1964 his country ranked sixth in world economic productivity, and during
the next three years Japan's economy passed West Germany, Great Britain,
and France to place just behind the two superpowers.4
The effect on U.S.-Japan trade began to gain attention about 1965, just as
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Americans began to die in Vietnam in large numbers. A trade balance long
favorable to the United States turned unfavorable; by 1968 the U.S. deficit
had quadrupled the deficit of 1967. An internal State Department history
summarized the results: "Of these [problems], one of the most important was
the coincidence of Japanese economic and trade growth with the worsening
of the U.S. balance of payments. The United States, therefore, while keeping
Japan's unique circumstances in mind, encouraged Japanese efforts to achieve
a greater sense of independence, and began to look to Japan to implement its
new position in the Free World by assuming duties and responsibilities com-
mensurate with its strength.
The State Department believed, in other words, that Japan would not use
its new wealth to help in Vietnam. The problem went deeper. If the Vietnam
War had not occurred, the trade turnaround would still have happened; the
aging United States industrial plant would still have been on a collision course
with the newly restructured Japanese economy. Washington officials grew
bitter as Japan maintained high trade and investment barriers.6 On a visit to
Washington, Foreign Minister Miki Takeo responded by criticizing American
business, especially textiles and steel, for retreating to a 1930s kind of pro-
tectionism that thwarted Japanese trade.
Vietnam, however, sharpened the growing animosity. The Japanese, in
American eyes, never really understood how the conflict influenced the Tokyo-
Washington relationship. But as early as November 1966, U.S. financial
experts noted that although Japan's economy had slumped in 1965, its growth
rate leaped from 2.7 percent to 7.5 percent in 1966—helped by nearly $1
billion spent in Japan by the United States for goods needed in the Vietnam
effort.8
Resolving structural problems developing in the "partnership" was sub-
ordinated to a Vietnam struggle that soon consumed Washington's attention.
Memoirs from the Johnson administration contain few more references to
Japan than do those of the Kennedy years. The president seemed interested
in his most important Asian ally almost solely because of the help it might
give in Vietnam.9 Johnson, however, never consulted with Sato Eisaku, Ike-
da's successor, before deciding to bomb North Vietnam in 1965 or to escalate
the ground fighting.10 Sato, who agreed with Johnson's policies more than
did other leaders of the Liberal Democratic party, publicly went along with
the United States escalation.
Severe doubts quickly appeared, however. One American involved in Viet-
nam planning, James C. Thomson Jr., recalled that "A Japanese, early on,
told me a wondrous thing that made my hair stand on end. . . . 'We tried
that twenty years ago, and it was a terrible mistake to do.' " n Others objected
publicly. Matsumoto Shigeharu, chairman of the International House of Japan,
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wrote in Japan Quarterly during early 1966, "As the domestic situation stands
in Japan at the moment, a war between America and Communist China would
split the nation in two, one half pro-American and the other antiwar, with a
danger of disturbances approaching a civil war in scale." Reischauer be-
lieved affairs had reached the point where he had to announce that the loss
of Japan would be more serious to U.S. interests than the loss of Vietnam.
He delayed leaving Tokyo in mid-1965, as he had planned, to spend another
year smoothing over growing cracks in the relationship.13
Washington's public statements did not lessen the tension. Assistant Sec-
retary of State William P. Bundy condemned Japanese conservatives for dis-
playing too much "tolerance" for Communists in Vietnam, China, and at
home. Another State Department official, Douglas MacArthur II, announced
that Japan's two largest newspapers had been "infiltrated" by Communists,
a charge the State Department had to retract. A great architect of the postwar
alliance, Yoshida Shigeru, declared from retirement that racism distorted the
American view of Asian realities.14 When Johnson thought of planning a visit
to Japan in late 1966, the reaction from Tokyo was immediate: "inconceiv-
able."15 By 1968, what had once perhaps been inadvertence had become
policy: the U.S. embassy in Tokyo advised that on Vietnam strategy Japan
should be ignored.
As Matsumoto observed, the two nations differed over how United States
policy might affect China. In 1964, the People's Republic (PRC) had exploded
a nuclear device. National Security Council Asian experts warned NSC adviser
McGeorge Bundy that although "Sato is a high-posture man, ready to lead
Japan toward a long-term UK-type dependability as a US ally," the "key issue
on Sato's mind is Communist China. . . . He is willing to play along with
us on China," but only if Washington had a tenable long-term plan; he wanted
no more "cliches [that] he has heard before."16 During a visit to Japan in
1964, George Kennan had been struck over "the extent to which Communist
China now dominates the external horizon of Japanese opinion," Japan's
desire for better relations with the PRC, and "a perfectly natural desire among
the Japanese to escape at least partially from the cloying exclusiveness of the
American tie.'
Kennan's analysis raised few echoes in Washington. Lyndon Johnson es-
calated the U.S. commitment in Vietnam precisely to contain China. When
State Department officials at the desk level moved to open consideration of
relations with the PRC, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in Thomson's words,
refused "to move one inch on China policy." When Kennan publicly sug-
gested a relaxation of both the American view of China and the U.S.-Japan
security arrangement, the Johnson administration quickly informed the Japa-
nese that any "general concept of [U.S.] disengagement in this area" is nothing
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more than "beautiful dreams," to use Reischauer's words.19 Privately, Reis-
chauer warned Vice President Hubert Humphrey that China was the "deeply
disturbing thing. This lurks behind all [the Japanese] think about Vietnam."20
With the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device and growing Japanese
doubt about U.S. policy, momentum grew in Sato's government during late
1964 and 1965 to establish official diplomatic relations with the PRC.21 Trade
between the two Asian powers grew until Japan became China's premier
trading partner in 1966. Rusk tried to keep his policy on course by assuring
Foreign Minister Shiina Etsasaburo that despite the Chinese nuclear success,
"The United States in no sense limits its commitment to Japan in terms of
the weapons employed. It would be literal madness for anyone to contemplate
the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear blackmail against Japan. The United
States considers its security arrangements with Japan entirely valid without
regard to the nature of weapons used. " 2 3 Security, however, was not the main
problem; apparently no serious discussions were held about modifying the
1960 arrangements, although Tokyo officials sent up trial balloons about
curing "nuclear allergy."24 Politics and trade, however, were quite different
issues.
The United States tried to hold the line politically (especially by preventing
formal Tokyo-Beijing relations and PRC entry into the United Nations), while
surrendering to the inevitable Japanese-Chinese trade ties. Some U.S. officials
(although apparently not Rusk) even thought this approach could be turned
to their advantage. In a discussion with Miki Takeo, secretary general of the
Liberal Democratic party, on January 13, 1965, Vice President-elect Hum-
phrey laid out the more flexible line. The United States would oppose rec-
ognition of the PRC or its admission to the U.N., Humphrey began, but he
understood personally that Japan would develop economic relations with the
Chinese "even if we didn't like it." He only worried about the conditions:
"For example, it would be injurious to our position in the world for Japan to
give more favorable credit and terms to Communist China than to England,
the Philippines or to us." Through trade, moreover, "Japan could act to reduce
some of the aggressive, militant spirit of Communist China." Speaking in-
dividually, as he stressed he was doing, Humphrey concluded that "Japanese
trade with the Mainland could be a positive factor." Miki nicely replied "that
Japan thought about its trade with Communist China in exactly the way Vice
President-elect Humphrey had stated."
The deal thus emerged that Japan could profit economically as long as it
cooperated politically and followed a trade policy of playing no favorites.
Neither part of that deal helped the effort in Vietnam. Rusk told Johnson on
the eve of Sato's visit in November 1967 that the United States wanted larger
pledges for economic aid, postwar rehabilitation, "international police-
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keeping," and double the $100 million Sato already was giving the Asian
Development Bank. Rusk also wanted the Japanese to ease pressure for the
return of Okinawa, at least until U.S. security in Southeast Asia improved.26
Sato finally agreed with Johnson's public communique summarizing their talks
that attacked the "present intransigent attitude" of the PRC. The prime min-
ister then told a Diet committee in Tokyo that he could "neither affirm nor
deny" that China had aggressive tendencies, and he repeatedly denied that
his government viewed the PRC as a "hypothetical enemy."27 Sato took this
position although 1967 marked a low tide in Sino-Japanese affairs, especially
in the trade area, where the Cultural Revolution caused a downturn.
Rusk was not pleased by Japan's performance, even though Japan had tried
to help some in Vietnam by urging Soviet officials to restrain Ho Chi Minh.29
Writing to Johnson in 1967, Rusk lamented the lack of a "more mature and
responsible attitude on the part of Japan towards the threat posed by Chinese
Communists and by the internal instability of the countries on the periphery
of China." Rusk now sounded quite different about the security pact arrange-
ment than he had when talking with Shiina two years before: the Japanese
should understand that American support "for our own commitments in Asia"
could depend on Japan's becoming more responsible in the region.30 The
developing American view was summarized in The Nation of January 15,
1968: "It seems the Japanese Governments have made an important distinction
between the safety of Japan and the containment of communism."
Rusk and Johnson were particularly bitter that Japan had not been a better
partner in regional security and development. A fundamental reason for the
original American involvement in Vietnam between 1949 and 1954 had been
the assumption that Vietnam had to be held as part of a security package
(including capitalist economic development) for the entire region—especially
for Japan. Only by keeping Southeast Asian markets open could the United
States prevent intolerable Japanese-Chinese relations.32 In 1963, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, at the start of a long fascination with Japan, hoped that "Japanese
resentment against the United States for impeding trade with China might be
overcome" if Japan assumed "regional responsibility for guiding and inspiring
the development of Asia."33
Walt Whitman Rostow, of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff
(and soon to become Johnson's National Security Advisor), broadened Brze-
zinski's approach. In March 1965, he explained to Johnson how the United
States could resolve the dilemma of growing, narrow nationalisms while pre-
serving American preeminence: "It is our interest in each of the regions of
the free world to assist in the development of local arrangements which, while
reducing their direct dependence on the United States, would leave the regions
open to cooperative military, economic, and political arrangements with the
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U.S. This requires of us a systematic policy designed to strengthen the hand
of the moderates in the regions and to reduce the power of extremists—
whether those extremists are Communists or ambitious nationalists anxious
to take over and dominate their regions."34
Rostow's formula strikingly resembled the Nixon Doctrine of four years
later. More immediately, it served as a rationale for escalating the effort in
Vietnam. Rostow later believed that the turning point for Asian regionalism
was Johnson's speech at the Johns Hopkins University in April 1965 when
the president both announced the military escalation and pledged a massive
regional development effort in Southeast Asia. An Asian Development Bank
appeared, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) met for the first time, and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) revived in 1965.
Rostow hoped Japan would help lead the movement as "a way of moving
out from the home islands in a setting of multilateral institutions which dimmed
painful memories of . . . Japanese imperialism." Sato cooperated by con-
tributing $200 million to the Asian Development Bank. Foreign Minister Miki
apparently coined the phrase "Asia-Pacific Concept" to replace the bad con-
notations of "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." (Miki further clarified
his position by calling the Vietnam conflict "a civil war," apparently to Sato's
displeasure, not to mention Rusk's.36) Tokyo's initiatives pleased Washing-
ton. In September 1965, Fukuda Takeo, minister of international trade and
industry, told Reischauer that he wanted to discuss Japan's aid to Southeast
Asia and "Japan's access to U.S. capital sources." Reischauer responded
warmly.37 Records of the ensuing conversations in Washington are apparently
not declassified, but the Fukuda plan resembles the Lamont-Kajiwara deal
that opened New York bank resources for Japanese development of Manchuria
after World War I.
The Lamont-Kajiwara agreement never fulfilled American hopes, and nei-
ther, for the Johnson administration, did Japan's contribution to regionalism
in the 1960s. The Sato government joined ASPAC only on the understanding
that it would not become involved with anti-Communist or anti-Beijing poli-
cies.38 Japan's contribution to the Asian Development Bank increased only
after fervent pleas from Johnson. Japanese investment in Southeast Asia did
increase; by 1967 Japan's auto companies had gained control of the Thai
market and textile investments expanded through the region. But such in-
vestment was not what Americans had in mind when they called for Japan
to take a lead. They wanted a major, ongoing contribution to security, par-
ticularly in Vietnam, and particularly after the British announced in early 1968
that they would withdraw their military forces from Malaysia and Singapore
by 1971. Japan instead, in Washington's view, only moved to develop their
assets and dominate Southeast Asia's trade.39
In retrospect this offensive can be seen as part of a global Japanese eco-
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nomic effort that appeared in the mid-1960s; prominent authorities in Japan
emphasized that the nation must increasingly act globally and not become
overly dependent on a single region such as Southeast Asia.4" Such a per-
spective, however, did nothing to help Johnson and Rusk in Vietnam. In their
view not even appeals to Sato himself (which Johnson made personally41)
produced the needed results.
As trade and the Vietnam War shaped Washington's view of Sato's poli-
cies, the issue of Okinawa molded much of Japan's view of U.S. intentions.
The U.S. embassy in Tokyo reported that a reliable public opinion poll re-
vealed that only the nuclear test ban issue concerned as many Japanese as did
the Okinawa reversion question. Sato, moreover, was clearly determined
to regain the Ryukyus and the Japanese population on those islands.44
The only real question became the date when the United States would
return the Bonins and Okinawa. Middle-level experts on Japan in the State
and Defense departments understood; they had long been preparing a position
on reversion. But as the Vietnam bloodshed increased, they encountered
opposition from top policymakers. Okinawa haaVbecome a massive logistics
center, important less for the nuclear weapons stored there (although these
deeply disturbed Japanese opinion), than because the base gave the United
States a vastly larger capacity to fight non-nuclear wars in Southeast Asia.46
Rusk agreed with the policy, but it was the Defense Department that led the
fight to retain Okinawa. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara urged John-
son in September 1967 to tell Foreign Minister Miki bluntly that the bases
"are there at least as much for the protection of the Japanese as they are for
the defense of the United States," and Japan should therefore share "the very
heavy political and economic costs of providing security to the area."47
While the Vietnam struggle continued, however, the Okinawa problem
could not be resolved. During the Sato-Johnson summit in late 1967 the Bonins
were returned to Japanese administrative control (the United States retained
two bases). Although important, the gesture was less crucial than the Okinawa
problem. A 1967 public opinion poll revealed that for the first time in years
the United States was not the country best liked by Japanese; they preferred
Switzerland. Inside Sato's Liberal Democratic party dissidents led by Naka-
sone Yasuhiro and Fujiyama Aiichiro argued that the prime minister's public
willingness to support Johnson's policies on Vietnam and China harmed Japa-
nese interests. The president meanwhile suffered a fatal political defeat when
the North Vietnamese launched their Tet offensive in February 1968. He took
himself out of the election campaign and made a serious offer to open ne-
gotiations with Ho Chi Minh. Amid these rapid changes, Sato reportedly told
his cabinet that he no longer considered binding the Yoshida Letter assurance
that Japan would not work out long-term economic ties with the PRC.50
Both the new president, Richard Nixon, and his national security advisor,
104 Walter LaFeber
Henry Kissinger, realized that Johnson's Vietnam policies had hit dead end.
They planned to remove U.S. ground troops from the country, but they were
not about to abandon either South Vietnam or larger American commitments
in Asia. They believed U.S. power and influence could be recaptured by
manipulating a new triangular relationship with Russia and China. American
commitments to Asia could meanwhile be maintained with the help of other
regional powers, especially Japan.51
At Guam in mid-1969, the president outlined a policy that became known
as the Nixon Doctrine. While depending on Asian allies to assume more of
the responsibility for containing communism in the region, the United States
would reduce its present forces, particularly in Southeast Asia, but maintain
its treaty commitments by providing a nuclear shield for friends and furnishing
military and economic aid to allies.52 Lowering the American profile in Asia
could also paradoxically strengthen the United States position in countries
such as Japan. Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and
Pacific affairs, explained why in a long memorandum sent to Nixon in the
spring of 1969: "As long as the war in Vietnam continues, it will be difficult
to decrease the official American presence in such countries as Japan, the
Philippines and Thailand. We must nevertheless bear in mind that an excessive
U.S. presence in East Asia presents a serious political liability not only in
terms of our relations with the countries concerned but also prospectively in
terms of weakening governments we seek to strengthen. " 5 3 Green emphasized
the 6,000 excess U.S. intelligence personnel in Japan. Nixon wrote across
the top of Green's report, "This is Great." The president was willing to make
tactical retreats for the sake of strategic advances. As he had written in his
1967 Foreign Affairs essay:
During the final third of the twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or
Latin America, will pose the greatest danger of a confrontation which
could escalate into World War III. . . .
The United States is a Pacific power. Europe has been withdrawing
the remnants of empire, but the United States, with its coast reaching
in an arc from Mexico to the Bering Straits, is one anchor of a vast
Pacific community. Both our interests and our ideals propel us west-
ward across the Pacific, not as conquerors but as partners.54
United States forces dropped rapidly in number (including a reduction of
12,000 in Japan between 1969 and 1971), but as Muraoka Kunio, of the
Japanese Diplomatic Service, saw clearly, "There is nothing in the Nixon
Doctrine to suggest a drastic decline of the United States interest in Asia."
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Under the doctrine, Muraoka observed, the importance to Americans of
"maintaining friendly relations with Japan cannot be overestimated."55
Muraoka's analysis signaled how power was shifting, regardless of Nixon's
and Kissinger's intentions. The United States might ultimately use nuclear
weapons to enforce containment, but short of that it would have to depend
on such allies as the Japanese to maintain a containment policy in a post-
Vietnam era. Nixon, however, refused to follow the policy to that conclusion.
He and Kissinger could never bring themselves to recognize the shifting of
this power. They consequently held back from transferring real security tasks
to Japan.56 Nixon held these tasks tightly, both to maintain unilateral United
States freedom of action and to give him the high cards for playing the new
game with the Soviets and Chinese. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited
Japan in 1971 and mused publicly that his hosts should undertake greater
defense efforts. He even reportedly declared he would look with "equanimity"
on Japanese development of nuclear weapons.57 That view certainly did not
mesh with Nixon's policy. He never wanted Japan to share control of a nuclear
shield long held by the United States. The president did not even want Japan
to undertake a significant, public, conventional buildup. When Chou En-lai
accused Kissinger of "tempting Japan into traditional nationalist paths," the
American vigorously and convincingly denied it. The U.S. security arrange-
ment of 1960, Kissinger argued, contained Japan's traditional "nationalism,"
and—he added ingeniously—the surest way to tempt Japanese nationalism
would be to trigger competition for Tokyo's favor between China and the
United States.58
The Japanese did not see the situation so clearly. In 1970, the government
published its first postwar White Paper on defense that suggestively mentioned
an "autonomous" defense policy tViat could somehow develop under the 1960
arrangements. With the projec. fourth buildup of the defense forces for
1972-1976, Japanese military spending was to grow into the seventh largest
defense budget in the world. Nevertheless, the fourth buildup also demon-
strated, in Muraoka's words, "heavy dependence" not only on United States
power in case of nuclear threats, but for "any major conventional assault on
Japan."59 A highly knowledgeable former State Department official, more-
over, doubted that the Japanese civil service, despite its "high competence"
in other areas, had the background, incentive, or personnel to deal with "in-
creasingly complex matters" in the strategic-military realm.
The Vietnam tragedy thus forced Nixon to undertake a tactical retreat to
more traditional American policies in Asia. These policies would have sur-
faced whether or not the Vietnam War had occurred. They were either historic
American approaches or policies that could be seen developing out of changes
in the region that appeared as early as 1957-1960 and included the Sino-Soviet
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split and Japan's new economic prowess. In the end, Nixon never could come
to terms with the Vietnam conflict. But neither could he come to terms with
a new Japan that was evolving outside the Vietnam context, for he wanted
the Japanese somehow to help enforce the Nixon Doctrine but not to build a
military force that could threaten either the United States' unilateral activity
in the region or the restraints long imposed on Japan's nationalism. Because
of that contradiction, Nixon and Kissinger no more came to terms with Japan
militarily and politically than they did economically.
Nixon's decision to reduce the land war and, over the much longer term,
the air war in Vietnam made American administrative control over Okinawa
expendable. That view was reinforced by a comprehensive analysis of U.S.-
Japan relations that Kissinger organized and drove through the bureaucracy
(over strong Pentagon opposition) during his first days in the White House.
Proud of his ability to distinguish the big picture from relatively minor details,
Nixon pledged the return of Okinawa to Japan's control during his summit
meeting with Sato in the autumn of 1969. The president wished only to
maintain bases for conventional U.S. forces; not even the right to store nuclear
weapons—a concession demanded by the Pentagon—was retained, although
as the 1960 security pact provided, such weapons could be reintroduced on
Japanese soil under joint consultation arrangements.
But Nixon did want another detail. He privately asked Sato for assurance
that Japanese textile exports to the United States would be limited. The presi-
dent could thus fulfill a campaign pledge made in southern states where the
textile industry floundered. Kissinger's notes show that Sato agreed. The
official Japanese position was, however, that the prime minister would have
to negotiate the issue in Tokyo. Back home Sato confronted textile and po-
litical interests that prevented granting Nixon's request. The president became
furious. By 1971, after nearly two years of fruitless talks, he threatened cutting
off Japan's textile exports to America by invoking the 1917 Trading with the
Enemy Act. That threat, the Nixon "shocks" of 1971, an imposed U.S.
deadline, and back-channel diplomacy by Kissinger and Sato's aides finally
resolved the issue in October 1971.
The relationship, whose balance-wheels both sides had taken too much for
granted, was now strained by long-term changes in Japan and the United
States. Nixon did not understand the demands of Japanese politics, but the
prime minister did not understand that this time the United States intended
to discipline an economic power that Americans were beginning to view as
"Japan, Inc."62 A campaign promise had turned into a policy principle for
Nixon. He refused to allow the belance-wheels of time and patience, which
both sides had exhibited until this time, to resolve the issue. By 1971 Nixon
had run out of both time and patience in this and other crucial foreign policy
areas.
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By 1971, the textile problem was, in Nixon's mind, less a part of the
Okinawa issue and more a part of a general crisis. The U.S. economy, un-
dermined by accelerating inflation and growing lack of competitiveness among
some of its major industries, stumbled toward its first unfavorable balance of
merchandise trade since the 1890s. Nixon cared less about historical precedent
than he did about what the turn portended for the U.S. capacity to maintain
costly worldwide commitments. The United States no longer had the capability
of paying for the kind of containment policy it had followed even before 1961,
not to mention afterward.
The reasons for this growing incapability related to the new complexities
of the post-1960 world, a relative decline in U.S. productive capabilities,
rising competitiveness of Japanese and European industry, and responsibilities
at home assumed by Johnson's Great Society program. The costs of Vietnam
only exacerbated this new situation. Nixon, however, had an immediate prob-
lem: he was running for reelection in 1972 and, in the early stages of the
campaign, planned to cap his career with summits in China and the Soviet
Union. To reverse the American decline, he refused to reduce overseas com-
mitments or obligations at home, but determined to make the allies—
especially Japan—pay more for both the commitments and obligations.
The Japanese were obvious targets. As the textile imbroglio exemplified,
Americans saw them as unfairly threatening basic U.S. industries. As the
dollar became overvalued and the entire postwar economic structure that rested
on the dollar began to crumble, Nixon asked leading competitors to revalue
so that breathing room could be found. Germany did so after 1969, but Japan
did not. By 1971, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans reportedly declared,
"The Japanese are still fighting the war, only now instead of a shooting war
it is an economic war. Their immediate intention is to try to dominate the
Pacific and then perhaps the world."63 One observer has noted that Stans's
image of Japan "was frozen somewhere in 1942," but Stans was, after all,
a high-ranking member of the Nixon administration and a close personal
associate of the president. His views, only slightly discounted, represented a
consensus in the administration. One State Department briefing paper re-
portedly went further by terming Japan a "potential enemy."
Japan's sin was not in refusing to build nuclear or even larger conventional
forces, but in not sufficiently helping the United States to pay for American
nuclear and conventional forces strung around the world. In Nixon's eyes,
this sin ramified when he could neither end the Vietnam War on his terms
nor stop the decline of the U.S. economy. His careful delineation, in his
publicized 1971 speech at Kansas City, that Japan had to be seen as one of
the "five great economic super powers," made sense only as a signal to Japan
to act like both an economic superpower and an American ally. The president
(not to mention his national security advisor) seldom preoccupied himself
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with economic issues unless they directly related to his geopolitical concerns.
Nixon revealed that linkage precisely in the Kansas City speech when he
declared that "economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the
future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century." When the
Japanese either missed or ignored this signal, Nixon moved to wring conces-
sions by declaring economic war. He imposed a 10 percent surcharge on
imports until Japan agreed to revalue, set a deadline for concluding the textile
deal on his terms, and announced his trip to China that would radically change
the traditional U.S. relationship with Asia.
C. Fred Bergsten wrote at the time that "the new economic approach,
coupled with the coming presidential visits to Peking and Moscow, produced
the most bizarre U.S. foreign policy imaginable: war on our friends, conces-
sions to our traditional adversaries."65 Nixon, however, explained the ap-
parent contradiction in his 1972 foreign policy report. He declared that the
"shocks" were regrettable, but they "only accelerated an evolution in U.S.-
Japanese relations that was in any event overdue, unavoidable, and in the
long run, desirable" because the relationship had to become a "more mature
and reciprocal partnership."66
Nixon's words (the 1972 report was actually written by Kissinger) assumed
that the U.S.-Japanese relationship of 1945 to the early 1960s had been an
exception in the century-old history of the two nations' ties. Americans and
Japanese were returning to a more normal set of relations, the kind that
characterized their bilateral dealings in the interwar years or before World
War I—only this time-U.S. officials determined to keep the dominant military
power of the relationship in their own hands. The Vietnam War had only
sharpened and intensified the effects of this change until the results had to be
dealt with in 1971.
Unsurprisingly, Tokyo officials read the shocks differently. The post-1945
ties with the United States had been based, in Muraoka's words, "on total
confidence." The announcements of Nixon's visit to Beijing and the impo-
sition of the New Economic Plan undercut that confidence because in neither
instance had Japan been consulted.67 The Japanese embarked on a more
independent foreign policy. Ignoring U.S. protests, Sato dispatched two of
his top department chiefs to discuss affairs with Hanoi just before Nixon was
to arrive in China. Sato also suddenly established diplomatic relations with
Outer Mongolia, a Soviet-controlled country on China's borders; that move
occurred just four days before U.S. officials flew to Tokyo to brief the Japanese
on the Nixon-Mao summit. Japan also improved relations, especially in the
economic area, with Russia and China, while retaining U.S. military protec-
tion. But that protection was somewhat less important, for as Japan exploited
the Sino-Soviet rift economically, so Tokyo was left without an immediate
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military threat to worry about. The Japanese were maneuvering profitably in
Nixon's five-power world.68 Nor, after the president's New Economic Plan
of 1971, could Americans complain as effectively about Japan's mercantilistic
tactics for capturing foreign markets and protecting its own.
In 1973, Kissinger could declare (unilaterally and from New York City)
that it was to be "The Year of Europe and Japan" in U.S. foreign policy,
but in reality 1973 became the year of the Middle East and Watergate. The
Middle East conflict and resulting oil embargo by Arab and Iranian producers
forced Japan to make its first major open break with the United States in the
post-1945 era. As a 1971 staff study informed Kissinger, a rise of energy
prices "would affect primarily Europe and Japan and probably improve Ameri-
ca's competitive position." (Such a comment and its policy implications
were probably unthinkable in Washington as late as 1965.) Japan rejected the
U.S. position on Israel and moved closer to the Arabs, who provided 80
percent of Japan's oil imports. In a larger framework, Tokyo's new policies
not only attempted to break with American policy in the Middle East, but
sought to become less dependent on United States economic—especially en-
ergy—policies in general. Americans were no longer viewed as the reliable
suppliers of the early 1960s. The 1971 shocks, a unilaterally imposed embargo
on American soybean exports to Japan, policy in the Middle East, and an
independent, aggressive Japanese economic offensive in Southeast Asia to
replace the departed Americans transfigured a relationship that was already
changing when Nixon entered office.70
As Kissinger tried to control the effects of these changes in his "Year of
Europe and Japan" approach, another group attempted to improve Japanese-
United States ties through a Trilateral Commission. Studies in 1971-72 by
Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Brookings Institution influenced David Rocke-
feller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, to establish the Trilateral Com-
mission so that shattered ties could be renewed among Japan, Western Europe,
and the United States. But it also aimed at nothing less than what one member
called "a new world order," with the three industrial power blocs forming
the foundation for that "order."71
Trilateralism, however, never could create such a new order. Japan's re-
lations with Western Europe, for example, could not approximate the im-
portance of ties with the United States or, increasingly, even the new ties
with Southeast Asia. Tokyo officials, moreover, prevented the commission
from issuing consensus statements on security issues—despite Kissinger's
1976 declaration that "security is the bedrock of all that [the industrial de-
mocracies] do."72
In 1975, Kissinger glossed over these problems by announcing that the
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"strains" of 1971 "are behind us. . . . U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations, lam
pleased to say, have never been better in 30 years." In the same speech,
however, Kissinger more accurately indicated why the relations could not be
as good as they were before the mid-1960s: "a new international environment"
had developed, "a world of multiple centers of power, of ideological differ-
ences both old and new, clouded by nuclear peril and marked by the new
imperatives of interdependence."73 To deal with this new world, both nations
had to work within an arrangement that was no longer fully acceptable to
either side: Japanese economic power was a constant irritation in American
debate and policymaking, while dependence on U.S. security arrangements
created doubt in Japan. The 1977 Japanese White Paper on defense for the
first time expressed public doubts about the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.
A relationship once characterized by terms such as "harmony" and "part-
nership" had changed to "competition."75 The "earthquakes" and
"typhoons" that struck the U.S.-Japanese relationship between 1960 and
1975—not the artificial atmosphere of 1945 to 1960—portended the future
of the relationship as they also reflected the more distant, pre-1931 past.
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PART TWO
The United States
and Japan in the
World Economy
Using the case studies of Part One as their starting point, the next group of essays
examines how Japan has performed in the economic arena since its leaders succeeded
in integrating the country into the U.S.-led world economy on their own terms, and
how their very success has created havoc with "the American system."
Okimoto and Krasner (chapter 7) offer several theoretical (predictive) models for
Japan's reaction to the disruption its booming economy caused in the structure of the
economic regime, i.e., rules of the game that are central to the American system.
They concede that Japan, under pressure from the United States, has greatly liberalized
its trade policies since the 1960s, but contend that these changes have had meager
outcomes. Especially in areas in which the United States has demonstrated a com-
petitive advantage in trading with third countries, Japan continues to buy less than
would be expected. Okimoto and Krasner offer several explanations, stressing the need
for greater attention to the private sector. Although they indicate that American de-
mands have been essential to obtain even modest results in Japan, their analysis suggests
that current protectionist trends in the United States could conceivably lead to the
disastrous economic nationalism of the 1930s:—rather than to active Japanese lead-
ership in a restructured liberal trading system.
Kanemitsu (chapter 8) provides a particularly valuable statistical profile of Japan's
trade relations, especially with the United States, as they have evolved since 1955.
His data dovetail neatly with the changing pattern of political power—Japan's move-
ment, as he suggests, from protege to partner—described in earlier chapters. Kanem-
itsu's tables and his explanations of them allow the reader to be more sanguine about
the working of the principle of comparative advantage than Okimoto and Krasner
suggest. The jury is still out on the issue, but there are indications that Japanese are
more optimistic these days than Americans about how well free trade works, much
like the British and the Americans in their days of hegemony, as noted by Okimoto
and Krasner. Kanemitsu also touches on another area of growing American concern,
Japan's role as an exporter of capital. He notes that as savings mount, public con-
sumption in Japan still does not offset the high rate of savings, and more and more
money will be available to buy property in the United States.
Feldman's essay (chapter 9), highly technical though it is, describes and explains
the liberalization of Japanese capital markets as the economy gained strength and its
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would-be managers gained confidence. A major opening of the capital markets occurred
in the mid-1960s, as the success of Japan's high growth strategy became evident, and
regulation all but disappeared in 1980. Feldman's analysis, consistent with that of
Okimoto and Krasner, suggests that liberalization came only after regulation proved
successful—that is, when it was no longer needed. Japan was responding less to
external pressures or any objective sense of fairness than to confidence that protection
of its capital market was no longer necessary. But like Kanemitsu's discussion, Feld-
man's offers hope that institutional mechanisms are sufficiently flexible to enable Japan
to accommodate its partners in the world economic system.
All three essays demonstrate the superb strategy pursued by Japan's leaders in the
reconstruction of the country's postwar, postoccupation economy. They protected their
industries and their markets and moved shrewdly and aggressively to expand their
exports. They were slower than some Americans to perceive the extent of their success,
but by the mid-1960s they initiated a process of liberalization in trade practices and
capital markets that continues to this day. Japanese political leaders and state economic
managers are responsive to the needs of their trading partners, but the outcome of
liberalization to date has been disappointing to potential American exporters—as per-
haps it always will be.
7
Japan's Evolving Trade Posture
STEPHEN D. KRASNER
and DANIEL I. OKIMOTO
Japan has experienced more dramatic levels of economic growth than any
other major industrialized country. One-twentieth the size of that of the United
States at the end of the Second World War, Japan's economy increased to
one-half that of the United States by the early 1980s. Its products jumped
from 3.4 percent of world exports in 1963 to 7.5 percent in 1982,1 and its
exports dominated several fast-growing and important industrial sectors. Its
intrusion into the world economy has generated conflict to the extent that
Japan has been accused of protecting its domestic economy while preaching
international liberalism. Import-impacted industries of other countries have
demanded protection; trading partners have pressed for greater access to the
Japanese market.
This essay is an effort to describe and explain Japan's trade posture. A
country's trade posture has two components: policies related to both tariff
and nontariff barriers and international regimes, and actual outcomes with
regard to the movement of goods. Three major trade postures can be described,
although these do not exhaust the logical possibilities: myopic self-interest is
characterized by only the most grudging and minimal changes in national
policy, indifference or hostility toward liberal international regimes, and limi-
ted access for foreign products; selective accommodation is characterized by
reactive concessions in trade policy, indifference or limited support for in-
ternational regimes, and selective change in trade outcomes; active coopera-
tion is characterized by extensive national liberalization, strong support for
and leadership in international regimes, and significant changes in actual
outcomes, that is, the actual movement of goods.
A country with a trade posture of myopic self-interest aims at maximizing
its national objectives over the short and medium term. There is little or no
concern about system stability and few connections are made between issue
areas. Myopically self-interested states act as free riders whenever possible.
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Given a liberal international system, such a state will pursue protectionist
policies (to maximize either static utility or dynamic growth), abandoning
them only to avoid foreign retaliation or when domestic industries are so
competitive that foreign products cannot compete. Ineffective liberalization—
policy modifications that do not lead to changes in outcomes—may be used
to mollify trading partners. Little support or leadership is provided for inter-
national organization.
A country with a posture of selective accommodation acts as a follower
in a liberal regime but not as a leader and it accedes to foreign pressures for
policy change. These changes are accompanied by alterations in the actual
flow of goods, but the state does not take a leadership role in maintaining
international regimes, nor does it alter policies in areas where it is not under
pressure.
A country with a posture of active accommodation is concerned with system
maintenance. It is a strong supporter of liberal regimes and may choose to
lift restrictive measures even without explicit pressure from trading partners.
Policy changes lead to changes in actual outcomes. Short-run economic in-
terests are subordinated or sacrificed for long-run objectives including sys-
temic stability.
In sum, the three ideal-typical postures identified above can be differen-
tiated along two dimensions, policy and outcomes. Policy can be more or
less liberal with regard to eliminating domestic barriers to trade. Given a
liberal regime, the very removal of such barriers is a major act of support for
the regime. In addition, a state may play a more or less active role in inter-
national organizations, and outcomes may be more or less open with regard
to the actual flow of goods.
Each of these ideal-types can be explained by one or more systemic level
theories that has been applied to the area of international trade. Systems level
analyses can be complemented by national level arguments that focus upon
political structure, interest group activity, national values, and electoral in-
centives as a more detailed guide to sectoral variation.2 These arguments can
be illustrated with reference to Japan.
Various realist or structural analyses of the international economy, espe-
cially the theory of hegemonic stability, imply that Japan has and will pursue
a policy of myopic self-interest. The theory of hegemonic stability maintains
that an open global economic system is associated with a hegemonic distri-
bution of power. Only a hegemonic state has the ability and interest to create
and maintain such an environment. The hegemon is a leader in international
organizations, tolerates free riders, and acts as a lender of last resort. As the
power of the hegemon declines, the global economic system becomes more
closed. The hegemonic state itself adopts more protectionist measures as
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increasing international competition raises the costs of openness. It becomes
more reluctant to tolerate free riders and less willing to bear disproportionate
costs for regime maintenance. Other states are unable to step into the breach
because they cannot allocate the costs of providing collective goods or co-
ordinate their policies, given differing national objectives. Hegemonic sta-
bility theory argues that the two most dramatic examples of policy
liberalization and openness with regard to outcomes—the middle of the nine-
teenth century and the period from 1945 to 1970—are associated with he-
gemonic states, Great Britain and the United States. As British power faded
at the end of the nineteenth century and American power since 1970, inter-
national economic transactions have become more restricted.3
Hegemonic stability theory implies that Japan's position in the international
system would encourage a policy of myopic self-interest. Over the years, the
ratio of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) to that of Japan has steadily
decreased. In 1955, the GNP ratio was 10.59; ten years later it had almost
halved (6.17). By 1970, it had dropped to 4.19 and declined still further to
3.12 by 1975. In 1981, the ratio was 2.15.4 During the early postwar period
Japan was so small that acting as a free rider was the optimal policy. Japanese
contributions to system stability, had they been attempted, would have had
little impact. Protectionism maximized short- and medium-term national in-
terest because it provided static benefits for the terms of trade and dynamic
benefits by protecting new industries until they became internationally com-
petitive.4
Japan's position relative to that of the United States has changed rapidly
over the postwar period. Once only 5 percent the size of its American coun-
terpart, Japan's economy mushroomed to over 40 percent the size of the U.S.
GNP by 1980. The decline in American power was visible across a number
of specific issue areas, most notably oil. Hegemonic stability theory associates
such weakening in power capabilities with less regime stability and more
protectionism. Secondary powers cannot stem this tide. As the system moves
toward greater closure, there is little incentive for countries like Japan to
liberalize. Japan is not strong enough to act as a leader. Conciliatory policies
would not necessarily be reciprocated by Japan's trading partners because of
domestic interest group pressures. Because no state can be sure that the game
will continue to be played by the same rules, the most prudent course is to
act in terms of short- and medium-term national goals. Although this might
mean occasional accommodation to foreign pressures in order to avoid costly
consequences, it would preclude any leadership role or general liberalization.
In sum, hegemonic stability theory suggests that Japan has pursued, and will
continue to pursue, a policy of myopic self-interest because in the early post-
war period it was small enough to act as a free rider and in more recent years
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it has not been large enough to stabilize the system in the face of declining
American hegemony.
The theoretical underpinnings for the second ideal-type trade posture, se-
lective accommodation, are derived from modified structural discussions of
international regimes and from game theoretic analysis of iterative prisoner's
dilemma. Regimes are principles, norms, rules and decision-making proce-
dures around which actor expectations converge. Regimes coordinate the be-
havior of individual actors: they lower the likelihood of disputes by enhancing
the flow of information and therefore reduce suspicions of cheating; they lessen
the intensity of conflicts by providing for dispute settlement procedures; when
differences cannot be reconciled, they may specify appropriate levels of re-
taliation, making it less likely that conflictual behavior will spread from one
dispute to another.6
Once regimes are in place they are likely to persist even though the power
configurations that led to their creation may have changed. Actors are un-
certain about alternatives. Existing regimes establish salient solutions for a
known set of problems. Vested bureaucratic interests and institutions develop
around established principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.
Since 1945, international regimes have been created for many important
issue areas. The problems most directly addressed by these regimes were
those of the 1930s, especially beggar-thy-neighbor practices, including com-
petitive devaluations, import quotas, and high tariffs. The exchange rate sys-
tem specified by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
and the liberal trading order embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) were efforts to prevent a repeat of the depression years.
Issues that had not been salient in the 1930s, including industrial policies,
international capital flows, and domestic financial structures, were not directly
addressed by the postwar international economic regimes.
Arguments based on the significance of international regimes suggest that
Japanese behavior would change, but primarily in those areas covered by
explicit agreements. As a major beneficiary of the postwar system, Japan
would have some stake in maintaining existing regimes. Japanese policy-
makers would be concerned about the consequences of violating explicit rules.
Japan might not only react to pressures and complaints concerning violations
of existing rules, but even take an active and initiatory role in supporting
ongoing regimes.
However, an analysis of international regimes grounded in a realist frame-
work would be skeptical about the prospects for altering Japanese behavior
in areas not covered by explicit rules and decision-making procedures. General
principles and norms would not provide clear guidelines under conditions of
clashing national interests. Attempts to create new rules of the game with
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specific prescriptions and proscriptions would be very difficult in the absence
of a hegemonic leader. Thus, while Japan would be accommodating, perhaps
even initiatory, with regard to issues covered by existing rules of the game,
little progress could be expected in other issue areas. If nonregime-governed
issues grew more salient, tension and conflict would increase even though
Japan's trade posture adhered to existing rules.
A game theoretic perspective also suggests that Japan's trade posture would
evolve toward selective accommodation. However, this approach points to
changes in Japanese trade posture over time as opposed to across-regime- or
nonregime-governed issues. As pressure from Japan's trading partners in-
creased, Japan would adopt increasingly liberal policies. Trade posture is seen
as analogous to the game of prisoner's dilemma. The optimal outcome for a
player occurs when that player cheats (protects) and the other player cooperates
(liberalizes). However, if both players cheat (protect), they are worse off than
if they had both cooperated (liberalized). For instance, if one trading nation
can impose an optimal tariff on its trading partners, it will be better off than
under a situation of free trade. However, if its trading partner retaliates, then
both are likely to finish in worse condition than if they had adopted a policy
of mutual cooperation leading to free trade.
In single play prisoners dilemma, the logical outcome is mutual cheating;
however in iterative prisoners dilemma, mutual cooperation is more likely.
In a fascinating exercise, Robert Axelrod invited players to submit strategies
for an iterative prisoners dilemma game. These strategies were then played
against each other. The winning strategy was TIT FOR TAT. TIT FOR TAT is
a strategy in which a player cooperates on the first move and then does
whatever the other player did on the last move. A player using TIT FOR TAT
never defects first, retaliates immediately, and is quick to forgive when the
opponent switches from defection to cooperation.7
If a player is sure the game will continue, then TIT FOR TAT will be a
stable solution for any set of cardinal values in conformity with the conditions
for a prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix. Each player begins by cooperating,
and cooperation continues. If the game will end at some point, then the
rationality of continuing to play TIT FOR TAT, as opposed to some other
strategy, such as ALL DEFECTION, depends upon the relationship of the values
of the payoff matrix and the probability that the game will end. Even under
conditions of mutual defection, it is still possible to move to a TIT FOR TAT
strategy, provided there is a clustering of individuals playing TIT FOR TAT. If
such a cluster is large enough, it can displace the strategy of ALL DEFECTION.
The implications of this analysis for current behavior in the area of inter-
national trade are quite sanguine. Charles Lipson has argued that, because
trading relations can be characterized as an iterative prisoner's dilemma, the
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prospects for cooperation are high.8 The number of plays can be increased
by disaggregating transactions into smaller parts. More significantly, the costs
of making a mistake (cooperating when the other player defects) are not high,
at least relative to the costs of making a mistake in the international security
arena. There is also more transparency in international economic environments
than in security ones; cheating can be discovered more easily. Hence the
mutual distrust that undermines strategic and military cooperation is less of
a problem in the area of trade because of repeated plays, transparency, and
small differences between the pay-offs for cheating instead of cooperating.
A game theoretic analysis suggests that Japan would alter its international
economic posture in response to pressure from trading partners. Changes
would not be isolated. Cooperation in one play of the game would lead to
cooperation in others. Even making the most generous assumptions about
American policy through the 1960s with regard to tolerating Japanese pro-
tectionism and the most cynical ones about Japanese policy, the logic of an
iterative prisoner's dilemma situation suggests that mutual cooperation would
emerge once the United States began to demonstrate that it was prepared to
retaliate against Japan. This argument is more sanguine about the prospects
for a liberal order than is modified realism with its emphasis on regimes.
Cooperation cumulates over time; eventually it becomes active rather than
selective as each player comes to understand that defection will always be
punished leaving both worse off. In the long run, a game theoretic approach
suggests that Japan would adopt a trade posture of active cooperation.
There are other arguments that also imply that Japanese policy would evolve
toward active cooperation even in the shorter run. Japanese accommodation
need not necessarily be explained by pressure from economic partners or be
limited to issue areas covered by existing regimes. The two other approaches
which suggest an evolution toward active cooperation for Japan are liberal,
or Grotian, theories emphasizing the mutual benefits of interdependence and
a realist, or structural, argument stressing the stability that arises out of a
structure of mutipolarity.
A liberal or Grotian perspective sees both national and subnational actors
linked by a web of interdependence created by ongoing transaction flows.
These flows are not hostage to changes in international power distributions.
They are not constantly threatened by cheating, either, because custom and
habit have evolved over time into internalized norms or because rational
calculation, based on full confidence in the continuity of the system, dictates
cooperative behavior.
Since 1960, there has been a significant increase in the relative importance
of trade for all major countries except Japan. The income elasticity of trade
has been greater than unity. Taking 1963 as equal to 100, the volume of
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world trade had increased to 300 by 1982 (it had peaked at 305 in 1980) while
the volume of world production had increased to only 223. The value of world
exports increased from $154 billion in 1963 to $1,845 billion in 1982.9
For Japan, exports plus imports as a percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) declined slightly from 21.2 percent in 1960 to 20.3 percent in 1970,
but then rose to 30.1 percent in 1981.10 Trade is critical for some sectors of
the Japanese economy. Japan is more heavily dependent on raw material
imports than is any other major industrialized country. Some of the most
dynamic firms in the Japanese economy have regarded exports as a critical
part of their overall strategies. Many Japanese corporations have become more
active direct foreign investors since the late 1960s. The international capital
market has become a more important source of funds. Thus, liberalism would
see Japan as a country whose public and private actors have a high stake in
the stability of an open international economic system. The interests of many
groups in Japan, both inside and outside the government, depend upon the
vitality of this system. As Japan's capabilities increase, it would play a more
active role in preserving and even improving the ongoing order. In sum, Japan
would be an active and positive player in the global political economy.
A second argument that suggests optimistic prospects for a liberal world
trading system, with high levels of active cooperation from Japan as well as
from other major countries, emphasizes the mutual interests of states func-
tioning in a multipolar system. A group of countries that are relatively equal
in size and relatively highly developed have an incentive to support an open
trading system because the benefits of openness, as measured by the relative
gains from trade, economic security, and the absolute gains from trade, are
likely to be greater than the costs incurred in negotiating and maintaining
such a system. This logic has been most thoroughly elaborated by David
Lake. Lake argues that the present international structure is not analogous to
the 1930s. (He defines structure in terms of a state's relative share of world
trade and labor productivity.) In the 1920s, the decline of Britain's techno-
logical prowess and share of world trade resulted in a structure in which there
was only one supporter for a liberal system, the United States, and no he-
gemon. Such a structure is likely to lead to protectionism. In contrast, the
late 1980s and beyond will be a period of "mutual supportorship" in which
there are several countries, including Japan, with high and relatively equal
levels of productivity and shares of world trade. Under these conditions sup-
porters recognize that protectionist initiatives will lead to retaliation reducing
the utility of all actors. There is strong incentive for major industrialized
market economy states to continue to adhere to liberal policies. In particular
Japan, according to Lake, is now becoming a "supporter" rather than a
"spoiler" because its labor productivity is approaching that of the United
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States, Germany, and France. Barring protectionist moves by trading partners,
Japan ought to continue to pursue a more open and liberal trade posture.11
None of these approaches has paid much attention to the possibility of a
divergence between policies related to tariff and nontariff barriers and inter-
national organizations, and actual outcomes, that is, the pattern of trade flows.
They have focused on one or the other of these variables or tacitly assumed
that the two elements of trade posture would move in the same direction. A
state that lowered its trade barriers would be supporting a liberal regime and
would experience an increase in its imports. A state that imposed trade barriers
would experience lower levels of imports and would weaken the liberal in-
ternational trade regime by violating its norms and rules. As we will dem-
onstrate in the case of Japan, there is not always congruence between policy
and outcomes; policy changes are not necessarily accompanied by changes
in the actual outcome of international commodity movements.
The Japanese have adopted a trade posture that is consistent with selective
accommodation. The pattern of change in Japanese policy can be explained
by a strategy of TIT FOR TAT in an iterative prisoner's dilemma game. In
general, one would expect that conflicts resulting from what could be regarded
as unfair export practices to be more easily reconciled than those arising in
relation to imports. So long as trading partners do not object to dumping,
subsidizing, or export downpours, there is little incentive for exporters to
change their behavior. However, threats to retaliate against such practices
are, once they are voiced, likely to be highly credible. The pattern of interest
group pressure in importing countries, where established industries are losing
their markets, creates incentives for public officials to act. If exporters have
any foresight, and if they can coordinate their behavior so that the collective
choice problems associated with a reduction in sales can be overcome, con-
flicts generated by exports are likely to be resolved through a pattern of
selective accommodation.
This supposition is borne out by Japanese responses to American com-
plaints concerning export behavior. Japan's political system makes alteration
of export behavior easier as a means of reducing bilateral frictions than ac-
commodation on the import side of the trade equation. MITI, for example,
has become noticeably more responsive to foreign outcries of Japanese dump-
ing. Whereas it might have turned a deaf ear to the same complaints in the
past, MITI is now trying hard to prevent dumping because of the tense and
volatile atmosphere abroad caused by the influx of Japanese products. In
sectors where formal complaints have been filed or at least threatened, MITI
has made it a practice to issue "administrative guidance," warning the industry
in question against dumping. Such warnings are then followed by careful
monitoring of production costs and export prices and volumes. Plainly, MITI
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is worried about inflaming anti-Japanese sentiments and triggering retaliation
for violations of internationally accepted codes.
Dumping is especially hard to control, because of the intensity of price
competition in Japan. Even under close MITI monitoring, dumping can still
occur as an extension of cutthroat pricing practices at home. Because MITI
would like to lower political temperatures on the export side, where it has
the administrative clout to regulate trade behavior (so that pressures can be
relieved on the import side, where accommodation is constrained by the
closeness of the LDP's ties to noncompetitive industries outside MITI's ju-
risdiction), it has tried to stop excessive price competition from being carried
out across national borders. The irony is that MITI must be circumspect in
its handling of this problem, because it is liable to face charges of price fixing
and restraint of trade by the U.S. Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission if it extends too visible a hand. In the case of 64K RAM exports,
this is precisely what happend; MITI's attempt to curb price cutting out of
deference to warnings from the U.S. Department of Commerce only led to
the threat of a law suit by the Justice Department for violations of antitrust.
Nevertheless, as indicated by the decline in the number of dumping charges,
MITI's admonition—on top of vocal American complaints—seems to have
had some effect. Japanese companies are more careful about following ag-
gressive pricing strategies that raise questions about dumping.
Another area where the Japanese have come to exercise more self-restraint
is in their old strategy of export-lead recovery from cyclical recession. Since
the mid-1970s, the Japanese have come to understand that the export market
is no longer as elastic as it used to be and that any attempt to export one's
way out of recession is apt to be viewed abroad as trying to foist off un-
employment. Here again, MITI has had to monitor the flow of exports during
cyclical recessions. American companies, which continue to lose ever larger
shares of their own markets to Japan, find it hard to believe that any kind of
self-restraint is being exercised; but relative to market shares that the Japanese
feel they could win if they were perfectly unencumbered, some degree of
self-restraint can be seen to be at work.
Japan's exercise of self-restraint—dictated by pragmatic calculations of
the costs and benefits of nonrestraint—are particularly evident in what is
perhaps the most significant realm of change in Japanese export policies,
namely the acceptance of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and orderly mar-
ket agreements (OMAs) covering several key export commodities such as
steel and automobiles. In 1983, these commodities accounted for over 40
percent of Japan's total exports to the United States. The Japanese feel that,
were it not for VERs and OMAs, their products could capture much larger
shares of the American market.
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Why, then, were these industries willing to accept VERs? In three of the
four cases, acceptance generated considerable conflict in Japan before the
affected industries finally acquiesced to foreign demands. Probably the main
reason why, in the cases of steel and automobiles, Japanese manufacturers
relented to U.S. demands was because the United States represented such a
big and indispensible market. They were realistic enough to realize that if
VERs were not accepted, ceilings would be placed on Japanese exports any-
way, and the United States might also take retaliatory action. Under such
circumstances, Japanese steel-and automakers had almost no choice but to
concede. It is doubtful that MITI by itself could have forced the auto industry
to accept VERs, whatever the degree of emphasis it placed on the importance
of maintaining harmonious U.S.-Japan relations.12 Japanese companies were
determined to resist, invoking the shibboleths of free trade, but eventually
gave in when they realized that the costs of defiance would outweigh the
benefits.
Having grudgingly accepted VERs, however, Japanese manufacturers dis-
covered that higher profits could still be made. Automakers simply shifted
the mix of exports to higher priced models. Under the trigger price mechanism
(based on the average, not marginal, costs of steel for the world's most efficient
producer), Japanese companies reaped the windfall benefits of selling the same
steel that they would have sold anyway, only at higher prices. Unlike European
steelmakers, the Japanese chose not to expand their share of the U.S. market
appreciably under the trigger price system, because their export earnings did
not suffer, and they wanted to avoid creating any further friction with the
United States.13
Although the United States succeeded in forcing Japan to swallow voluntary
export restraints, the United States may have been the one to incur the heaviest,
long-term costs of this coercion. The costs have included, for example, Ameri-
ca's retreat from the principles of free trade, stronger and more insidious
inflationary pressures, and protection for inefficient industries with no incen-
tives, much less guarantees, for the recovery of competitive strength. Beyond
buying time, and mollifying politically powerful interest groups, how much
has the United States gained?
Viewed in long-run perspective, one can argue that Japan has been the
prime but inadvertent beneficiary from VER arrangements. Every time the
United States has forced a VER on Japan in one product market, Japan has
responded by shifting its mix of exports to products of higher value. And as
the overall volume of trade has risen steadily, Japan's relative share has more
than kept pace. U.S.-imposed VERs, in short, have hastened the evolution
of Japanese exports from relatively low value-added textiles to steel, consumer
electronics, various machinery, automobiles, computers, office equipment,
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and other high value-added technology products. By protecting its declining
industries, America has inadvertently provided a catalyst for the rechanneling
of Japanese exports from declining, smokestack sectors into the high growth,
high technology sectors—precisely the direction toward which Japan's com-
parative advantage has been shifting anyway. By accepting American VERs
and modifying their export behavior, the Japanese managed to deflect pres-
sures on their own home markets and at the same time advance their long-
term industrial interests.
That it has worked to Japan's advantage, ex post facto, should not detract
from the significance of Japan's willingness to accommodate U.S. demands
at what was perceived to be some sacrifice. In terms of the Axelrod TIT FOR
TAT strategy, Japan adopted a cooperative strategy in spite of America's latest
moves of noncooperation. Indeed, the irony of America's swing away from
openness toward selective protection—at precisely the time when it was de-
manding that Japan move in the opposite direction—was not lost on the
Japanese. Japan's immediate reasons for cooperating stemmed more from the
threat of negative sanctions than from positive inducements. The unantici-
pated, long-run rewards for cooperative behavior—conflict avoidance and
larger profits—came later.
Selective accommodation to foreign pressures turned out to be not very
damaging to Japanese national interests; indeed, in almost every case, the
benefits have far outweighed the costs. Under these circumstances, being
flexible, accommodating, and cooperative is easy, because it involves little
or no self-sacrifice.
Japan's trade posture with regard to imports presents a more complicated
picture because of the incongruity between policies and outcomes. Japan has
made sweeping changes in the area of removing formal trade barriers. The
number of items covered by Japanese quota restrictions fell precipitously from
466 in 1962 to'27 by 1983, bringing Japan not only in line with, but actually
below, most OECD countries (France had 46 items on its list of residual
import restrictions). Of the 27 items, 22 (or over 80 percent) cover agricultural
products, the only area where formidable import quotas have remained in
place.
Japan has also altered nontariff barriers in other areas. In accord with codes
established during the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, Japan
made substantial changes in customs procedures and industrial standards. The
cumbersome procedures used by Japan and reluctance to accept the results
of standards tests conducted in other countries had led trading partners to
complain that these were devices used by Japan to exclude foreign products.
Japan also entered into extensive negotiations with the United States regarding
government procurements, especially as related to the communications in-
Japan's Offsetting Responses to Liberalization
FOREIGN PRESSURES
Regulation of Financial System
• underdeveloped capital markets
• regulated interest rates
• controls over international
capital flows
Rationalization
• structural streamlining
• mergers
• antitrust approval
(inefficient, nonproductive sectors)
Formal Barriers
• quotas
• import duties
• control over technology licensing
• controls over direct
foreign investment
LIBERALIZATION
I
Technology Push
• R&D support
• national projects
• government R&D
• tax incentives
(high technology sectors)
Informal Barriers
• customs/inspection/standards
• dual structure subcontracting
• banking-business ties
• keiretsu affiliations
• retail distribution network
• intercorporate stock holding
Demand Stimulation
• export promotion
• buy Japanese policies
• closed procurements
• rental/leasing arrangements
• tax incentives for special equipment
purchases
(all industries)
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dustry. Hence in many, if not all, areas of nontariff barriers to trade, Japan's
policy has become markedly more liberal since the 1960s.
Japan's average duty rates also have fallen sharply. In 1963, average duties
stood at 7.3 percent for all imports and 20.9 percent for dutiable imports; by
1981, these rates had dropped to 2.5 percent and 4.3 percent, placing Japan
among the lowest in the world (lower than the United States and much lower
than Europe). The duty rate for small cars plummeted from 40 percent in
1968 to zero by 1980; similarly, duties for color televisions and machine tools
disappeared; computer peripherals fell from 22.5 percent to 6.0 percent in
1983. For semiconductors, the United States and Japan agreed to abolish all
tariffs by 1987. Except for agriculture, therefore, Japan has rolled back formal
tariff barriers and quotas farther than any other country, including the United
States.
We should note, however, that Japan dragged its feet on trade liberalization
and conceded only when it no longer could hold foreign governments at bay.
By the 1970s, roughly the time when Japan moved in line with other advanced
industrial states in terms of formal trade bareriers, most sectors of the Japanese
economy had long graduated from "infant industry" status.
Furthermore, it is also possible to argue that what appeared to be selective
accommodation was actually nothing more than myopic self-interest. If Japa-
nese industries had already developed the capacity to compete, then lifting
formal barriers was not consequential, especially not with nontariff barriers
continuing to impede access as a de facto second line of defense. Even for
industries such as computers and semiconductors, which appeared badly over-
matched against foreign Goliaths like IBM, there were third-line defenses,
consisting of "lateral steps" that could be taken to soften the impact of
liberalization. The repertoire of compensatory measures included, research-
and-development (R&D) subsidies, national research projects, special tax
provisions, preferential loans, guaranteed procurements, mergers, and struc-
tural rationalization.
The liberalization of discrete aspects of trade may not accomplish much
in isolation because of the interchangeability of policies that have similar
functions. When the Japanese government abolished formal barriers, exposing
industries like semiconductors to potential foreign domination, it was able to
mitigate the trauma by shifting from tariff protection to R&D subsidies and
joint national research projects designed to hasten the industry's development
(see figure). The "technological push" worked, helping to bring the Japanese
semiconductor industry from far behind to the forefront of technology in an
astonishingly short period of time.
From the standpoint of the specific rules of the GATT regime, the sub-
stitution of R&D subsidies for tariffs and quotas has been a step in the right
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Table 7 .1 . Imports as Percentages of Japanese Domestic Supply
Industry 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Transport and communications
Total: All industries
16
59
3
6
5
15
60
3
6
4
18
76
4
9
7
16
79
3
10
6
13
69
3
7
4
17
80
4
10
7
Source: Derived from figures in U.N., Yearbook of National Account Statistics, various years.
direction. But this step was taken in response to foreign pressure, not initiated
by Japan. Japan's trade policy has been consistent with both myopic self-
interest and selective accommodation. A more refined judgment requires an
assessment of actual trade flows. If policy liberalization is accompanied by
increased imports, then Japan's behavior must, at the least, be seen as selective
accommodation.
We have noted that, since the mid-1960s, the Japanese government has
made substantial modifications in its trade policies. The modifications can be
explained by a variety of factors: strong American pressures, the maturation
of Japanese industrial structure and financial markets, changes in the inter-
national system and an awareness that Japanese policies had to be brought
into closer alignment with the country's growing power. These factors have
forced Japan to alter policies formulated during an earlier era of infant-industry
protection. Aside from lingering barriers in certain specific areas, no one can
deny the trend toward policy liberalization.
Beyond the unmistakable trend, however, we must ask whether changes
at the policy level have resulted in changes in actual outcomes. If the answer
is yes, then Japan's trade posture can be seen as one of active cooperation
or at worst as selective accommodation. If, on the other hand, the answer is
either no or unclear, then a number of alternative explanations can be offered,
ranging from clever manipulation by Japanese policymakers to the more be-
nign conclusion that policies have little to do with outcomes or that there are
temporal lags between policy change and behavioral outcomes.
The aggregate evidence shows only modest movement toward greater open-
ness in the Japanese economy. Looking at foreign imports as a percentage of
total domestic supply for several major industries, we see only limited in-
creases from 1970 to 1980 (see table 7.1). Another aggregate indicator of
openness is foreign trade as a percent of gross domestic product. For all
industrialized market-economy countries, trade as a percentage of aggregate
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Table 7.2. Manufactured Imports as Percentages of GDP
Country
Japan
U.K.
Italy
France
Germany
U.S.
Canada
1970
2.41
10.16
7.96
9.23
10.41
3.48
16.40
1980
2.87
16.03
12.70
13.09
15.03
5.73
20.20
Percentage Increase
19
57
59
42
44
64
23
Source: Derived from figures in World Bank, World Tables, 3d ed., Comparative Economic
Data, Table 6 and country pages, Economic Data Sheet I, using current prices.
economic activity remained more or less constant from the mid-1950s through
the 1960s but rose sharply during the 1970s with exports and nonfactor services
for all countries increasing from 13.4 percent of GDP in 1970 to 19.8 percent
in 1981 and imports from 12.9 percent to 20.1 percent.14 Japan's experience
is not exceptional, with exports rising from 10.8 percent of GDP in 1970 to
15.5 percent in 1981, and imports from 9.5 percent to 13.6 percent. This
amounts to a 54 percent increase in the share of imports as a percentage of
GDP for Japan, as compared with increases of 10 percent for the United
Kingdom, 32 percent for Canada, 51 percent for Germany, 59 percent for
France, 67 percent for Italy, and 92 percent for the United States. For Japan,
however, this increase is unimpressive given the sharp escalation of energy
prices and Japan's heavy dependence on energy imports. In 1982, mineral
fuels, including oil, gas, and coal, accounted for nearly 50 percent of Japan's
total imports. One would have expected that Japan's trade ratio, more than
that of countries less dependent on imported energy, would have reflected
OPEC price hikes, particularly since it would have had to expand exports to
pay for the rising costs of imports.
The import of manufactures into Japan was low in 1970 and has not in-
creased much despite changes in policy. The government has liberalized trade,
investment, and capital market policies, but the importance of manufactured
imports has not grown. Table 7.2 shows manufactured imports as a percentage
of GDP in 1970 and 1980. Not only are the absolute figures much lower for
Japan, but the level of increase in the 1970s is lower than that of other major
industrialized countries. Table 7.3, illustrating manufactured imports as a
percent of total imports, shows this pattern continuing into the early 1980s,
after the second oil shock.
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Table 7.3. Manufactured Imports as Percentage of Total Imports
Country
Japan
United States
1972
29
68
1974
23
55
1976
20
54
1978
22
54
1980
18
49
1982
20
58
Source: Derived from figures in GATT, International Trade 1976177, 1980181, 1982/83, country
pages, appendix tables.
The low level of Japanese manufactured imports is particularly striking in
sectors where other countries, particularly the United States, are generally
recognized as having a competitive advantage. This is brought out by table
7.4, which presents figures for all three-digit SITC (Standard International
Trade Classification) numbers beginning with the digit 7, which designates
machinery, for all categories in which the United States and Japan were among
the ten largest exporters in 1982 and either the United States or Japan was
among the twenty largest importers. Figures are presented for American and
Japanese shares of exports and imports for all market economy countries, and
for Japanese and American sales to third markets, that is, American exports
excluding sales to Japan and Japanese exports excluding sales to the United
States. This gives some measure of the competitiveness of Japanese and
American products in third markets where they compete head to head. In all
cases where complete data are not available, it is because Japan is not among
the top twenty importers. (Smaller importers are not listed in the U.N. Year-
book of International Trade Statistics.) It is very unlikely that the inclusion
of a more complete set of data would alter the general conclusions that can
be drawn from the table, since Japan is not a major importer of any of the
products for which data are missing,
The most obvious conclusion suggested by the share of exports and imports
of the United States and Japan (columns 3-6) is that the United States is a
major importer as well as a major exporter for most categories of goods.
Although Japan is a major exporter of many categories of machinery, it is
not a major importer of any; the highest percentage of imports accounted for
by Japan in any category is 5.50 percent (SITC 714, engines and motors).
This is also the only category in which the aggregate share of Japanese imports
exceeds that of exports. In most cases Japanese exports were more than ten
times greater than imports.
Columns 7-9 provide some indication of the competitiveness of American
and Japanese products in third markets, column 9 shows the ratio of U.S.
exports to Japanese exports in third countries. Japanese exports exceed Ameri-
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can exports in only five of twenty-three categories for which data are available
(as indicated by a figure of less than 1.00 in column 9). American products
are competitive with Japanese products in third country markets. However,
as columns 10-12 indicate, American products do not sell very well in Japan
compared with sale of Japanese products in the United States. American sales
in Japan exceed Japanese sales in the United States in only five categories
(as indicated by a figure greater than 1.00 in column 12).
Column 13 provides an indication of how well American products sell in
Japan compared with their sales in third markets. This column reports the
ratio of the figures in column 12 to those in column 9. This figure would be
equal to 1.00 if the ratio of American sales in Japan to Japanese sales in
America was the same as the ratio of American sales in third markets to
Japanese sales in third markets. For example, if the United States sold ten
times more electrical machinery than Japan in third markets, and also sold
ten times more electrical machinery in Japan than Japan sold in the United
States, then column 13 would equal 1.00. In other words, sales in third-
country markets are taken as a predictor of sales for American and Japanese
products in each other's markets. Figures less than 1.00 indicate that the
United States is selling less than would be predicted on the basis of sales in
third-country markets; figures greater than 1.00 indicate that it is selling more.
As the numbers in column 13 indicate, there is not one instance in which the
United States is selling more in Japan than would be predicted on the basis
of sales in third-country markets. In most cases, it is selling less than one-
fifth, in many cases less than one-tenth. Even assuming that sales to Japan
should be 50 percent less than would be predicted on the basis of sales to
third markets (because the Japanese market is about half the size of the U.S.
market), most American products are still substantially underrepresented in
Japan. The best showing for the United States is SITC 728 (other machinery
for specialized industry) in which sales of U.S. products in Japan compared
with Japanese products in the United States are 90 percent of what would be
predicted on the basis of performance in third markets. It is very unlikely
that the inclusion of numbers for the missing entries in column 13 would alter
the overall conclusions that can be drawn from the table, because these are
all categories in which Japan is not among the top twenty market-economy
importers.
American producers find it much harder to penetrate the Japanese market
than Japanese producers to penetrate the American market, compared with
their relative performance in third countries. Tables 7.1 through 7.4 suggest
that Japan's trade policy changes in the 1960s and 1970s have not had much
impact on actual outcomes. The data presented here can, of course, only
suggest this because the level of imports might have been even lower had
Table 7.4. Japanese and U.S. Trade in Machinery, 1982
United States Japan Japan
SITC
Number
(1)
712
713
714
716
718
722
723
Description
(2)
Steam
engines,
turbines
Intrnl
combus
pstn engn
Engns &
motors
Rotating
elec plant
Oth power
genratg mach
Tractors
non-road
Civil engrg
equip, etc.
to Mkt
Econs
(3)
37.08
26.60
37.08
19.53
5.88
24.21
43.01
frMkt
Econs
(4)
6.64
15.95
17.86
7.25
4.56
15.01
5.89
toMk
Econs
(5)
18.84
13.08
1.40
17.10
7.14
15.01
11.65
US Exports Japan
to Exports
Japan to US
Exports % Imports % Exports % Imports US Exports Exports
 t fr Mkt Excl Japan Excl US
Econs (000 US $) (000 US $) 7:8 (000 US $) (000 US $) 10:11 12:9
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
<1.54
5.50 2,925,723 11,250 26.2 198,662 18,161 10.90 .41
1.85 1,304,411 1,144,863 1.14 22,635 167,897 .13 .11
2.06
<1.27
89,487 93,953 .95 2,706 18,026 .15 .16
United States Japan Japan
SITC
Number
(1)
724
725
726
727
728
736
737
Description
(2)
Textile,
leather
machnry
Paper, etc.
mill machry
Prntg bkbndg
mach pts
Food machry
non-dom
Oth machry
for spec
indus
Metal wrkg
mach tools
Metal wrkg
mach
% Exports
to Mkt
Econs
(3)
7.82
14.20
20.08
18.33
16.36
12.68
17.60
% Imports
frMkt
Econs
(4)
12.81
9.45
13.96
6.11
9.40
18.58
8.07
US Exports Japan
to Exports
Japan to US
% Exports % Imports US Exports Exports
to Mkt fr Mkt Excl Japan Excl US
Econs Econs (000 US $) (000 US $) 7:8 (000 US $) (000 US $) 10:11 12:9
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
14.70
4.86
6.09
2.58
<1.83
<1.69
3.07
1.72
9.52 <1.57
615,245 134,220 4.58 29,308 61,359 .47 .10
358,657 44,747 8.01 358,657 7,046 1.40 .17
8.42 2.77 1,999,484 1,018,398 1.96 232,575 130,751 1.77 .90
14.83 2.82 1,108,271 821,785 1.34 75,686 562,650 .13 .10
Table 7.4. Cont'd
SITC
Number
(1)
741
742
743
744
745
749
751
752
Description
(2)
Htg coolg
equip
Pumps for
liquids, etc.
Pumps
centrfuges,
etc.
Mech handlg
equip
Nonelec
mach tools
Nonelec mach
pts, ace
Office mach
Auto data
proc equip
United
% Exports
toMkt
Econs
(3)
21.25
22.47
22.77
15.40
19.38
12.63
10.40
36.42
States
% Imports
frMkt
Econs
(4)
5.56
9.44
11.31
7.91
10.21
9.14
24.49
6.46
Japan
% Exports ft
to Mkt
Econs
(5)
19.49
10.72
11.42
14.81
6.77
13.57
43.43
9.39
> Imports
frMkt
Econs
(6)
<1.79
1.95
2.38
<1.72
1.87
2.18
1.12
4.13
US Exports
Excl Japan
(000 US $)
(7)
1,163,028
1,,752,777
1,161,816
1,762,796
560,109
4,881,754
Japan
Exports
Excl US
(000 US $)
(8)
495,379
765,629
318,763
1,570,368
14,561,719
728,925
7:8
(9)
2.34
2.28
3.64
1.12
.38
6.70
US Exports
to
Japan
(000 US $)
(10)
29,986
86,182
1,161,816
62,137
28,579
395,011
Japan
Exports
to US
(000 US $)
(ID
73,753
159,960
318,763
390,175
1,002,031
631,935
10:11
(12)
.40
.53
.56
.16
.02
.62
12:9
(13)
.17
.23
.15
.14
.07
.09
United States Japan Japan
> Exports % Imports
SITC
Number
(1)
759
761
762
763
764
111
111
Description
(2)
Office, ADP
mach pts
access
TV recvers
Radio
receivers
Sound
recorders
Telecom equip
pts, ace
Elec power
machy
Switchgear,
etc. parts
NES
to Mkt
Econs
(3)
43.08
5.66
2.91
4.28
22.45
10.19
15.44
frMki
Econs
(4)
18.88
16.94
32.20
26.69
23.75
14.49
10.38
% Exports % Imports US Exports Exports
to Mkt fr Mkt Excl Japan Excl US
Econs Econs (000 US $) (000 US $) 7:8 (000 US $) (000 US $) 10:11 12:9
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
US Exports Japan
to Exports
Japan to US
8.47
35.20
46.63
17.23
17.60
12.83
3.07
<1.48
.94
75.94 <.O8O
2.91
4,157,218 411,709 10.10 408,660 486,483 .84 .08
149,350 1,496,609 0.10 550 904,804 .0006 .006
2.01 3,213,936 2,889,554 1.11 161,279 1,507,691 .10 .10
350,764 541,683 .65 11,219 83,658 .13 .20
2.63 1,891,448 1,382,343 1.36 104,891 276,577 .38 .29
Table 7.4. Cont'd
United States Japan
SITC
Number Description
(1) (2)
Japan
7c Exports % Imports % Exports % Imports US Exports Exports
to Mkt fr Mkt to Mkt fr Mkt Excl Japan Excl US
Econs Econs Econs Econs (000 US $) (000 US $) 7:8 (000 US $) (000 US $) 10:11 12:9
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
US Exports Japan
to Exports
Japan to US
773
774
775
776
778
781
782
Elec distrb
equipment
Electro med
Xray equip
Hshold type
equip
Transistors,
valves, etc.
Electrical
mach
Pass motor
veh excl
buses
Lorries spcl
mtr veh
11.99
33.99
8.77
28.40
17.60
9.82
19.45
11.67
29.19
13.72
5.23
9.75
34.92
19.68
18.43
9.01
14.09
17.24
17.29
29.82
26.88
<1.52
5.46
<1.39
0.57
925,322 212,933 4.34 109,514 61,228 1.78 .41
4.77 4,207,802 1,890,958 2.23 216,330 795,115 .27 .12
2.71 2,300,017 1,755,359 1.31 128,883 631,376 .20 0.1
3,116,486 8,210,502 .37 45,546 9,804,613 .004 .01
SITC
Number
(1)
783
784
785
786
791
792
793
Description
(2)
Road motor
veh
Motor veh
pits, access
NES
Cycles, etc.
motrzd or
not
Trailers, non-
mot veh
Railway veh
Aircrft etc.
Ships, boats
etc.
United
% Exports
toMkt
Econs
(3)
9.79
25.51
2.49
7.48
16.40
44.61
8.72
States
% Imports
frMkt
Econs
(4)
8.00
13.40
26.88
2.52
5.88
13.24
2.62
Japan
% Exports fi
to Mkt
Econs
(5)
14.18
8.44
66.49
10.73
10.42
0.60
39.34
b Imports
frMkt
Econs
(6)
<1.12
<.81
<.93
<1.42
<1.63
3.76
<1.61
US Exports
Excl Japan
(000 US $)
(7)
10,980,430
Japan
Exports
Excl US
(000 US S)
(8)
35,608
US Exports
to
Japan
7:8 (000 US $)
(9) (10)
308.37 906,372
Japan
Exports
to US
(OOOUSS) 10:11 12:9
(11) (12) (13)
123,236 7.35 .02
Source: Derived from figures in U.N., 1982 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. 2, ST/ESA/STAT/SET.G/31/Add.l (New York, 1984), 1130-1218.
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these policy changes not been made. We have not attempted the much more
complex counterfactual analysis that would be required to more effectively
substantiate our argument.
An examination of Japan's trade posture, including both state policies and
actual outcomes, does not lead to a straightforward conclusion that Japan has
become more open or liberal. There is no doubt that Japanese trade policies
have changed. Behavior has also changed but in more ambiguous ways. Japan
has accommodated to foreign pressures to control export surges. Although
this posture is consistent with selective accommodation explained by a TIT
FOR TAT strategy, it has not been particularly painful. Japan has become
more involved in world trade, but the increase is smaller than that of any
other major industrial state, and smaller than might have been expected. In
particular, the ratio of manufactured imports has not increased substantially,
and in some areas of high technology where the United States is usually
recognized as being highly competitive, such as office and telecommunications
equipment, the import ratio has been relatively low and has even declined in
contrast to patterns in the United States and the European community.
To explain this disjunction between policies and actual outcomes, several
alternative interpretations can be offered. First, it may be that Japanese poli-
cymakers have only consented to liberalization in those areas where Japanese
producers have been able to compete. Where domestic companies have not
been internationally competitive, policymakers have found ways of insulating
them from more efficient foreign producers; this is especially conspicuous in
highly politicized sectors like agriculture, food processing, and construction.
For infant industries with great growth potential, import protection, as an
integral part of industrial targeting, can confer dynamic advantages over for-
eign competitors under conditions of imperfect competition. One might call
this a strategy of calculated ineffectuality under the guise of liberalization.16
Prima facie evidence for this interpretation can be found in the persistent
inability of foreign producers to take full advantage of their comparative
advantage in some industrial sectors.
A second interpretation of the disjunction between policy and outcomes is
that barriers to outside entry arise out of the structure of the private sector as
opposed to deliberately ineffectual public policy choices. Changes in trade
policies have had only a marginal impact because of impediments embedded
in the structure of Japan's domestic economy. The multilayered system of
retail distribution, featuring close ties between buyers and sellers, for example,
makes it unusually difficult for outsiders to break in. The interlocking network
of ownership among Japanese corporations often disposes them to do business
with closely related domestic firms, even when foreign firms are able to offer
Japan's Evolving Trade Posture 141
competitive prices. During the forty years of postwar recovery and growth,
Japanese companies have spun out intricate webs of interdependence, risk
diffusion and sharing, and common interests and goals based on long-term
interactions and mutual trust. Such deeply embedded institutional impedi-
ments as subcontracting networks, keiretsu affiliations (industrial groupings
like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, centered on a lead bank or major manufac-
turer), and the value placed on implicit long-term business transactions are
not readily amenable to government-ordered change. Japan's economy clearly
does not function in the classical Adam Smith mode. Although it is certainly
market-based, like that of the United States, Japan's economy is permeated
by a maze of formal and informal organizational networks that structure and
shape the market process. In commercial transactions, short-run market
calculations—such as comparative prices and noniterative bidding—are not
the sole determinants of business decision. Other considerations—long-stand-
ing business ties, financial interdependence, intercorporate stockholding, kei-
retsu membership, and subcontracting networks—enter into the complex
calculus as factors of often overriding importance.
Organizational factors fit into a broader concept of market behavior in that
they take consciously into account many relevant long-term considerations
that transcend immediate price signals As Williamson and Coase have pointed
out, trying to minimize long-run transaction costs (e.g., poor quality, op-
portunism, constant monitoring, costly litigation) is highly rational from the
standpoint of corporate strategy. For U.S. firms, breaking into Japan' s struc-
tured but highly competitive market, therefore, poses far greater inherent
difficulties than the reverse—Japanese companies seeking to establish foot-
holds in the less structured, more decentralized U.S. market.
A third possible interpretation is that public policies have only a limited
impact on outcomes. Basic underlying factors like national ratios of total
savings versus dissavings or factor endowments and geographic distance may
be the prime driving forces behind trade patterns, including the percentage
of manufactured imports. A state can regulate the influx of foreign products
by imposing quantitative restrictions, but whether it can adopt policies that
automatically raise import levels is not clear. If foreign producers are not
competitive, the removal of tariffs or nontariff barriers will not have any
effect. Given Japan's factor endowments and its geographic distance from
trade partners, it can be argued that the observed pattern of trade, including
the percentage of manufactured imports, is consistent with what would be
predicted from a conventional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson analysis.
A fourth possible interpretation is that there are lags between policy changes
and trade outcomes. Foreign exporters, unable to crack the Japanese market
in the past, may be reluctant to take full advantage of greater opportunities
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now opening up. They may find that they have to adapt their products to
Japanese tastes and offer the kind of after-service that Japanese customers
demand. Often they will have to be prepared to absorb short-term losses in
order to establish long-term market footholds. It may also take some time
before Japanese consumers and industrial customers become accustomed to
purchasing foreign goods. All this suggests that the effects of policy liber-
alization may only be registered some time later, after adjustments are made
on both sides.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Of the four explanations
for the disjuncture between policy and outcomes, only the third has been
tested systematically. Using a modified version of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Sam-
uelson model, Gary R. Saxonhouse has found that the ratio of Japanese manu-
factures falls well within the normal range, given its resource base and
location.19 Neither the first nor the second is amenable to quantitative testing,
and empirical data for the fourth is unavailable, because verification of the
time-lag hypothesis lies presumably in the future.
This is not to say, however, that the third approach is immune from criti-
cism or that it is most persuasive. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model sheds
light only on the relative composition of imports at a specific point in time,
given broadly defined factor endowments. It does not say anything about
absolute levels of trade, much less account for trade imbalances. It cannot
say much more than that Japan will import raw materials and export manu-
factures, but the latter may be textiles, automobiles, or computers. Nor does
it deal with a variety of political forces that have a direct bearing on trade.
Exactly how much it tells us about the relationship between public policies
and trade outcomes is, therefore, open to question.
In spite of the measurement difficulties and the obvious problems of making
aggregate inferences from microlevel factors, we believe that the second inter-
pretation—private sector impediments—deserves more attention than it has
received. Interviews with foreign businessmen who have tried to export into
Japan indicate that the barriers posed by Japan's extra-market institutions and
practices constitute serious bottlenecks, especially in such areas as marketing
(e.g., retail distribution, sellers of intermediate goods, and buyers of end-
user products), direct foreign investments (e.g., corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions), and public policies (e.g., close government-business cooperation).
Keiretsu groupings, the role of giant trading companies, close banking-busi-
ness relations, industrial policy, the complex set of relationships between
individual bureaucracies, the LDP, and interest groups, and extensive inter-
corporate stockholding—to say nothing of distinctive cultural values and busi-
ness practices—undoubtedly make Japan far harder for Americans to penetrate
than the American market is for Japanese to break into. In Oliver Williamson's
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terminology, hierarchical or organizational factors are more widespread in
Japan than in the United States.20
As Japan's economy develops and is exposed increasingly to the forces of
internationalization, such organizational factors may recede in importance.
Should that happen, private sector barriers to foreign penetration will be
reduced. However, as market trends are likely to be limited by the inertial
weight of the extant system, trade tensions between Japan and other indus-
trialized states will persist. Changes in trade policies have served to alleviate
but not eliminate such tensions. To resolve conflicts in the future, Japan's
trade partners will insist that greater progess be made with respect to actual
outcomes.
Japan and the United States are the two major economic powers in the
noncommunist world. The extent to which they can cope with their inter-
national trade conflicts will have an important impact on the larger system of
world trade. The analysis presented in this essay suggests, although it cannot
firmly conclude on the basis of available evidence, that differences in domestic
economic structures will become an increasingly important consideration in
international trade disputes. So long as tariff or nontariff barriers were so high
that they blocked the import of goods, domestic structures were irrelevant.
However, as formal state barriers to trade have been lowered these domestic
structures have become more important determinants of trade flows. The
current international regime for trade offers no guidance for dealing with such
issues. It tacitly assumes that all countries have more or less similar domestic
political economies; that international rules will have the same impact in
different states.21 If, however, the removal of formal trade barriers opens
markets in one country because its firms act as if they were in an auction
market, while leaving markets inaccessible in other countries whose firms act
as if they were in customer markets, friction is bound to result. This friction
may be lessened by changing domestic political economic structures in one
or more countries, by expanding the scope of the international regime by
drafting rules that apply to these new problems, or by limiting the amount of
economic interaction. All of these alternatives will require initiatives that move
beyond the postwar liberal system so carefully created and nurtured by the
United States.
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U.S.-Japan Trade Relations,
1955-1982
HIDEO KANEMITSU
Throughout the period from 1955 to 1982, a close political and economic
interdependence existed between the United States and Japan, but the char-
acteristics of their interdependence underwent substantial changes. The span
of years may be divided into three periods.
Period I (1955-64) may be characterized as one of patron-protege relations,
in which the United States gave unilateral support and protection as a powerful
patron of Japan and helped it enter the postwar international community. The
United States strongly endorsed Japan's membership in GATT in 1955 and
in OECD in 1964. In the latter year, Japan was asked to become an IMF
Article 8 nation, symbolizing its status as a developed industrial country.
Throughout this period Japan was almost totally dependent upon the United
States for both exports and imports. Though the United States also needed
Japan's political and economic stability in the Far East, the relationship be-
tween the two countries was overwhelmingly one-sided. Japan's goal was to
develop and stabilize its economy above everything else. Indeed, after re-
newing the security treaty with the United States in 1960, Japan's major
concern was exclusively focused on its domestic economic growth while
maintaining its external equilibrium. The Japanese economy expanded rapidly;
its real Gross National Product (GNP) grew at a rate of about 10 percent,
compared with 3.2 percent for the United States. Japan's trade expanded still
faster; its exports grew at a rate of 13 percent and its imports at 12 percent,
while United States exports and imports grew much more slowly, at a rate
of 5 percent. Thoughout the period, Japan's merchandise trade balance had
a chronic deficit averaging about $800 million annually. On the other hand,
the United States enjoyed a merchandise trade surplus averaging about $4.5
billion. Japan's trade deficits with the United States also continued at an annual
average of about $500 million until 1964.
Period II (1965-73) was a historic one for the Japanese economy. Japan
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succeeded in achieving spectacular economic growth (approximately 10 per-
cent of real GNP growth per year). In contrast, the U.S. economy grew at a
much slower rate of 3.4 percent in real GNP, which was lower than the
average growth rate (4.4 percent) of the industrial countries in the world.
Japan expanded its exports at a rate of more than 20 percent and its imports
at approximately 19 percent per year. During the same period. The U.S.
import expansion rate (approximately 15 percent) was much higher than its
export expansion rate (about 11 percent), indicating a downward trend in the
U.S. Merchandise trade surplus. On the other hand, Japan had a surplus in
its merchandise trade balance for the first time since the end of World War
II. Since 1965, the bilateral trade balance between the United States and Japan
has continued to create a considerable trade surplus for the latter. Globally
Japan had arrived at the stage of a secular surplus on current account, which
enabled it to become a long-term capital export country.
In 1971, the United States had a trade deficit for the first time in this
century. Since then, the U.S. trade deficit has continued to increase except
in 1973 and 1975. During the period of 1965-73, the United States was the
only major industrial country involved in a large-scale war. In the international
monetary sphere, the so-called dollar shortage in the 1950s evolved into a
dollar glut and finally the gold convertibility of the U.S. dollar was suspended,
marking the end of the era of the Bretton Woods System.
In contrast to the international position of an overvalued Japanese yen in
Period I, the IMF par value of the Japanese yen (360 yen per U.S. dollar)
was considered to be grossly undervalued. But the Japanese government was
quite reluctant to recognize this currency realignment until the end of Period
II in 1973. Unquestionably, Japan made a great effort to maintain close ties
with the U.S. leadership in connection with international currency crises and
the settlement of the Kennedy Round at the GATT multilateral trade nego-
tiation. From this standpoint, Period II can be described as one of a leader-
follower relationship between the United States and Japan. Though conflicts
on trade issues were by no means lacking between the two nations, such as
the textile negotiations in the early 1970s, both the United States and Japan
came to recognize valuable benefits arising from mutual trade expansion.
Period III (1974-82) started with the first oil crisis; then, in 1979-80, the
second oil crisis delivered another serious blow to the world economy. The
overall performance of the Japanese economy, which depended so heavily on
imported foreign oil, was affected acutely by these energy crises. This was
reflected principally in Japan's balance of payments deficits, first a $4.7 billion
deficit in 1974, then an $8.7 billion deficit in 1979, and a deficit of over
$10 billion in 1980. In 1974, Japan experienced a decrease in its real GNP
(minus 1.2 percent in real GNP growth) for the first time since the end of
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World War II. In fact, during this period, Japan's GNP growth rate declined
sharply to the level of 4.7 percent per annum, which was less than one half
of the annual rate of the previous period. Though Japan maintained its export
expansion rate at approximately 15 percent in value terms, its growth rate in
volume dropped substantially to only 7 percent, less than one-half that of the
previous period. Japan's import growth rate also was reduced considerably
from 15 percent in Period II to 2.3 percent in volume.
During the same period, the United States also experienced a slower growth
of its real GNP at a rate of 2.2 percent per annum, but its export growth rate
increased slightly from 11 percent in Period II to 12.6 percent in value terms.
The U.S. import growth rate (14.8 percent) was still higher than its export
growth rate, a trend continuing from the previous period. Moreover, the gap
between Japan's export expansion with the United States was widening in
this period, which accelerated the deficit trend of the U.S. merchandise trade
balance. Indeed, Japan's export expansion rate (about 17 percent) was in-
creasingly larger than its import expansion rate (about 12 percent) with the
United States throughout this period.
The tensions in the economic relationship between the United States and
Japan gradually mounted, and perhaps the U.S. government for the first time
came to recognize a rival relationship with Japan. Thus, Period III can be
characterised as the period of competing partners between the United States
and Japan. This competitive relationship was exemplified when the U.S.
government strongly requested that the Japanese government take specific
actions in order to cope with the problem of sharing the oil deficits in 1976-
77. The United States and Japan in Period III faced constant conflicts, par-
ticularly in the area of international trade and investment. Trade frictions
involving exchange rate misalignment and Japan's import restrictions became
rampant against the background of the huge U.S. trade deficits and Japan's
trade surplus, especially in 1977-78 and 1981-82. In fact, the bilateral trade
imbalance between the United States and Japan constituted the most funda-
mental cause of the U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts, which became political
issues in the United States as well as in Japan.
The United States and Japan as competing partners do not yet have an
equal status when considering international security, where the United States
has maintained an overwhelming superiority in a worldwide context. In con-
trast, Japan purposely and stringently restricted it military role in the inter-
national community in the post-World War II era.
From 1955 to 1982 world exports (excluding the centrally planned econo-
mies) expanded at a remarkable pace of 13.3 percent annually. World exports
excreased approximately twenty times, from $85 billion in 1955 to $1,663
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billion in 1982. During the same period, U.S. exports expanded at an annual
rate of 11.5 percent, increasing approximately fifteen times, from $14.3 billion
in 1955 to $212.2 billion in 1982. At the same time, Japan's exports expanded
at an annual rate of 18.6 percent, much larger than the world export expansion
rate. Japan's exports increased about seventy times, $2 billion in 1955 to
$139 billion in 1982. As a result, the United States decreased its export world
share from 16.8 percent (1955) to 12.8 percent (1982), while Japan's export
world share increased from 2.4 percent (1955) to 8.4 percent (1982).
On the other hand, the United States expanded its imports at a much faster
rate (13.6 percent per annum) than its export expansion rate. Thus, the United
States increased its imports approximately twenty-one times, from $11.4 bil-
lion in 1955 to $244 billion in 1982. Japan's imports also expanded at a
remarkably high rate of 17.2 percent per annum; thus,7apan increased its
imports approximately fifty-three times, from $2.5 billion in 1955 to $132
billion in 1982. Accordingly, the United States slightly increased its import
world share from 12.8 percent (1955) to 14 percent, while Japan's share
increased from 2.8 percent (1955) to 7.6 percent (1982).
We observe that the U.S. export expansion rate, 11.5 percent, was much
slower than its import expansion rate, 13.8 percent. Japan had just the opposite
case in the same period, that is, its export expansion rate, 18.6 percent, was
higher than its import expansion rate, 17.2 percent. Consequently, the United
States increasingly reduced its trade surplus and eventually generated trade
deficits, while Japan clearly maintained trade surpluses during this period.
Indeed, these contrasting trends in the United States and Japan started around
1964-65, a critical period for U.S.-Japan trade relations.
During the same period, Japan's exports to the United States expanded at
an annual rate of 18.6 percent, which is exactly the same expansion rate of
Japan's total exports to the whole world. On the other hand, Japan expanded
its imports from the United States at an annual rate of 13.9 percent, which
was lower than Japan's global import expansion rate, 17.2 percent. Thus, the
difference between Japan's export growth rate and import growth rate with
the United States is much greater than the difference between Japan's global
export and import expansion rates. To be more specific, Japan's imports were
greater than its exports in Period I (1955-64), and its merchandise trade balance
was roughly in equilibrium in Period II (1965-73), except in 1971 and 1972.
In Period III (1974-82), because of the two oil crises with soaring oil prices,
Japan's trade balance was disturbed and fluctuated in an unprecedented man-
ner. Nevertheless, despite the enormous impact of the two oil crises on the
Japanese economy, Japan's merchandise trade balance clearly showed a sur-
plus trend. This was reflected particularly in Japan's trade balance with the
United States.
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The United States merchandise trade balance showed an approximately
opposite trend. The United States maintained trade surpluses until the end of
the 1960s; then its trade balance was roughly in equilibrium during the period
of 1968-75. After 1976, the U.S. merchandise trade balance showed a clear
deficit trend.
We shall be interested in the long-run trends of both America's and Japan's
trade shares in the world market. During the period 1955-82, the U.S. share
of world exports clearly showed a declining trend. The U.S. export share was
approximately one-fifth of the world exports in the middle of the 1950s (19
percent in 1957), but it declined steadily to the level of 12 percent in 1980.
By contrast, Japan increased its share almost steadily from 2.4 percent in
1955 to the level of 8.5 percent in 1981. On the other hand, the United States
had no such declining trend in its share of world imports, while Japan had a
similarly rising trend, though a milder one compared with its export share
trend in the same period.
It is striking to observe that, during the period 1955-82, the total of the
U.S. and Japanese shares of the world exports remained at a fairly stable
level, approximately 21 percent on the average. Judging from this, it appears
that the United States was losing its export market share as rapidly as Japan
was adding to its share. It is true that Japan raised its export share by increasing
exports to the United States by the same expansion rate of 18.6 percent per
annum, but U.S. exports to Japan increased at approximately 14 percent
annually, much faster than it global exports, which increased only 11.5 percent
annually during this period. Therefore, it is simply not true that the decline
in the U.S. share of world exports is attributable to a decline in its share of
exports to Japan.
Nevertheless, during the period 1955-82 the United States and Japan were
competing in world export markets, where the United States share continued
to decrease while Japan's expanded to almost the same degree. There must
be many factors to explain this, but I shall restrict myself to several empirical
observations.
First, as Table 8.1 shows, during this period, U.S. export prices (relative
to the Japanese wholesale price index) were rising, while Japan's export prices
(relative to the U.S. wholesale price index) were slightly declining. Accord-
ingly, Japan's competitive position vis-a-vis the United States was strength-
ened steadily in world export markets. In the same period, Japan's real per
capita GNP increased about seven times (or at a rate of 7.2 percent per annum),
while the U.S. real per capita GNP grew only about 1.8 times (or at a rate
of 2.2 percent per annum). This indicates a fundamental difference between
the rates of change in value-added labor productivity in the United States and
Japan. Furthermore, there was a significant difference between Japan's growth
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Table 8.1. Annual Percentage Changes in Production, Wholesale Prices,
Wages, and Trade for the United States and Japan
Real Gross National Product
Japan
U.S.
World GDP"
Industrial Production Index
(1980=100)
Japan
U.S.
Labor productivity11
Japan
U.S.
Wholesale prices (1980= 100)
Japan
U.S.
Wages (1980= 100)
Japan
U.S.
Trade (in U.S. dollar value)0
Japan
Exports
Imports
Exports to U.S.
Imports from U.S.
Period I
(1955-64)
9.8
3.2
4.3
15.8
3.5
8.3
2.1
0.1
0.6
6.7
3.4
13.1
12.3
16.5
11.2
Period II
(1965-73)
9.9
3.4
4.4
13.6
3.5
8.6
1.3
2.4
3.7
13.9
5.8
20.5
18.8
19.8
16.5
Period III
(1974-82)
4.7
2.8
2.7
5.0
2.2
3.6
0.6
4.6
8.7
7.9
8.6
14.7
13.7
17.3
12.1
Total
(1955-82)
8.3
3.4
4.0
10.3
3.8
7.1
1.5
3.6
4.5
11.7
5.7
18.6
17.2
18.6
13.9
(continued opposite)
rate, 10.3 percent, and the U.S. growth rate, 3.8 percent, in industrial pro-
duction. In fact, this difference is more salient in the area of machinery
production; Japan's machinery production (index) expanded at a rate of 14.1
percent per year, while the U.S. machinery production (index) grew only at
a rate of 4.3 percent per year.
Second, Japan's exports showed a much higher income (or world imports)
elasticity than U.S. exports. Indeed, U.S. export elasticity (with respect to
world imports) was less than one (0.86), compared to the Japanese export
elasticity, which was greater than one (1.36), so that whenever world exports
increased 1 percent, U.S. exports expanded less than 1 percent while Japanese
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Table 8.1. Cont'd
Trade (in U.S. dollar value)0
U.S.
Exports
Imports
World
Exports
Imports
Trade (in volume)
Japan
Exports
Imports
U.S.
Exports
Imports
Period I
(1955-64)
5.1
5.1
6.0
6.0
14.7
14.1
4.3
5.5
Period II
(1965-73)
11.2
14.8
14.2
13.7
14.3
14.8
6.9
9.4
Period III
(1974-82)
12.6
14.8
13.0
13.5
7.2
2.3
3.9
3.5
151
Total
(1955-82)
11.5
13.6
13.3
13.1
13.9
10.3
6.0
6.8
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983;
The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various years); The Bank of Japan, Kokusai
Hikaku Tokei (Japan and the World: A Comparison by Economic and Financial Statistics) (various
years); U.S. Department of Commerce; Survey of Current Business (various issues); and Eco-
nomic Report of the President, February 1984.
"Gross Domestic Product Index (1980 = 100) of the industrial countries, excluding the centrally
planned economies.
bReal GNP per civilian employed person.
cExcludes exports and imports of the centrally planned economies. Japan export data are on
f.o.b. basis and imports data are on c.i.f. basis. U.S. export and import data are both on f.a.s.
basis.
exports grew more than 1 percent. Because world exports expanded during
this period by approximately 13 percent per year, this difference produced a
significant gap in the export expansion rates of the two countries.
Third, Japan's export performance was distinctly superior in machinery
trade, where world imports expanded most rapidly (at 15.4 percent per year).
In contrast to this, the United States had a better performance in food trade,
where world imports expanded at the lowest rate (at 10 percent per year).
Indeed, at Table 8.2 indicates, the growth rate of U.S. exports was higher
than that of world exports only in food trade. During this period, the United
States had the highest elasticity of food exports (with respect to world food
imports), 1.03, and the lowest elasticity of machinery exports (with respect
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Table 8.2. Annual Percentage Growth of U.S., Japanese, and World Trade
in Selected Commodities, 1955-82
Commodity
Food
Raw material
Manufactured
Machinery
equipment
Total
&fuel
goods
& transport
World
Exports
10.3
13.4
14.1
15.0
13.3
Imports
10.0
13.6
14.3
15.4
13.1
U
Exports
10.6
10.2
11.5
12.0
11.0
.S.
Imports
7.9
13.8
15.9
21.2
13.8
Japan
Exports
8.8
12.5
18.9
24.6
18.6
Imports
16.6
18.6
18.9
17.1
17.2
Sources: OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade; The Bank of Japan, Kokusai Hikaku Tokei.
Table 8.3. Income Elasticities of U.S. and Japanese Exports for Selected
Commodities, 1955-82
Commodity
Food
Raw materials & fuel
Manufactured goods
Machinery & transport equipment
Total
U.S.
1.03
0.76
0.84
0.83
0.86
Japan
0.86
0.89
1.29
1.53
1.36
Sources: OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade; The Bank of Japan, Kokusai Hikaku Tokei.
Note: Estimation on elasticity of export with respect to world import: log(EX) = Constant
+ T|log(WI); EX: Export of a commodity of each country; WI: World import of a commodity
minus exporting country's import of that commodity; T|: Elasticity of export with respect to world
import
to world machinery imports), 0.83. On the other hand, Japan had the highest
elasticity of machinery exports, 1.53, and the lowest elasticity of food exports,
0.86. Furthermore, in manufactured goods trade, the United States had also
a lower export elasticity, 0.84, while Japan had an export elasticity of 1.29
(see Table 8.3).
Fourth, in world machinery trade, Japan increased its export share from
approximately 3 percent in the middle of the 1950s to almost 20 percent in
the early 1980s. The United States followed an opposite trend; its market
share of world machinery exports decreased from about 38 percent in 1956
to 20 percent in the early 1980s. Thus, in world machinery exports, Japan's
export share was less than one-tenth that of the United States in the middle
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of the 1950s, but it was rapidly approaching equality by the early 1980s. Both
the United States and Japan maintained a high proportion of machinery exports
to total exports during the period 1955-82. For the United States, the ratio
of machinery exports to total exports remained in a stable range of approx-
imately 35 to 45 percent. In contrast, Japan's machinery export ratio increased
sharply from about 20 percent in the middle of the 1950s (19.4 percent in
1956) to more than 60 percent in the early 1980s (61.7 percent in 1981).
Judging from these results, the difference between U.S. and Japanese export
performances appears to reflect a much sharper contrast in machinery export
performance.
Fifth, the U.S. share of Japanese imports declined substantially from ap-
proximately 34 percent in the middle of the 1950s to less than 18 percent in
the early 1980s. On the other hand, the Japanese share of U.S. imports more
than tripled during this period, from less than 5 percent in the late 1950s to
more than 15 percent in 1982. This marked contrast is certainly one of the
contributing factors in producing a significant difference between U.S. and
Japanese export performances in the international markets.
Sixth, as noted already during 1955-82, the United States lagged far behind
other industrial countires, except the United Kingdom, in export expansion.
While Japan's export expansion rate, 18.6 percent per annum, was the highest
among the major industrial countries, the corresponding U.S. expansion rate
of 11.0 percent was lower than the world export expansion rate, 13.3 percent
per annum.
Trade between the United States and Japan expanded rapidly in volume
as well as in value during the period 1955-82. In 1955, Japan's exports to
the United States amounted to $456 million, which accounted for 23 percent
of Japan's total exports. In the same year, Japan's imports from the United
States amounted to $774 million, or 31 percent of Japan's total imports. In
1982, the amount of Japan's exports to the United States was more than $36
billion, accounting for 26 percent of total exports, and the amount of Japan's
imports from the United States was $24 billion, or 18 percent of total imports
(tables 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7).
The growth rate of Japan's exports to the United States was as high as
18.6 percent per year, equal to the growth rate of Japan's total exports. Japan's
imports from the United States also expanded at a fairly high rate of 14 percent
per year, Which was higher than the growth rate of the United States' total
exports in the same period. Until the early 1970s, Japan's export prices re-
mained generally stable and then increased sharply after 1973. During the
period 1955-82, Japan's export prices increased at an annual rate of 4.2 percent
and Japan's import prices increased at a much faster rate of 6.3 percent.
Therefore, in terms of constant export prices at 1980, Japan's (real) exports
Table 8.4. Japan's Exports to the United States for Selected Years (millions of U.S. dollars, percentage)
Food
Raw materials & fuels
Light industry goods
Textiles
Heavy and chemical
industry products
Chemicals
Metals
Iron & steel
Machinery
General machinery
Office machines
Electrical machinery
Radio sets
TV sets
Tape recorders
Transport equipment
Motor vehicles
Motorcycles
Precision instruments
Total
1955
($)
47
25
308
170
76
6
41
13
29
14
• •
3
• •
• •
• •
• •
• •
• •
12
456
(%)
(10.3)
(5.5)
(67.5)
(37.3)
(16.7)
(1.3)
(9.0)
(2.9)
(6.4)
(3-D
(.7)
(2.6)
1960
($)
73
22
653
288
354
17
150
71
187
35
• •
106
69
• •
• •
9
2
2
37
1,102
(%)
(6.6)
(2.0)
(59.3)
(26.1)
(32.1)
(1.5)
(13.6)
(6.4)
(17.0)
(3.2)
(9.6)
(6.3)
(.8)
(.2)
(.2)
(3.4)
1965
($)
84
20
906
441
1,446
46
692
509
707
92
• •
377
104
62
50
158
34
104
81
2,479
(%)
(3.4)
(-8)
(36.5)
(17.8)
(58.3)
(1.9)
(27.9)
(20.5)
(28.5)
(3.7)
(15.2)
(4.2)
(2.5)
(2.0)
(6.4)
(1.4)
(4.2)
(3.3)
($)
135
26
1,408
597
4,298
160
1,296
899
2,841
408
143
1,328
397
265
256
915
536
280
190
5,940
1970
(%)
(2.3)
(-4)
(23.7)
(10.1)
(72.4)
(2.7)
(21.8)
(15.1)
(47.8)
(6.9)
(2.4)
(22.4)
(6.7)
(4.5)
(4.3)
(15.4)
(9.0)
(4.7)
(3.2)
1975
($)
165
30
1,161
432
9,508
346
2,499
1,845
6,664
953
266
1,992
389
256
256
3,239
2,281
577
480
11,149
(%)
(1.5)
(-3)
(10.4)
(3.9)
(85.3)
(3.1)
(22.4)
(16.5)
(59.8)
(8.5)
(2.4)
(17.9)
(3.5)
(2.3)
(2.3)
(29.1)
(20.5)
(5.2)
(4.3)
1980
($)
245
78
2,664
593
27,956
767
4,167
2,702
23,021
3,368
779
5,135
783
196
979
12,820
10,119
1,256
1,698
31,367
(%)
(.8)
(.2)
(8.5)
(1.9)
(89.1)
(2.4)
(13.3)
(8.6)
(73.4)
(10.7)
(2.5)
(16.4)
(2.5)
(.6)
(3.1)
(40.9)
(32.3)
(4.0)
(5.4)
1982
($)
255
49
3,437
760
32,170
918
4,386
2,807
26,866
4,391
1,444
6,880
883
268
1,510
13,565
11,036
1,291
2,029
36,330
(%)
(.7)
(.1)
(9.5)
(2.1)
(88.5)
(2.5)
(12.1)
(7.7)
(73.9)
(12.1)
(4.0)
(18.9)
(2.4)
(.7)
(4.2)
(37.3)
(30.4)
(3.6)
(5.6)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade)
(various years).
Table 8.5. Japan's Imports from the United States for Selected Years (millions of U.S. dollars, percentage)
Food
Raw Materials
Mineral Fuels
Coal
Manufactured Goods
Chemicals
Machinery
General Machinery
Office Machines
Electrical Machinery
Transport Equipment
Aircraft
Precision Instruments
Total
1955
($)
178
327
90
48
177
42
93
64
9
9
16
3
4
774
(%)
(23.0)
(42.2)
(11.6)
(6.2)
(22.9)
(5.4)
(12.0)
(8.3)
(1.2)
(1.2)
(2.1)
(.4)
(.5)
1960
($)
122
731
178
92
514
148
267
159
31
27
62
40
20
1,545
(%)
(7.9)
(47.3)
(11.5)
(6.0)
(33.3)
(9.6)
(17.3)
(10.3)
(2.0)
(1.7)
(4.0)
(2.6)
(1.3)
1965
($)
563
858
205
128
735
177
416
229
63
70
95
78
22
2,366
(%)
(23.8)
(36.3)
(8.7)
(5.4)
(31.1)
(7.5)
(17.6)
(9.7)
(2.7)
(3.0)
(4.0)
(3.3)
(.9)
1970
($)
812
1,645
761
623
2,304
401
1,412
690
201
341
302
245
78
5,560
(%)
(14.6)
(29.6)
(13.7)
(11.2)
(41.4)
(7.2)
(25.4)
(12.4)
(3.6)
(6.1)
(5.4)
(4.4)
(1.4)
1975
($)
2,489
3,144
1,909
1,687
4,011
775
2,195
986
228
552
499
364
158
11,608
(%)
(21.4)
(27.1)
(16.4)
(14.5)
(34.6)
(6.7)
(18.9)
(8.5)
(2.0)
(4.8)
(4.3)
(3.1)
(1.4)
1980
($)
5,171
6,383
2,098
1,581
10,607
2,536
5,015
2,031
708
1,489
1,091
890
404
24,408
(%)
(21.2)
(26.2)
(8.6)
(6.5)
(43.5)
(10.4)
(20.5)
(8.3)
(2.9)
(6.1)
(4.5)
(3.6)
(1.7)
1982
($)
4,965
4,681
3,069
2,135
11,206
3,058
5,390
2,271
767
1,862
818
694
439
24,179
(%)
(20.5)
(19.4)
(12.7)
(8.8)
(46.3)
(12.6)
(22.3)
(9.4)
(3.2)
(7.7)
(3.4)
(2.9)
(1.8)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade)
(various years).
Table 8.6. Japan's Exports for Selected Years (millions of U.S. dollars, percentage)
Food, raw materials, & fuel
Light industry goods
Textile
Chemicals
Metals
Iron & steel
Machinery
Radio sets
TV sets
Motor vehicles
Ships & boats
By Destination
U.S.
Western Europe
Oceanea, Canada, S. Africa
Developed area
Southeast Asia
Middle East
Developing area
Communist bloc
Total
1955
($)
250
1,072
749
103
387
259
249
1
• •
6
78
456
• •
137
• *
565
• •
• •
39
2,011
(%)
(12.4)
(53.3)
(37.2)
(5.1)
(19.2)
(12.9)
(12.4)
(-0)
(.3)
(3.9)
(22.7)
(6.8)
(28.1)
(1.9)
1960
($)
347
1,893
1,223
181
568
388
1,035
145
3
78
288
1,102
478
344
1,924
1,307
178
2,056
73
4,055
(%)
(8.6)
(46.7)
(30.2)
(4.5)
(14.0)
(9.6)
(25.5)
(3.6)
CD
(1.9)
(7.1)
(27.2)
(11.8)
(8.5)
(47.4)
(32.2)
(4.4)
(50.7)
(1.8)
1965
($)
471
2,692
1,582
547
1,718
1,290
2,975
216
85
237
748
2,479
1,093
726
4,298
2,195
356
3,672
478
8,452
(%)
(5.6)
(31.9)
(39.0)
(6.5)
(20.3)
(15.3)
(35.2)
(2.6)
(1.0)
(2.8)
(8.8)
(29.3)
(12.9)
(8.6)
(50.9)
(26.0)
(4.2)
(43.4)
(5.7)
1970
($)
847
4,335
2,408
1,234
3,805
2,844
8,941
695
384
1,337
1,410
5,940
2,905
1,595
10,440
4,902
634
7,827
1,045
19,318
(%)
(4.4)
(22.4)
(12.5)
(6.4)
(19.7)
(14.7)
(46.3)
(3.6)
(2.0)
(6.9)
(7.3)
(30.7)
(15.0)
(8.3)
(54.0)
(25.4)
(3.3)
(40.5)
(5.4)
1975
($)
1,626
7,220
3,719
3,889
12,518
10,176
30,004
1,324
783
6,190
5,998
11,149
8,131
4,155
23,434
12,543
6,075
27,632
4,683
55,753
(%)
(2.9)
(12.9)
(6.7)
(7.0)
(22.5)
(18.3)
(53.8)
(2.4)
(1.4)
(11.1)
(10.8)
(20.0)
(14.6)
(7.5)
(42.0)
(22.5)
(10.9)
(49.6)
(8.4)
1980
($) (%)
2,859 (2.2)
15,786 (12.2)
6,296 (4.9)
6,767 (5.2)
21,319 (16.4)
15,454 (11.9)
81,481 (62.8)
3,009 (2.3)
1,660 (1.3)
23,273 (17.9)
4,682 (3.6)
31,367 (24.2)
21,503 (16.6)
8,303 (6.4)
61,172(47.1)
30,910 (23.8)
14,358 (11.1)
59,480 (45.8)
9,155 (7.1)
129,807
1982
($)
2,440
16,781
6,240
6,364
21,215
15,645
90,514
2,401
1,489
24,559
6,870
36,330
21,640
10,225
67,995
31,873
16,946
62,435
8,401
138,831
(%)
(1.8)
(12.1)
(4.5)
(4.6)
(15.3)
(11.3)
(65.2)
(1.7)
(1.1)
(17.7)
(4.9)
(26.2)
(15.6)
(7.4)
(49.0)
(23.0)
(12.2)
(45.0)
(6.1)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various years); Office of the Prime Minister, Bureau of
Statistics, Japan Statistical Yearbook (various years).
Table 8.7. Japan's Imports for Selected Years (millions of U.S. dollars, percentage)
Food
Raw materials
Textile materials
Metal ores
Wood
Mineral fuels
Coal
Oils
Petroleum products
Manufactured goods
Chemicals
Metals
Machinery
Light industry goods
By Origin
U.S.
Western Europe
Oceanea, Canada,
S. Africa
Developed area
South East Asia
Middle East
Developing area
Communist bloc
Total
1955
($)
625
1,263
586
186
62
289
56
149
84
308
112
• •
132
• •
774
• •
311
• •
527
• •
• •
89
2,471
(%)
(25.3)
(51.1)
(23.7)
(7.5)
(2.5)
(11.7)
(2.3)
(6.0)
(3.4)
(12.5)
(4.5)
(5.3)
(31.3)
(12.6)
(21.3)
(3.6)
1960
($)
548
2,209
762
673
170
742
141
465
135
992
265
• •
435
63
1,545
394
636
2,584
915
449
1,782
125
4,491
(%)
(12.2)
(49.2)
(17.0)
(15.0)
(3.8)
(16.5)
(3.1)
(10.4)
(3.0)
(22.1)
(5.9)
(9.7)
(1.4)
(34.4)
(8.8)
(14.2)
(57.5)
(20.4)
(10.0)
(39.7)
(2.8)
1965
($)
1,470
3,220
847
1,019
493
1,626
270
1,047
289
1,853
408
• •
760
254
2,366
730
1,091
4,186
1,406
1,112
3,456
527
8,169
(%)
(18.0)
(39.4)
(10.4)
(12.5)
(6.0)
(19.9)
(3.3)
(12.8)
(3.5)
(22.7)
(5.0)
(9.3)
(3.1)
(29.1)
(8.9)
(13.4)
(51.2)
(17.2)
(13.6)
(42.3)
(6.5)
1970
($)
2,574
6,677
963
2,696
1,572
3,905
1,010
2,236
550
5,634
1,000
1,292
2,298
1,043
5,560
1,962
2,908
10,430
3,013
2,337
7,564
887
18,881
(%)
(13.6)
(35.4)
(5.1)
(14.3)
(8.3)
(20.7)
(5.3)
(11.8)
(2.9)
(29.8)
(5.3)
(6.8)
(12.2)
(5.5)
(29.4)
(10.4)
(15.4)
(55.2)
(16.0)
(12.4)
(40.1)
(4.7)
1975
($)
8,815
11,660
1,524
4 An
2,621
25,641
3,454
19,644
1,351
11,521
2,057
1,664
4,286
3,514
11,608
4,395
7,891
23,894
10,586
16,477
30,962
3,006
57,863
(%)
(15.2)
(20.2)
(2.6)
(7.6)
(4.5)
(44.3)
(6.0)
(33.9)
(2.3)
(19.9)
(3.6)
(2.9)
(7.4)
(6.1)
(20.1)
(7.6)
(13.6)
(41.3)
(18.3)
(28.5)
(53.5)
(5.2)
1980
($)
14,666
23,760
2,393
8,430
6,909
69,991
4,458
52,763
5,088
30,568
6,202
5,797
9,843
8,725
24,408
10,437
14,275
49,120
31,751
44,500
84,733
6,669
140,528
(%)
(10.4)
(16.9)
(1,7)
(6.0)
(4.9)
(49.8)
(3.2)
(37.5)
(3.6)
(21.8)
(4.4)
(4.1)
(7.0)
(6.2)
(17.4)
(7.4)
(10.2)
(35.0)
(22.6)
(31.7)
(59.9)
(4.7)
1982
($)
14,575
18,911
2,327
6,757
4,546
65,618
5,782
46,274
5,135
30,252
6,824
5,571
9,112
8,744
24,197
10,149
14,100
48,428
29,985
37,764
76,069
7,430
131,931
(%)
(11.0)
(14.3)
(1.8)
(5.1)
(3.4)
(49.7)
(4.4)
(35.1)
(3.9)
(22.9)
(5.2)
(4.2)
(6.9)
(6.6)
(18.3)
(7.7)
(10.7)
(36.7)
(22.7)
(28.6)
(57.7)
(5.6)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (various years); Office of the Prime Minister, Bureau of
Statistics, Japan Statistical Yearbook (various years).
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to the United States expanded at a rate of approximately 14 percent, while
Japan's (real) imports from the United States grew at a rate of about 7 percent
in constant import prices at 1980.
We shall be interested investigating how the U.S. share and the Japanese
share in each country's trade have changed during this period when the world
economy as a whole experienced a wave of drastic and painful change: the
suspension of the gold convertibility of the U.S. dollar, the transition to a
system of floating exchange rates among major currencies, and two oil crises.
First, and most important, Japan's trade dependence on the United States
was much greater than the U.S. trade dependence on Japan. This difference
is particularly evident with regard to Japan's exports. On the average, the
United States accounted for more than 25 percent of Japan's total exports,
except in two brief periods at the end of the 1950s and in the middle of the
1970s after the first oil crisis. The U.S. share of Japan's exports continued
to be well above the level of 30 percent in the late 1960s. On the other hand,
Japan's share of U.S. exports remained stable, below the level of 10 percent,
except for the period 1970-74. Thus, on the average, the U.S. share of Japan's
exports remained more than twice as high as Japan's share of U.S. exports,
though disparity in these two shares was gradually diminishing. There was a
mild rising trend in Japan's share of U.S. exports during the period of 1955-
82.
Second, the U.S. share of Japan's imports steadily declined while Japan's
share ofU.S. imports showed a rising trend. TheU.S. share of Japan's imports
was falling as early as in the 1960s, but this trend accelerated after the first
oil crisis of 1974. In 1975 this share reached the level of 20 percent, down
from about 38 percent in 1957, and remained below a 20 percent level in
Period III (1974-82). Japan's share of U.S. imports also fell substantially
during the oil crises, but a rising trend in this share was also observed.
Third, Japan's continued effort to diversify its worldwide import sources
of raw materials and a huge increase in the amount of Japan's oil imports
since the two oil crises were major causes for the sharp decline in the U.S.
share of Japan's imports during the 1960s and the 1970s. On the other hand,
a continued increase in Japanese machinery exports, particularly electrical
machinery and transport equipment, to the United States was a prime factor
in increasing Japan's share of U.S. imports. Machinery accounted for more
than 40 percent of Japan's exports to the United States in the early 1970s and
for more than 55 percent in the early 1980s.
Fourth, since the U.S. share of Japan's exports was virtually stable, except
for two brief periods in the late 1950s and in 1974-75, the gap between a
stable level of the U.S. share of Japan's exports and a sharply declining trend
in the U.S. share of Japan's imports continued to widen. This widening gap
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was also reflected in the discrepancy between a relatively stable Japanese
share of U.S. exports and an expanding Japanese share of U.S. imports during
the same period.
Fifth, Japan's oil import ratio changed dramatically during this period.
The value of Japan's oil imports was 9.4 percent of its total imports in 1955,
and gradually increased to 17 percent in 1973. The first oil crisis made this
ratio jump to 34 percent in 1974 and eventually to 41 percent in 1980. Japan's
oil import bill in 1980 amounted to $57.8 billion, which was almost two and
a half times the total amount of Japan's imports from the United States in the
same year. Nevertheless, we find that the U.S. share of Japan's imports after
excluding its oil imports remained remarkably stable with a range of 30 to
40 percent.
During the period 1955-82, the commodity composition of Japan's exports
to the United States underwent a drastic change. Starting from a position of
exporting mainly foodstuffs and light industry products such as textiles, Japan
made a distinct transformation of its trade pattern, exporting machinery and
other heavy industry products, which came to account for almost 90 percent
of Japan's exports to the United States. In contrast to this, the commodity
composition of Japan's imports from the United States remained remarkably
stable during the same period.
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 show Japan's principal commodities traded with the
United States in 1955, 1970, and 1982. Japan has continued to import food-
stuffs (wheat, soybeans, maize), raw materials (cotton, coal), and high tech-
nology machinery (aircraft, office machines), and to export mainly
manufactured goods (clothing, iron and steel, machinery and transport equip-
ment) since the middle of the 1950s. This trade pattern is basically in accord
with the principle of comparative advantage, considering the fact that the
United States is a country richly endowed with land, natural resources, and
highly advanced technology, while Japan is a country of poor natural resources
and little arable land, amply endowed with highly skilled and resourceful
labor. A complementary trade relationship between the United States and
Japan is principally a reflection of such differences in resource endowments
between the two countries. However, from a long-range perspective of two
to three decades, the quantity and quality of capital stocks accumulated in
each country play a crucial role, determining the rate of technical progress
which, in turn, gradually changes the dynamic structure of the trade pattern
in each country.
Is is apparent from Table 8.8 that the commodity composition of exports
to the United States shows a radical change between 1955 and 1982. Excluding
iron and steel and sewing mahcines, the top eight commodities Japan exported
to the United States in 1955 consisted of fish and shellfish, silk, and light
Table 8.8. Principal Commodities Exported by Japan to the United States in 1955, 1970, and 1982 (millions of U.S. dollars,
percentage)
1955
1. Clothing
2. Fish & shellfish
3. Raw silk
4. Cotton fabrics
5. Plywood
6. Toys
7. Pottery
8. Sewing machines
9. Iron & steel
10. Floor coverings
Sum (1-10)
Total exports to U.S.
($)
59
42
31
30
27
27
21
15
13
11
276
456
(%)
(12.9)
(9.2)
(6.8)
(6.6)
(5.9)
(5.9)
(4.6)
(3.3)
(2.9)
(2.4)
(60.5)
Iron & Steel
Passenger Cars
Radio Sets
Metal Products
Motorcycles
Clothing
TV Sets
Tape Recorders
Office Machines
Fish & Shellfish
1970
($)
899
458
397
324
280
274
265
256
143
97
3,393
5,940
(%)
(15.1)
(7.7)
(6.7)
(5.5)
(4.7)
(4.6)
(4.5)
(4.3)
(2.4)
(1.6)
(57.1)
Passenger Cars
Iron & Steel
Tape Recorders
(VTR)
Office Machines
Motorcycles
Radio Sets
Trucks
Motor Vehicle Parts
Copying Machines
Semiconductors
1982
($)
9,588
2,807
1,510
(1,066
1,444
1,291
883
806
578
556
539
20,002
36,330
(%)
(26.4)
(7.7)
(4.2)
(2.9))
(4.0)
(3.6)
(2.4)
(2.2)
(1.6)
(1.5)
(1.5)
(55.1)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade)
(various years).
Table 8.9. Principal Commodities Imported by Japan from the United States in 1955, 1970, and 1982
1955
1. Cotton
2. Wheat
3. Soybeans
4. Coal
5. Rice
6. Iron & steel scrap
7. Heavy fuel oils
8. Barley
9. Beef tallow
10. Maize
Sum (1-10)
Total imports from U.S.
($)
121
83
67
48
42
33
27
21
21
15
478
774
(%)
(15.6)
(10.7)
(8.7)
(6.2)
(5.4)
(4.3)
(3.5)
(2.7)
(2.7)
(1.9)
(61.8)
1970
Coal
Wood
Soybeans
Iron & steel scrap
Aircraft
Maize
Office machines
Wheat
Kaoliang
Petroleum products
($)
623
518
330
270
245
217
201
173
133
110
2,820
5,560
(%)
(11.2)
(9.3)
(5.9)
(4.9)
(4.4)
(3.9)
(3.6)
(3.1)
(2.4)
(2.0)
(50.7)
Coal
Maize
Wood
Soybeans
Office machines
Aircraft
Fish & shellfish
Wheat
Meat
Cotton
1982
($)
2,136
1,466
1,371
1,108
767
694
673
650
562
552
9,979
24,179
(%)
(8.8)
(6.1)
(5.7)
(4.6)
(3.2)
(2.9)
(2.8)
(2.7)
(2.3)
(2.3)
(41.3)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsushamo Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade)
(various years).
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industry goods, which accounted for more than 50 percent. The value of these
eight commodities declined to 12 percent of 1970 exports and then to less
than 2.5 percent in 1982. In 1970, the top seven commodities exported to
the United States consisted mainly of heavy industry products and machinery
equipment, which accounted for more than 48 percent. In 1982, the top ten
commodities exported to the United States were all machinery and transport
equipment except for iron and steel. The export of transport equipment (pas-
senger cars, trucks, motorcycles, motor vehicle parts) alone accounted for
about one-third of Japan's exports to the United States. (These products were
imported mostly from the United States in 1955.) Observe that office machines
were traded in both directions between the United States and Japan and were
a substantial component in Japan's export and import. Semiconductors are
another example of a two-way trade between the United States and Japan in
1982; semiconductors valued at $362 million accounted for 1.5 percent of
Japan's imports from the United States.
At the beginning of Period I (1955-64), heavy and chemical industry pro-
ducts were less than 17 percent of Japan's exports to the United States; food-
stuffs and other light industry goods accounted for more than 83 percent.
Heavy industry products (chemicals, metals, machinery and transport equip-
ment) increased steadily and at a remarkably rapid pace, reaching over 50
percent in 1964 and 85 percent in 1974, while the value of light industry
products approached the level of 10 percent of exports. Then, in Period III
(1974-82), this trend appeared to reach a saturation level.
In 1966-68, metals (mainly steel) were more than 25 percent of exports,
but this share was gradually reduced to the level of 15 percent in Period III.
Chemical exports to the United States never exceeded 3 percent except in
1974-75, during the first oil crisis.
In the long-run trends of U.S.-Japanese trade relations, textiles and au-
tomobiles played a significant role at critical times for both the United States
and Japan. During the period 1955-82, we can observe two entirely opposite
trends in Japan's trade in these commodities with the United States: Japan's
textile exports, more than 37 percent in 1955, declined to less than 2 percent
by 1980; transport equipment, negligible at the beginning of Period I, rose
dramatically from 4 percent in 1964 to 30 percent in 1972 and eventually to
40 percent in 1980. In 1982, Japan exported to the United States $13.6 billion
of transport equipment, which accounted for 37.3 percent of Japan's exports
to the United States. The automobile exports to the United States amounted
to $11 billion, which alone accounted for about 30 percent of Japan's exports
to the United States in 1982.
The commodity composition of Japan's exports to the United States from
1955 to 1982 shows a steady downward trend in the percentages of foodstuffs,
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textiles, and other light industry products such as toys and footwear on the
one hand, and a rapidly expanding trend in metal goods and machinery,
particularly in transport equipment, on the other. The principal commodity
exported to the United States was textiles in the middle of the 1950s, then
toys and footwear in the early 1960s. These light industry products were
replaced quickly by steel in the middle of the 1960s, which was in turn replaced
first by electrical machinery, such as radio and television sets and tape re-
corders, in the middle of the 1970s and then by motorcycles and automobiles
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. This shift in the export ratios of the
commodities continued with a gradual expansion of office machines (elec-
tronic computers) and more sophisticated electrical machinery and equipment
(video tape recorders and semiconductors) in the early 1980s.
In comparison with a drastic change in Japan's export structure, there was
a stable commodity composition of imports from the United States during
1955-82. There were cyclical fluctuations in this composition, which largely
reflected the cyclical fluctuations of the Japanese domestic economy during
the same period. At the time of boom periods (1961, 1964, and 1973), the
import ratio of raw materials and fuel increased, while the import ratio of
manufactured goods, particularly machinery and equipment, was forced to
decline. On the whole, however, a stationary trend was observable especially
in the ratio of foodstuffs and machinery imports. On the average in this period,
food imports remained at approximately 18 percent and machinery imports
at about 20 percent. Fuel (mainly coal) imports were fairly constant, remaining
at about 10 percent.
Japan's raw material imports from the United States ranged from about 50
percent in the middle of the 1950s to 35 percent in 1968 and then to ap-
proximately 25 percent in the early 1980s. The downward trend in the raw
material imports can be contrasted to the upward trend in the import of manu-
factured goods, particularly chemical products such as medical and phar-
maceutical products and electrical machinery. The import ratio of
manufactured goods rose from approximately 25 percent in the middle of the
1950s to 40 percent at the beginning of the 1970s and eventually to the level
of more than 46 percent in 1982.
The trend in the commodity composition of Japan's exports to the United
States seems to have reflected precisely the trend in the commodity compo-
sition of Japan's exports to the whole world. This is also true for the United
States exports. That is, the trend in the commodity composition of Japan's
imports from the United States reflected the trend in the commodity com-
position of U.S. exports to the whole world. Indeed, the trend in the global
exports of the United States showed a strikingly stable structure in this period.
During the period 1955-82, world machinery trade expanded rapidly at a
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rate of 15 percent, which clearly contributed to accelerating world trade ex-
pansion by as much as 13 percent per year. As a result, the commodity
composition of world exports changed significantly, increasing the machinery
export share from 17 percent in 1955 to around 30 percent at the end of the
1970s. But the growth rates of machinery exports differed significantly among
nations during 1955-82. The U.S. growth rate was the lowest, at 12 percent,
and the U.K. rate was 13.7 percent. Both these rates were lower than the
growth rate of world machinery exports, 15 percent, which was approximately
equal to West Germany's. Japan's machinery exports expanded at a rate of
24.6 percent annually, the highest growth rate among the industrial countries.
Thus, Japan had the largest elasticity of machinery exports, 1.6, while the
United States had the smallest elasticity, approximately 0.8, among the in-
dustrial countries.
Japan's impressive performance, particularly in comparison with that of
the United States, was brought about by a remarkable expansion of the Japa-
nese machinery industry in the same period. In terms of the industrial pro-
duction index, Japan's machinery industry production expanded at a rate of
more than 14 percent annually, while the production index of the United
States machinery industry grew only at a rate of 4.3 percent per year during
1955-82. Furthermore, there was a significant difference in the growth rate
of labor productivity between the United States and Japan. Indeed, Japan's
labor productivity (measured by real GNP per employed person) increased at
a rate of approximately 7 percent annually, while in the United States it
remained fairly stable, increasing only at a rate of 1.5 percent per year. During
1967-79, Japan's automobile and electrical machinery industries especially
attained a remarkable high growth rate of more than 15 percent annually in
terms of value-added labor productivity index, which was three times more
than the growth rate of those industries in the United States.1
Machinery trade between the United States and Japan expanded very rap-
idly during the period 1955-82. Japan maintained a remarkably high growth
rate, approximately 29 percent per year, in machinery exports to the United
States. This was indeed a leading factor in maintaining the high growth of
Japan's exports to the United States during this period. On the other hand,
the growth rate of Japan's machinery imports from the United States was
much lower, about 15 percent per year. As a result, the machinery trade
balance between the United States and Japan changed greatly during this
period. Until 1963, Japan had a chronic deficit in machinery trade with the
United States. After 1964, however, Japan's machinery trade with the United
States turned into a surplus, which continued to increase in magnitude.
It is interesting to see how Japan's machinery trade with the United States
changed from a deficit to a surplus, indicating the dynamic nature of Japan's
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evolving comparative advantage in international markets. First in 1956, Ja-
pan's trade of electrical machinery with the United States became a surplus
which expanded at a rate of more than 20 percent per year in the period 1959-
82. Then, in 1964, following the spectacular growth of domestic production
and exports of motorcyles and automobiles, Japan's trade balance of transport
equipment with the United States turned into a surplus, which expanded at a
spectacular rate of more than 38 percent in the period 1965-82. Thus, in 1965,
U.S.-Japanese trade relations entered into a new era in which Japan maintained
a surplus not only in machinery trade balance but also in overall merchandise
trade balance with the United States. Japan's surplus of machinery trade with
the United States increased more than seventy times (or at a rate of approxi-
mately 29 percent per annum), from less than $300 million in 1965 to more
than $21 billion in 1982. Finally in 1976, Japan's trade balance in general
machinery with the United States changed from a chronic deficit to a surplus,
mainly because of a steady increase in the export of office machines such as
electronic calculators and automatic data processing machinery. Thus, Japan
continued to have a considerable surplus in most categories of machinery trade
with the United States. Indeed, in the period of 1962-82, export expansion
(in value terms) was remarkable rapid, at a rate of 26 percent for the machinery
industry as a whole, 20 percent for electrical machinery, 22 percent for pre-
cision instruments (including cameras, copying mahcines, watches), 27 per-
cent for general machinery (including prime movers and office machines),
and 37 percent for transport equipment.
The principle of comparative advantage appeared to be working in ma-
chinery trade between the United States and Japan. Japan imported from the
United States technology-intensive machinery such as scientific instruments,
eletrical measuring instruments, semiconductors, electronic computers,
atomic reactors, and aircraft. In return, Japan exported mass-produced and
skilled-labor-intensive machinery such as cameras, telecommunications
equipment, electronic calculators, motorcycles, and motor vehicles in which
Japan had its comparative advantage vis-a-vis the United States.
The machinery trade between the United States and Japan in the period
also showed, however, that the commodities constituting Japan's and Ameri-
ca's comparative advantages changed gradually as technological progress on
and international competition continued.
Japan's balance of payments in the current account fluctuated widely during
the whole period 1955-82. There was a long-run tendency, however, toward
an increasing surplus in Japan's current account. The trend in Japan's current
surplus was mainly a reflection of the surplus trend in its trade balance since
the middle of the 1960s. On the other hand, there appeared to be a falling
tendency of the U.S. current surplus since the middle of the 1960s, reflecting
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Table 8.10. Elasticities of Exports and Imports of the United States and Japan,
1955-82
Income Elasticity R2 S.E. DW
log(JEXV) = - 10.423 + 3.275 log(WGPDI) 0.9962 0.0664 1.169
(-63.899) (84.270)
log(JIMV) = - 10.672 + 1.240 log(JGNPR) 0.9890 0.0873 1.089
(-36.617) (49.357)
log(USEXV)= - 2.18 + 1.444 log(WGDPI) 0.9658 0.0893 0.629
(-9.979) (27.623)
log(USIMV)= - 10.731 + 1.957 log(USGNPR)g 0.9836 0.0710 0.550
(-29.373) (40.241)
JEXV: Japan's exports in volume (1980= 100)
JIMV: Japan's imports in volume (1980= 100)
USEXV: U.S. exports in volume (1980= 100)
USIMV: U.S. imports in volume (1980= 100)
WGDPI: Gross Domestic Product Index (1980= 100) of the industrial countries
(excluding centrally planned economies)
JGNPR: Japan's real GNP at 1980 prices
USGNPR: U.S. real GNP at 1980 prices
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983.
a sharply declining trend in its trade surplus. In fact, during the whole period,
the two countries' current balances went in entirely opposite directions. The
magnitude of this opposite imbalance became proportionately large as time
went on.
In order to assess such contrasting characteristics, I shall point out three
salient features in the basic structures of each country's trade, services, and
current balances. First, in the period of 1955-82, Japan's income elasticity
of exports, approximately 3, was much larger than its income elasticity of
imports, which was about 1.3. For the United States, the income elasticity
of exports was approximately 1.4, its income elasticity of imports about 2
(table 8.10). If these estimates are roughly correct, Japan's trade balance tends
to yield a surplus as long as Japan maintains the same growth rate of its real
GNP as the rest of the world. The opposite will be the case for the United
States. In particular, Japan had a much larger income elasticity of exports to
the United States than its income elasticity of imports from the United States
(table 8.11). Indeed, the difference between export elasticity and import elas-
ticity is much greater in Japan's trade with the United States than in its global
trade. Therefore, as long as Japan's GNP grows at the same rate as that of
the United States, it is very likely that Japan will continue to increase its trade
surplus with the United States.
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Table 8.11. Elasticities of Japan's Exports and Imports in Its Trade with the
United States 1955-82
Income Elasticity Price Elasticity R2 S.E. DW
log(JAEXR) = -12.055 + 3.676 log - 1.394 log 0.9848 0.2358 0.762
(USGNPR) (SJEXP/USWPI)
( - 6.939) (37.501) ( - 4.780)
log(JAIMR) = 2.569 + 0.953 log - 0.929 log 0.9614 0.1222 1.585
(JGNPR) (¥JIMP/JWPI)
( - 3.647) (25.912) (-5.728)
JAEXR: Japan's exports to U.S. at 1980 prices = Japan's exports to U.S. /SJEXP
SJEXP: Japan's export prices on dollar base (1980= 100)
JAIMR: Japan's imports from U.S. at 1980 prices = Japan's imports from U.S/.SJIMP'
WIMP: Japan's import prices on dollar base (1980= 100)
¥JIMP: Japan's import prices on yen base (1980= 100)
USWPI: U.S. wholesale price index (1980= 100)
JWPI: Japan's wholesale price index (1980= 100)
USGNPR: U.S. real GNP at 1980 prices
JGNPR: Japan's real GNP at 1980 prices
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1983; The Bank of Japan, Kokusai
Hikaku Tokei; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on
International Trade); Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics.
Second, since the early 1960s, Japan continued to have a deficit trend in
the service account which tended to reduce considerably Japan's increasing
trade surplus. In sharp contrast, the United States increased the surplus in its
service account, which contributed to mitigating U.S. trade deficits. It is
particularly noteworthy that the United States maintained an enormous amount
of investment income from abroad which exceeded its trade deficits after 1971,
except for 1977, 1978, and 1982. We also note that the United States main-
tained a strong surplus trend in technological trade (such as patent royalties),
in which Japan's payments exceeded it receipts. This was unavoidable because
Japan insatiably imported technological services from the United States. In-
deed, it was by so doing that Japan succeeded in establishing its comparative
advantage, particularly in the machinery industry.
Third, during the whole period of 1955-82, Japan maintained a much higher
rate of savings and investment than did the United States. Until the middle
of the 1970s, Japan's rate of investment was high enough to offset a consid-
erable portion of the personal sector's savings. Since 1975, however, the net
savings ratio (in percentage of GNP) increased gradually, while the business
sector's net investment ratio sharply declined. Though the imbalance between
savings and investment was diminished by increasing the public sector's defi-
cits, Japan continued to have a trend of increasing excess (domestic) savings,
which helped finance the current deficits in the external sector. That is to say,
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Table 8.12. Appendix: Japanese and U.S. Merchandise Trade, 1955-82 (mil-
lions of U.S. dollars)
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Exports
2,011
2,501
2,858
2,877
3,456
4,055
4,236
4,916
5,452
6,673
8,452
9,776
10,442
12,972
15,990
19,318
24,019
28,591
36,930
55,536
55,753
67,225
80,495
97,543
103,032
129,807
152,030
138,831
Imports
2,471
3,230
4,284
3,033
3,599
4,491
5,810
5,637
6,736
7,938
8,169
9,523
11,663
12,987
15,024
18,881
19,712
23,471
38,314
62,110
57,863
64,799
70,809
79,343
110,672
140,528
143,290
131,931
Japan
Balance
-460
-729
-1,426
-156
-143
-436
-1,574
-721
-1,284
-1,265
283
253
-1,221
-15
966
437
4,307
5,120
-1,384
-6,574
-2,110
2,426
9,686
18,200
-7,640
-10,721
8,740
6,900
a
Exports
to U.S.
456
550
604
690
1,047
1,102
1,067
1,400
1,507
1,842
2,479
2,969
3,012
4,086
4,958
5,940
7,495
8,848
9,449
12,799
11,149
15,690
19,717
24,915
26,403
31,367
38,609
36,330
Imports
from U.S.
774
1,067
1,623
1,056
1,115
1,545
2,096
1,809
2,077
2,336
2,366
2,658
3,212
3,527
4,090
5,560
4,978
5,852
9,270
12,682
11,608
11,809
12,396
14,790
20,431
24,408
25,297
24,179
Balance
with U.S.
-318
-517
-1,019
-366
-68
-443
-1,029
-409
-570
-494
113
311
-200
559
868
380
2,517
2,996
179
117
-459
3,881
7,321
10,125
5,972
6,959
13,312
12,151
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Customs Clearance Statistics; The Bank of Japan, Economic
Statistics Annual; U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business.
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Table 8.12. Appendix: Japanese and U.S. Merchandise Trade, 1955-82
Cont'd.
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Exports
14,291
17,333
19,495
16,367
16,407
19,629
20,188
20,973
22,427
25,690
26,691
29,379
30,934
34,063
37,332
42,659
43,549
49,119
70,823
97,908
107,130
115,150
121,150
143,578
181,651
220,549
233,677
212,193
Imports
11,384
12,615
12,982
12,835
15,207
15,018
14,714
16,390
17,138
18,684
21,364
25,542
26,812
33,226
36,043
39,952
45,563
55,583
69,476
100,251
96,116
121,009
147,685
171,978
206,256
240,834
261,305
243,952
United
Balance
2,907
4,718
6,513
3,532
1,200
4,611
5,474
4,583
5,289
7,006
5,327
3,837
4,122
837
1,289
2,707
-2,014
-6,464
1,347
-2,343
11,014
-5,859
-26,535
-28,400
-24,605
-20,285
-27,628
-31,759
States6
Exports
to Japan
651
905
1,236
845
967
1,341
1,739
1,415
1,711
2,009
2,080
2,364
2,695
2,954
3,490
4,652
4,055
4,963
8,313
10,679
9,563
10,145
10,522
12,885
17,581
20,790
21,823
20,966
Imports
from Japan
432
558
601
671
1,029
1,149
1,055
1,358
1,498
1,768
2,414
2,963
2,999
4,054
4,888
5,875
7,259
9,064
9,676
12,338
11,268
15,504
18,550
24,458
26,248
30,701
37,612
37,744
Balance
with Japan
219
347
635
174
-62
192
684
57
213
241
-334
-599
-304
-1,100
-1,398
-1,223
-3,204
-4,101
-1,363
- 1,659
- 1,705
-5,359
-8,028
-11,573
-8,667
-9,911
-15,789
-16,778
aJapanese export data on f.o.b. basis, import data on c.i.f. basis.
bU.S. data on f.a.s. basis.
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as long as Japan maintains a trend of high savings which cannot be sufficiently
offset by domestic deficits such as private investments or public consumption,
it is very likely that Japan will continue to increase its current surplus by
increasing its capital exports (foreign lending) to the rest of the world.
1. Based on data estimated by Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho Hakusho
(White Paper on International Trade) (1982), 460-63; (1983), 446-49.
9
Internationalization of
Japanese Capital Markets
ROBERT ALAN FELDMAN
This essay describes the regulatory environment of capital account transactions
in Japan in the 1950-80 period. The rationale for regulation of such trans-
actions is discussed within a theoretical framework before turning to a dis-
cussion of the channels through which payments were made and how proper
structuring of such channels could simplify the achievement of national eco-
nomic goals. Specific rules relating to foreign investment,1 raising funds in
foreign markets, and banking are also discussed.
First, a brief discussion regarding capital market regulation and its relation
to foreign exchange is appropriate. To improve welfare, an economy must
trade and invest. Without foreign exchange, both trade and investment would
be seriously restricted; hence, maintaining access to foreign exchange is es-
sential for normal economic activity. This access is usually maintained by
supply and demand in the market, but the flows from the two sides are not
always smooth; seasonality and economic shocks can easily disturb foreign
exchange markets. In serious cases, such shocks can terminate access to
foreign exchange.
Access to foreign exchange has two aspects, price and quantity. Under a
fixed exchange rate regime, the price of foreign exchange is guaranteed by
the central bank, and access is ensured by quantities of foreign exchange
which the central bank buys and sells in the course of normal trade and
investment flows. This has the advantage that traders and investors know
the price of foreign exchange with certainty (so long as central bank reserves
and access to foreign exchange borrowing are sufficient), but the disadvantage
that quantities held by the central bank can change drastically in short periods.
Under a floating rate system, in which the central bank withdraws from the
foreign exchange market, the price is freely determined, and access is guar-
anteed by the profit motive; holders of foreign exchange will provide quantities
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so long as the price is right. This system has the advantage that prices are
likely to reflect fundamental changes in a more timely fashion and thus be
more efficient, but has the disadvantages of uncertainty and susceptibility to
short-term disturbances.
Because disturbances in the foreign exchange market inevitably cause dis-
tortions in the real economy, it is reasonable for government to provide a
regulatory structure to minimize these distortions; capital market regulation
is one tool, and it can be used, with modifications, under both fixed and
flexible exchange rate regimes. The hard parts are assessing what disturbances
are likely, what distortions they will cause, and what regulatory responses
are appropriate.
Next, we must consider the actors in the foreign exchange market. The
market consists of the authorities (in a fixed rate or managed floating regime),
the financial sector, and the nonfinancial sector. Both the latter include resident
and nonresident subsectors. Each sector and subsector differs in the com-
position of its balance sheet, its expertise in asset and liability management,
and its tastes for risk and return. Thus, each sector and subsector will react
differently to circumstances, so that there is a clear rationale for different
regulations for each sector or subsector.
A typical balance sheet is presented in Table 9.1. The instruments available
are currency, deposits, loans, bonds, equities, and real assets (e.g., capital
equipment, real estate). These may be assets or liabilities to any sector, de-
pending on the nature of its business; for example, deposits are an asset to
the nonfinancial sector but a liability to banks. And some sectors will hold
different types of an instrument on both sides of the balance sheet. The
difference between assets and liabilities is net worth. This balance sheet lists
assets denominated in both foreign and domestic currency. The conversion
factor is the exchange rate; values of negotiable assets are listed as the product
of price and quantity, to emphasize that their values change in the marketplace
(e.g., entries for equities are multiplied by the price of equities, but deposits
need not be so multiplied, because they are of fixed nominal value). When
the exchange rate changes, both asset and liability sides will change; but
typically, one will rise by more than the other, the difference being the change
in net worth, i.e., profit or loss. When the foreign currency is expected to
appreciate (i.e., e is expected to rise), then it is wise to sell foreign currency
liabilities and buy foreign currency assets; once the rise occurs, the value of
assets will be higher and that of liabilities lower than in the original state,
leaving a profit.
But such transactions are complicated by two factors, the risk and return
of the instrument being used for such foreign exchange speculation. Between
the time of purchasing the foreign asset and the time of selling it to realize
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Instrument
Currency
Deposits
Loans
Bonds
Equities
Real Assets
Net Worth
Return
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
High
High
Risk
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
High
High
Assets
C
eC*
D
eD*
L
eL*
PbB
ePbB*
PeE
ePE*E*
PUK
ePk*K*
Liabilities
and Net
Worth
D
eD*
L
eL*
PbB
ePbB*
PeE
ePE*E*
PUK
ePk*K*
NW
Note: Variables with asterisks are denominated in foreign currency and converted to domestic
currency at the exchange rate, e. Negotiable assets are premultiplied by their prices. No entry
for currency exists on the liability side because currency is a liability only for the authorities.
the profit, the foreign asset will earn a return. The higher this return, the more
attractive is the asset as a vehicle for speculation. But risk is also a factor,
particularly for negotiable assets. When the foreign currency price of the
foreign asset is highly variable, any gains made on the exchange rate can be
wiped out by losses from a lower price.
Authorities take these factors into account when determining the regulatory
structure for each sector. If authorities believe that the destabilizing effects
of speculation more than outweigh the benefits of efficient resource allocation
from free capital movement, then it is reasonable to limit foreign exchange
transactions to those for instruments with either low returns or high risk.
When the benefits of free capital flows outweigh the risks of destabilization,
then reducing these restrictions is reasonable. And because conditions change
over time, e.g., because of innovations by institutions or because of tech-
nology of funds transfer, it is only natural for the regulatory structure to adapt.
Because the goal of Japan's foreign exchange regulation in the 1950s was
prevention of large, sudden outflows, it was logical for the authorities to
restrict the number of channels through which capital could flow. This was
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done by limiting the number of banks allowed to handle foreign exchange
transactions. Only certain nonresident accounts held at these banks were
deemed convertible to foreign exchange, and even this convertibility was
restricted. As time passed and the foreign exchange constraint eased, the
conditions of convertibility of these accounts also eased. New types were
added and old types abolished.
From the abolition of freely convertible accounts in 1951 through 1959,
the main type of nonresident account was the Nonresident Yen Deposit Ac-
count (NYDA). Opening a NYDA required approval before 1959 but was
made free to any nonresident from 1959 on. In early years, there is no special
mention of what types of funds could be credited to such accounts, but they
were generally credited with yen earned on trade transactions. The funds in
such accounts could be used to pay debts in yen or transferred to other NYDA
accounts, but remittance from these accounts in foreign currency was subject
to individual license.
Another type of account was the Foreign Investor Deposit Account (FIDA).
Inward investment was hard to attract without special remittance rights, and
these accounts were a response to that need. In the early 1950s, proceeds of
securities sales could be remitted in five equal annual installments, starting
two years after the purchase of the security. FID As held the funds awaiting
repatriation.
A change in regime occurred in 1960, with the establishment of the Free
Yen Account (FYA). From 1960 until 1977, the FYA and the NYDA stood
together as the two main types of accounts, with the former receiving funds
deemed available for immediate repatriation and the latter receiving only
partially convertible funds. Over time, as the foreign exchange constraint
eased further, the domain of the free yen account enlarged while that of the
NYDA shrank.
When FYAs were established, in July 1960, they were thought of as the
receptacle for yen earned by nonresidents on trade account transactions. Pay-
ments from FYAs were not restricted, but credits to them were. Originally,
only proceeds from sales of foreign exchange, transfers from other free yen
accounts and "authorized payments"3 were creditable. But after December
1964, proceeds of securities liquidation could be deposited in FYAs if the
equity in question had originally been purchased with NYDA funds and if it
had been held for at least three years. From 1965, proceeds from the sale of
any security for which acquisition was validated could be deposited in an
FYA if the security had been held for six months or more. "Amnesties" of
transfer between NYDA and FYA accounts were declared in July 1969, De-
cember 1970, and February 1971, allowing transfer of NYDA balances into
FYA accounts. These liberalizations occurred at times of upward pressure on
the yen—pressure Japanese authorities wished to relieve.
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In the 1970s, the authorities influenced FYA accounts through reserve
requirement changes. That is, authorities made additions to FYA accounts
very expensive for banks, particularly at times of intense upward pressure on
the yen. Ceilings on increases in FYA balances on a bank-by-bank basis were
instituted in August 1971, just as the Bretton Woods System entered its first
crisis. These ceilings were lifted early in 1972. In mid-1972, the Bank of
Japan acquired the legal power to set reserve requirements (in force since
1959 on domestic accounts) on FYAs, and in July of that year set a reserve
requirement of 50 percent on increases in FYA balances. This requirement
was lowered to 10 percent in December 1973 as the yen weakened, and was
eliminated in September 1974. Use of reserve requirements on nonresident
accounts continued as a tool to affect capital flows after 1977, the year the
FYA/NYDA distinction was abolished.
The other main nonresident account in the 1960-77 period was the NYDA,
which remained the same in name but changed in character. It was intended
for receipt of funds which were only partially convertible, but the rules of
repatriation of even NYDA funds eased over the years. In May 1961, NYDA
deposits became transferable among holders so that a nonresident wishing to
exchange yen for foreign currency could do so if another nonresident were
willing to be counterpart in the transaction. No organized market for such
transfers existed, but the possibility of conversion through this means did
exist. Interest earned on NYDA accounts became freely remittable in June
1961. NYDAs also became the receptacle for fixed asset liquidation proceeds
and for proceeds of sales of any nonvalidated investments. When securities
liquidation proceeds became creditable to FYAs in 1965, the importance of
NYDAs declined. The amnesties of 1969-71 further reduced the importance
of these accounts, and they were finally abolished in 1977.
Since 1977, there has been essentially one type of account for nonresidents,
the nonresident deposit account (NDA). (For a few years it was still called
a free yen account, but because all yen became free, there was no need to
retain the name.) Any proceeds of any transaction can be credited to these
accounts, and they can be used for any purpose. The main tool of control
continues to be reserve requirements. A basic level of 0.25 percent of total
balances was imposed in May 1977, with changes at the discretion of the
Bank of Japan. In November 1977, as the climb in the yen steepened, a
marginal rate of 50 percent was imposed. In March 1978, with the yen rapidly
approaching ¥ 200/US$—an unheard of strength—the marginal rate was set
at 100 percent. This rate was reduced in January 1979, after the dollar rescue
measures of late 1978 were announced by the Federal Reserve, and the NDA
reserve requirement was lowered to 50 percent. With the oil crisis of late
1979 and consequent weakening of the yen, the reserve requirement on in-
creases in NDAs was eliminated completely (February 1980).
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In summary, the types of accounts available in Japan to nonresidents varied
over the years; in the early period, convertibility was severely restricted
through limits on the proportions of balances convertible to foreign exchange
in any year and limits on the types of proceeds creditable to accounts with
repatriation rights. Gradually, these restrictions were eased and new types of
fully convertible accounts established. As Japan's very strong reserve position
emerged in the late 1960s, the importance of the distinction between con-
vertible and nonconvertible accounts waned and quicker response to yield
differences across countries became possible for nonresidents.
In the late 1970s, the chief method of regulating capital flows shifted from
control of conditions affecting demand for nonresident accounts to control of
conditions affecting their supply by banks. By this time, the distinction be-
tween trade and capital transactions was essentially eliminated, and overall
flows became the important factor. Even 100 percent reserve requirements
on nonresident deposits failed to have a noticeable effect on the course of the
exchange rate. The general commitment to internationalization and the ap-
parent lack of success in using regulatory changes to affect the exchange rate
may well account for deregulations codified in the 1980 foreign exchange law
and for the fewer changes of rules since then in response to market devel-
opments.
We now change focus from the accounts through which nonresidents'
payments were made to the types of instruments used by all investors. These
instruments differ in risk and liquidity, and the differences make them more
or less attractive as avenues for foreign investment, whether resident or non-
resident. For example, a low risk, highly liquid security is best for foreign
exchange speculation, as the risks of speculation are not compounded by
repayment and liquidity risks inherent in the security. The basic types of
instruments of foreign investment were direct investment, equity purchase,
and bond or other fixed income (security) purchase. We begin with direct
investment, and investigate the regulatory environment surrounding each type
of asset in turn.
One might wonder why a country such as Japan in the early 1950s, hungry
for capital and for foreign exchange, would regulate nonresidents wishing to
bring foreign exchange to build factories. The major reason seems to have
been the fear that capital brought in would wish to exit quickly at an incon-
venient time. In fact, Japanese authorities did not view themselves as being
restrictive toward foreign direct investment but rather as giving it special
repatriation privileges. Reflecting this concern, the system for direct invest-
ment recognized two types, validated and nonvalidated investment. The for-
mer, to which special foreign exchange conversion rights were granted,
required approval; the latter, with no conversion rights other than those for
nonresidents, did not require approval.
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It is sometimes said that the reason for direct investment controls was to
prevent foreign competitors with better technology from entering the Japanese
market and dominating it. Although application of approval procedures for
validated investments may have given some support to this hypothesis, the
existence of the nonvalidated investment category at least shows that the
concerns of authorities were not entirely about protection of resident-owned
industry.
The concept of direct investment itself developed over the years. In earlier
years, all stock purchases, whether for participation in management or for
portfolio, were treated identically. There were two types of controls, one on
the total share held by nonresidents and one on the amount of stock any single
nonresident could own. There were also, for the purpose of this regulation,
two types of industries: restricted ones (including electricity and gas utilities,
waterworks, banking, transportation, and retail trade), and nonrestricted ones.
Before 1960, automatic approval was given to equity ownership by nonresi-
dents if the total foreign share was less than 8 percent, or for nonrestricted
industries if the size of the block purchased by a single resident was less than
5 percent. (Limits were slightly lower for restricted industries.) Purchases
above these limits required approval. These limits were raised in 1960 to 15
percent and 10 percent.
The concept of distinguishing direct investment from portfolio investment
emerged in the early 1960s, and a new system for direct investment was
implemented in July 1963. The category of nonvalidated investment was
abolished, and income on nonvalidated investments was made freely remitta-
ble. (Principal, if repatriation was desired, had to be deposited in a NYDA
and remitted from there.) New direct investments were freely remittable for
both principal and interest as long as the original validation requirement had
been fulfilled. Moreover, the 1963 reforms simplified screening procedures,
even though an escape clause (allowing delay in repatriation or allowing denial
of investment right if an "adverse effect" on the Japanese economy were
foreseen) was inserted.
Another liberalization of direct investment procedures was announced in
1967, to be implemented in four steps. Two lists were constructed, the A list
and the B list. For industries on the A list, automatic approval for direct
investments (with management participation) was given if less than 50 percent
of the firm was foreign owned. For those on the B list, automatic approval
was given up to 100 percent foreign ownership. The stages of implementation
saw the A list grow to 160 and the B list to 44 industries in 1969, and to 448
and 79, respectively, in 1970. In 1971, a negative list of seven industries (in
which no direct investment was permitted) was established, with the B list
expanded to 228, and the A list expanded to all others. Through the 1970s,
industries were removed from the negative list, with retail trade removed in
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1975 and data processing in 1976, leaving only agriculture and forestry,
petroleum, mining, and leather as restricted.
The foreign exchange law of 1980 further clarified the definition of direct
investment. Acquisition of shares of unlisted companies, acquisition of more
than 10 percent of equity in a firm by a single nonresident, or acquisition of
long-term loans or privately placed securities is treated as direct investment.
A negative list of "designated" industries still exists, on which ministries
concerned may place industries where foreign ownership is judged likely to
have adverse impact on the economy.5 Direct investment regulations may be
applied to such industries if the total foreign share rises above 25 percent.
Application of direct investment regulations means that prior approval must
be obtained in certain cases; most will require prior notice with a twenty-day
waiting period for comments (and potential objections) by competent min-
istries.
Although direction of the liberalization program was clear, the degree of
discretion in implementation was not always clear. It is somewhat confusing
to investors to require approval which is given automatically. In practice, this
appeared to be only a reporting requirement but still left investors with doubts.
Particularly, given the changes in the automatic nature of approval of other
categories of transactions, the system itself, until the foreign exchange law
of 1980, could still appear confusing. Until data on the ratio of applications
to approvals is available, no definite conclusion is possible about when regu-
lation of direct investment was tight and when weak.6
Outward direct investment by Japanese residents was controlled much more
strictly than inward direct investment by foreigners. Indeed, in the 1950s,
residents were required to declare all foreign assets and to liquidate and re-
patriate proceeds if authorities so ordered. Approval was required for any
foreign investment. Gradually, however, approval became easier. By late
1969, approval was automatic for direct investments of less than US$200,000,
except by financial sector firms. This limit was raised to US$1 million in
September 1970 and abolished in July 1971. The timing here is interesting;
the big liberalizations occurred just as pressure on the Bretton Woods exchange
rate was growing.
After 1972, the official attitude toward direct investment became one of
active encouragement; public sector financial institutions were authorized to
lend up to 70 percent of the total value of any direct investment overseas in
late 1972, and the limit was raised to 90 percent in May 1973. Under the
foreign exchange law, outward direct investment requires prior notice, with
a twenty-day waiting period for official comment.
Equity investment has been the easiest way for nonresidents to invest in
Japan in the postwar years. Although the attitude was restrictive in the 1950s,
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this changed in the early 1960s and made equities the easiest of Japanese
securities to buy and sell, with proceeds remitted freely after 1963. A series
of restrictions was imposed in the early 1970s, not on purchasers but rather
on securities firms. These were eliminated fairly rapidly, and automatic ap-
proval of equity purchase returned. At present, equity acquisition for portfolio
investment requires only notification of purchase.
The rules on equity purchase in the 1950s did not restrict the purchase of
equities so much as sale and repatriation of proceeds, although equities of
certain industries (see above) required prior approval before purchase, even
if repatriation rights were not desired. If an investor wished to liquidate a
position in an equity and remit the proceeds, these proceeds had first to be
deposited in a NYDA or FTDA; if two years had elapsed from the original
purchase of the stock, 20 percent of the liquidation proceeds became eligible
for repatriation in each year thereafter. The 20-percent-per-year-over-five-
years rule was relaxed to a 33.33-percent-per-year-over-three-years rule, and
then to a 100-percent-in-one-year-rule in 1961, but the two-year waiting period
from original purchase remained.
There were also limits on total foreign ownership below which approval
was automatic; these were 8 percent for most industries and 5 percent for
restricted ones (see above). These ratios were raised to 15 percent and 10
percent in 1960. Approval was also required for any individual to own more
than 5 percent.
A major change occurred in 1961, when income on equities became freely
remittable, and another major change occurred in 1962, when the two-year
holding period was reduced to six months. Even this six-month rule was
abolished in 1963, making rapid movement of funds in and out of Japan
possible if the funds were invested in the stock market. Here, equities had a
distinct advantage over other securities, to which the six-month rule still
applied. In 1967, the automatic approval limits were raised from 15 percent
and 10 percent for unrestricted /restricted industries to 20 percent and 15
percent, and the limit for any individual was raised to 7 percent. The unre-
stricted industry limit was raised to 25 percent in 1970. With these changes,
Japanese equities became the most liquid investments for foreigners, a liq-
uidity which continued throughout the 1970s when the Japanese stock market
seemed most sensitive to movements in the yen.
There were, however, some restrictions in the early 1970s, as part of a
general package of capital flow restrictions aimed at defending the Bretton
Woods System. After October 1972, each securities dealer in Japan was
required, until November 1973, to avoid net sales of Japanese securities to
nonresidents. Any given nonresident customer could acquire Japanese equi-
ties, but only if another nonresident were willing to sell. It is interesting that
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this regulation continued well past the advent of floating in February 1973;
it was only rescinded when the yen began to weaken after the first oil crisis.
Again, the regulatory structure appeared to reflect concerns about the exchange
rate.
But since 1973, regulation of nonresident purchases in the equities market
has been progressively eased to the point of virtual elimination. With the
change in the direct investment law in 1973, the 25 percent and 15 percent
limits on portfolio acquisitions were eliminated, and after 1976 stock pur-
chases were given automatic approval. Moreover, equities retained an ad-
vantage over other securities, because proceeds of liquidation of equities could
go directly into the foreign exchange market, while proceeds of liquidations
of other securities had to be deposited in bank accounts before conversion to
foreign exchange. Under the 1980 foreign exchange law, nonresident acqui-
sition of Japanese equities requires notification but no wait, so long as the
acquisition is not in the nature of direct investment.
Residents were treated far more strictly than nonresidents with respect to
equities purchase in early years. Equities, like other foreign assets, were
subject to the declaration and liquidation-at-request requirement of the old
foreign exchange law, and each equity investment required approval until
1971. In general, only investment trusts were allowed to purchase foreign
equities, and this only on a case-by-case basis. But official attitudes changed
in mid-1971, as the exchange crisis approached. From July 1971, all residents
except mutual funds were permitted to purchase foreign equities in any
amount. This treatment changed abruptly with the oil crisis; case-by-case
approval was required after November 1973. The Ministry of Finance also
issued a directive to securities dealers not to encourage residents to buy foreign
equities (or other securities); this directive was not revoked until June 1975.
After that, however, foreign equity purchase by residents became fully free.
Under the 1980 law, it is fully free if executed through one of twenty-six
designated dealers (who notifies authorities) and requires notice, but no wait,
if executed through a nondesignated dealer.
The rules applying to nonresident purchase of securities other than equities
were similar to those for equities in the 1950s but were relaxed at a slower
pace. The 20-percent-per-year-over-five-years rule with the two-year holding
period applied to most, but the rule on debentures was even tighter. Principal
was remittable only at maturity and the shortest maturity available was five
years. In effect, there was a buy-and-hold-until-maturity requirement. More-
over, proceeds of securities sales (other than equities) could not even be
reinvested in Japan; proceeds had to be held in appropriate bank accounts to
await repatriation.
These rules were eased in the early 1960s, and the holding period was
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shortened to six months in August 1962. In 1965, the remittability of securities
investments rose when proceeds of sales became payable into FYAs if the
six-month holding period had passed.
Regulations were apparently tightened in 1971, with a prohibition "in
principle" of nonresident purchase of short-term government securities. Ap-
parently these securities had become a vehicle for pro-yen speculation. These
rules were tightened again in 1972, because foreign exchange for securities
purchase was required to be deposited in special accounts at foreign exchange
banks or securities dealers, with conversion to yen not permitted until an
actual contract for the purchase was written. From October 1972, proceeds
of sales of securities had to be reinvested or remitted within a month after
liquidation, presumably to prevent a pool of highly liquid funds from accu-
mulating. This rule was imposed along with the prohibition of net sales of
securities to foreign customers by authorized dealers, mentioned above. These
rules were rescinded in December 1973—after the oil crisis.
In fact, the oil crisis appears to have brought a complete turnabout in the
official treatment of foreign purchase of securities. After August 1974, non-
resident purchase of short securities was given automatic approval, even for
unlisted securities, though a six-month hold rule was also enforced.
The rules changed again when the yen started appreciating sharply in 1977-
78. In March 1978, an outright ban of nonresident purchase of securities of
less than five years and one month in remaining maturity was enforced.7 This
lasted to January 1979, when the period was reduced to thirteen months to
maturity; it was abolished in February 1979. A major liberalization of 1979
was the grant of automatic approval status for gensaki (bond repurchase)
transactions. The gensaki market is one of the largest and most free of the
Japanese money markets, and nonresident participation has in fact become
an important link between Japanese interest rates and the world money market.
Thus, liberalization of nonequity security markets to nonresidents pro-
ceeded more slowly than liberalization of the equity market but was virtually
complete by 1980. The 1980 foreign exchange law approves all nonresident
purchases of securities (unless of a nature to make them subject to direct
investment laws—see above) with only notification. In actual practice, au-
thorities have not used even the available power to restrict flows as a tool to
affect the value of the yen. Many rule changes of the 1970s were aimed at
influencing the exchange rate, but fluctuations were still very wide. This
experience apparently convinced authorities that markets had grown beyond
the point where regulation could be effective in controlling captial flows and
that basic macroeconomic policies, not capital market regulations, are more
important in achieving external targets.
As with equities, resident purchase of foreign nonequity securities required
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approval, which was not granted freely, throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Also as with equities, only investment trusts were permitted to purchase
foreign securities before 1971, and even this amount was subject to a global
ceiling (of US$100 million per firm in 1970).
Deregulation began in early 1971, with life insurance firms granted ap-
proval for up to US$100 million on nonequity foreign securities. Total lib-
eralization of purchase of foreign securities (except for mutual funds) occurred
in July 1971, and foreign securities firms were allowed to open branches from
September—to make such purchase easier. Trust banks were allowed unlimi-
ted purchase of foreign securities after February 1972, and in April of that
year private placement of foreign bonds in Japan was allowed if less than 50
percent of total subscriptions came from Japan. Mutual fund purchase was
approved in November 1972.
The oil crisis brought tightening of rules on resident purchases of short-
term foreign bonds, with approval put on a case-by-case basis. The Ministry
of Finance directive to dealers and banks not to encourage purchase of foreign
securities applied to nonequities as well as to equities. A turnabout occurred
in 1977, when the yen started strengthening rapidly; from May 1977, auto-
matic approval was given to resident purchases of foreign securities. Free
acquisition continues under the 1980 foreign exchange law; such purchases
require only notification.
Overall, both residents and nonresidents were strongly restricted in their
ability to buy and sell nonequity securities through the 1950s and 1960s. For
nonresidents, liquidity of such investments was low compared to that of equi-
ties, while for residents approval was difficult to obtain. Around a trend of
overall liberalization, regulations in the 1970s were affected by the state of
the currency market; inflows were encouraged when the yen was weak and
outflows when the yen was strong. But the endogenous regulatory behavior
of authorities did not appear to substantially alter the value of the yen. Since
the implementation of the foreign exchange law of 1980, the regulatory en-
vironment has been highly free and highly stable.
The issue of nonresident borrowing in either equity or securities markets
hardly was mentioned in the 1950s and 1960s. Nonresident equity was first
issued in Japan in October 1972; part of the delay here was because of different
institutional situations, such as par value issue, market value issue, and dis-
closure rules. Nonconsolidation of balance sheets was the rule in Japan in the
early 1970s and, at first availability of such balance sheets, was made a
condition of equity flotation in Japan. But in September 1973, the Ministry
of Finance agreed to accept foreigners' consolidated balance sheets if accounts
were in accordance with home country rules. In March 1974, even this was
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eased, and disclosure requirements were made equivalent to those of the
issuing firm's home country. Despite these liberalizations, Tokyo does not
appear to have become a thriving market for foreign issues, perhaps because
the purpose of some foreign flotations is to avoid domestic disclosure re-
quirements.
Bond issue by nonresidents in Tokyo was liberalized over the 1970s, though
not suddenly. First permission for foreign issue was given in 1971, but only
to international organizations (e.g., the IBRD and the Asian Development
Bank). Guidelines for nonresident issue were presented in April 1972 and
required case-by-case authorization. But the list of acceptable issuers was
widened to include individual governments in that year. The issue guidelines
changed with the value of the yen; for example, after August 1972, 90 percent
of the proceeds of flotations had to be converted to dollars and remitted
immediately after issue. This rule was relaxed in November 1973; one way
to help stem capital outflow was to cease requiring it of foreign flotations.
But authorities simultaneously ceased approving nonresident issues at all, to
reduce the pool of potential outflow.
Approvals of nonresident issue resumed in July 1975, and frequent ap-
provals began in 1976. The timing and size of issues were determined by
agreement among borrowers and the underwriters' association (kisaikai), in
consultation with the Ministry of Finance. There were eighteen issues in 1977
worth a total of ¥ 326 billion and forty issues in 1978, worth a total of ¥ 827
billion.8 Tax privileges on nonresident issue expanded in 1977, with interest
income on the first ¥  3 million of holdings becoming tax free for foreign-
government guaranteed bonds as well as foreign government bonds them-
selves. This accorded nonresident bonds equal treatment with Japanese
government bonds.
Another factor, in addition to worries about capital flows and the exchange
rate, affected regulatory decisions on nonresident issues. This was the potential
for competition between Japanese government bonds and nonresident bonds.
With its own debts accumulating, the Japanese government was forced to
grant concession after concession to financial institutions to maintain the bond
underwriting syndicate, with its many benefits for the government. Non-
resident bonds were direct competitors for government bonds; the willingness
of the Japanese authorities to allow expansion of nonresident issues seems
remarkably liberal. (One hypothesis is that the expansion of foreign issues
was a concession to syndicate members, eager for foreign business, granted
in return for favorable treatment of government issue by the syndicate.) Do-
mestic securities such as financial institution debentures, which also compete
with government bonds, were not given such consideration.
With the 1980 foreign exchange law, nonresident issues require prior notice
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and a twenty-day wait. In practice, however, nonresident issues have been
relatively free, at about 2 percent of total domestic bond issue since 1981.
Very little is mentioned in available sources about resident issues in foreign
markets in the 1950s and 1960s, but such issues must have occurred, because
a ban on conversion of their proceeds into yen was enforced in April 1971.
Licenses were necessary for issuing bonds abroad through the 1970s, though
such licenses were granted freely after 1977. In fact, free license of issues
by trading companies was the practice after December 1973 if the funds were
to be primarily used abroad. After November 1974, licenses were issued on
a case-by-case basis if funds were to be converted to yen. Approval was
required until 1980.
Even with the 1980 law, prior notice with examination is required for such
issues. This caution is probably because of two factors, the ability of firms
to use foreign issue to circumvent domestic monetary policy and the fear that
large numbers of foreign issues might occur at one time, causing unwelcome
disruption in foreign markets and friction with foreign governments.
Most of the discussion above has considered transactions by the nonfi-
nancial sector, whether resident or nonresident. Financial sector transactors,
however, have also been critical actors throughout the postwar period, par-
ticularly since they are the primary traders of foreign exchange. They had
special privileges, such as the right to engage in forward transactions without
underlying trade transactions, but were also subjected to special regulations
at times. We next consider regulation of both asset and liability sides of balance
sheets of both foreign and domestic banks, regarding foreign exchange trans-
actions.
The major function of foreign banks in Japan through the 1950s and 1960s
was trade financing, but some capital account business did occur. Foreign
banks became a source of capital for domestic firms when money became
tight, resulting in the invention of the impact loan, a six-to twelve-month loan
for operating funds, denominated in foreign currency. Such loans were given
official-recognition and subjected to official guidance and quotas, at least from
late 1960. These quotas appear to have been responsive to official attitudes
about the value of the yen; e.g., the quotas for impact loans were raised in
January 1974, when capital inflows were being encouraged.
But the critical area of control over foreign banks was on the liability side,
in the form of yen conversion quotas. Foreign banks had continuous difficulty
in raising yen to carry out their normal business, and special yen conversion
rights were the means by which authorities accommodated this need. But in
periods of intense pressure on the yen, there was the temptation to convert
one's entire quota very early in the quota period (quarterly) and thus augment
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pressure on the currency. In December 1971, conversion quotas were put on
a monthly basis, and prior approval for conversions was strictly enforced.
Instructions not to exceed quotas were reissued in March 1972, suggesting
that enforcement of the rules was difficult—particularly when incentives to
break them were strong.
With the oil crisis, the yen conversion quotas were raised, as capital inflow
was to be encouraged in this category as elsewhere. An expansion occurred
in November 1973, another in December, two in August 1974, two more in
December 1975, and one in January 1976. (No documentary evidence was
available on how quotas were determined.) The problem changed in nature
after the CD market began in 1979, a market in which foreign banks too could
issue yen-denominated CDs; foreign banks now had an alternative source of
funding.
Moreover, foreign banks were affected by a change in 1977 in the target
of regulation from the total quantity of foreign currency converted to the net
position of a bank in foreign currency. Foreign banks were permitted short
positions in the dollar from 1977, even when their Japanese counterparts were
not. But the competitive environment for foreign banks also stiffened, because
domestic banks were permitted to make long-term impact loans after June
1979 and short-term ones after March 1980.
Although foreign banks have at times complained about regulations, Japa-
nese authorities have pointed out certain privileges enjoyed by foreign banks—
e.g., sole rights to make impact loans for so long. And one privilege not
often mentioned is the nonparticipation of foreign banks in the government
bond underwriting syndicate. The rise in the number of foreign banks with
branches in Japan from twenty-one in 1969 to seventy-five in 1983 suggests
that the restrictions have not been too onerous.
Japanese banks were intimately connected with all aspects of foreign ex-
change in the postwar period, through the "authorized foreign exchange bank"
system. The largest banks were authorized to deal in foreign exchange, and
to execute all foreign exchange transactions. Hence, these banks became the
actual implementors of foreign exchange regulations. Here, however, we will
limit consideration of the banks' role to regulations affecting own-account
capital transactions and the net foreign exchange position of the banks.
The first major move of Japanese banks away from pure trade financing
transactions came in late 1960, when nonimport-related borrowing in foreign
currency from nonresident banks was permitted, along with a relaxation of
controls on banks' overall exchange position. Japanese banks continued ac-
quiring foreign currency-denominated liabilities throughout the 1960s, as
Japanese trade grew and as Japanese participation in foreign investments rose.
One prudential rule was imposed, that 15 percent of total foreign currency
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liabilities be held as foreign currency assets. But in 1970 and 1971, dollar
borrowing grew as part of speculation against the dollar. Along with other
controls imposed at the time, a freeze on Japanese banks' foreign currency
borrowing was imposed from August to December 1971. But in 1972, the
growing importance of dollar funding to Japanese banks helped encourage
regulatory evolution. Issue by Japanese banks of dollar-denominated CDs in
London began on a limited basis in September 1972, and limits were removed
in December of that year. Similar issues in Singapore were permitted from
May 1975 and in the United States from June 1975.
Prudential regulation on the net foreign exchange position of banks began
in 1974 (in the wake of the Herrstadt collapse). These replaced yen conversion
quotas (which were also applied to Japanese banks, though they were not so
important relatively) as the main regulatory tool in May 1977. When these
new rules were promulgated, Japanese banks were not permitted to be short
on the dollar, suggesting a desire by authorities to constrain pro-yen specu-
lation at the time. But the intention to relax this control was announced along
with the control itself. The rule was in fact relaxed in January 1979. Under
the 1980 foreign exchange law, these prudential regulations on net foreign
exchange position remain.
On the asset side, Japanese banks faced a similar development of regu-
lation, with loans abroad requiring official approval through the 1950s. But
the limit on nontrade-related credit was eliminated in August 1960, along
with the corresponding one on borrowing. Once again, regulations tightened
in 1971 as speculation against the dollar mounted; ceilings on Japanese banks'
foreign branches' loans to nonresidents and to Japanese firms were imposed
in May 1971, along with ceilings on loan guarantees by such branches. These
restrictions were lifted in January 1972. In early 1973, encouraging outflow
by foreign lending became official policy, and government financial institution
loans abroad were a means of accomplishing this. Blanket approval to all
foreign loans began in mid-1978, though the approval procedure was kept.
A major concern of authorities at this time was the mismatch of maturity
structures on the balance sheets of banks; from January 1979, a 60 percent
long-term liability match for long-term loans in foreign currencies was im-
posed. Under the foreign exchange law, there is a formal requirement for
notice and a twenty-day wait on foreign loans, but no wait has been imposed
in fact since 1982.
Overall, the internationalization of Japanese banks' capital account trans-
actions began in earnest in the late 1960s and grew quickly in the 1970s.
Although some attempts to control lending and borrowing in foreign currencies
were made in times of crisis, the banks were mostly allowed to pursue their
international interests as they wished. Perhaps continued good relations with
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the underwriting syndicate at home informed the regulatory choices made vis-
a-vis the banks' international activities. Prudential regulations do remain, but
there do not appear to be strong complaints about them.
The institutional history given in this essay suggests two major turning
points in capital market internationalization in the postwar period in Japan.
The first was in the mid-1960s. By this time, it was clear that Japan's high
growth strategy, aimed partly at easing the foreign exchange constraint, had
succeeded. The regulations once needed to protect the economy from the
dangers of that constraint became more costly. The benefits of foreign capital
inflow could now be acquired at lower cost, and the costs of domestic capital
outflow could now be offset by higher benefits. Although deregulation was
never abrupt, the intent and direction were clear. Still, in times of crisis,
regulatory structure did respond to market pressures; but constraints were
always lifted once crises passed—especially becasue many attempts at regu-
latory control appeared to be ineffective.
The second major turning point was in the late 1970s, and the changes are
codified in the foreign exchange law of 1980. More types of transactions were
authorized for automatic approval, and there emerged the new principle of
freedom of transaction unless specific prohibition exists. In practice, discre-
tionary use of capital market regulation as a tool for achieving external equili-
brium has virtually ceased; that is, since the 1980 law, the regulatory structure
has ceased to be highly endogenous to the system.
1. The main source of information is the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions, which includes pages on Japan from 1952 to present. For a description
of the new foreign exchange law and discussion of the differences with the old, see Atarashii
gaikoku kawase kanri ho no kaisetsu  [An Explanation of the New Foreign Exchange Control
Law], edited by Fukui Hiroo (Tokyo, 1980).
2. In a fixed rate regime, it is usual to require legally that all foreign exchange transactions
be implemented through the central bank or through authorized foreign exchange dealers under
the central bank's jurisdiction.
3. Sources are unclear on the exact definition of this term, but the nuance is restrictive.
4. The Dow Chemical case of the early 1970s comes to mind.
5. For example, a debate occurred in 1983-84 over whether to place data communications
switching equipment (computer linking equipment, etc.) on the restricted list. Under one proposal,
foreign ownership of over 20 percent in any firm would have been prohibited. The Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications favored the restriction on infant industry protection grounds,
while MITI opposed it on grounds of encouraging competition. The MITI viewpoint prevailed.
6. For the period before 1980, data are available only on approvals, not on applications.
7. In sources available, no mention was made of a requirement that securities so purchased
be held to maturity, or that the six-month holding period had been extended. Without such
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regulations, it is unclear how restricting the maturities available to nonresidents would prevent
capital flows. So long as the long-maturity securities could be sold, the holding period for new
purchases would be the critical matter, not the maturity of the security itself.
8. These amounts are equivalent to 1.1 percent and 2.6 percent of all domestic bonds floated
in these years.
9. The importance of withholding taxes was demonstrated in the summer of 1984, when
German authorities reacted immediately to the United States' cancellation of the 30 percent
withholding tax in the United States on foreign bondholders. The Japanese withholding tax rate
on foreign bondholders' interest income is 20 percent.
10. For a description of the syndicate, see Kitamura Kyoji, ed. Kokusai (Tokyo, 1979).
11. Nonfinancial firms were permitted to engage in such transactions from April 1984.
PART THREE
Global Awareness
The three essays in this part underscore the extent to which Japanese define themselves
in relation to the United States, whereas Americans perceive Japan more in terms of
changing American values than in terms of Japanese realities. As an international
political economy, the American system may be disintegrating, but it appears to persist
culturally. On the other hand, Japan is only now, in the 1980s, beginning to have any
influence on America's self-image as quality is identified with Japanese industry and
Americans strive to meet Japanese standards. At the same time, Japanese seem con-
fused by the responsibilities of the power that Americans seek to thrust upon them.
Iriye (chapter 10) examines the changes in American perceptions of Japan's role
in international politics beginning with the 1931-45 image of a warlike nation, as
dangerous as any in the world. He notes the grave concern with which Americans
undertook to eradicate Japanese militarism during the occupation and Japanese ac-
ceptance of a constitution which left their country the only one in the world unable
to resort to war. To the astonishment of many Japanese, their new pacifism was
condemned as naive and selfish by Americans who, conditioned by the Cold War,
now concluded that preparedness offered the only path to peace. Iriye sees the Japanese
as continuing to oppose rearmament but lacking a coherent view of their role in
maintaining world peace.
Homma (chapter 11) remarks upon the persistent American image of the impene-
trable Japanese but is not unaware of the great surge of Japanese studies in the United
States—the mounting effort to understand. He is bemused by American contempt for
the Japanese Socialist party, which he suggests is more committed to American demo-
cratic values than are the Liberal Democrats. He is concerned more, however, with
Japanese efforts to understand the United States and to find cultural autonomy as they
outgrow American political and economic dominance. Homma sees the "Pacific Age"
of the late 1980s as a crossroad in the quest for mutual understanding. He wonders
how Japan can accept the responsibilities of power and share its burdens without
fighting the world, including Americans. Should Japan lead—or is it still better to
respond and adapt?
Yamamoto (chapter 12) has had enough of Japan's leaving the initiative to the
United States or any other nation. He sketches the cycles of friction that have dominated
media accounts of relations between Japan and the United States since the mid-1960s:
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American complaints and demands, followed by Japanese concessions and settlement,
followed by a new round of friction. He sees Japan constantly on the defensive, forced
to respond, relying on damage control. Choosing one of the alternatives in Krasner
and Okimoto, he calls upon the Japanese people to play a more activist, global role,
to prevent fires rather than perpetually having to put them out.
Again and again these essays, like those that precede them, confront Japan's di-
lemma. Japan, perhaps more than any other nation today, can make choices, define
its role, its partnership with the United States. Is this possible for what Chie Nakane
has called the "vertical society"? Do Japanese leaders have the necessary courage and
wisdom? Are Americans ready to enter into a real as opposed to nominal partnership
with Japan?
10
War, Peace, and
U.S.-Japanese Relations
AKIRA IRIYE
During the 1930s and throughout World War II, few ideas were more prevalent
in the United States than the notion that Japan was a warlike nation: militar-
istic, aggressive, brutal, and bent on committing atrocities wherever its sol-
diers went. As early as 1934, Nathaniel Peffer was describing Japan in the
following fashion, using words and concepts that would remain essentially
constant until 1945:
That the country is completely under the rule of the military caste is
self-evident, and that the people would follow the army into any ad-
venture, however fantastic, is equally clear. It is the combination of
national centralization with feudal loyalty, of mysticism with technical
efficiency, of medievalism with tanks and airplanes, that make the Japa-
nese incalculable by twentieth-century criteria and beyond understand-
ing by the modern mind, as well as peculiarly dangerous in a world at
least somewhat rationalist. They dwell in a no-man's zone of time: their
springs of action in the Middle Ages, their instruments of action out of
the twentieth century.1
That Japan combined "medieval mysticism with twentieth-century efficiency
and organization," as Peffer put it, became the accepted framework in which
Japanese behavior in Asia and the Pacific was comprehended. Such a com-
bination made Japan extremely dangerous, for "the romanticism of samurai
chivalry," when coupled with "twentieth century imperialism," created "an
uncontrollable lust for conquest." The country was "anti-social and inimical
to the hope of an ordered, civilized world."2
The rape of Nanking, the bombing of the Panay, the Pearl Harbor attack,
the Bataan death march, the brutal treatment of indigenous populations in
Southeast Asia—all these confirmed such an image of Japan. Few words were
applied to it with greater regularity than "warlike." Given such a perception,
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it is not surprising that in 1945, when Japan's defeat was merely a matter of
time, opinion polls in America should have expressed serious doubt that it
would ever become peace loving, or that more than one out of eight Americans
interviewed should have called for the annihilation of the Japanese race as
the only guarantee for postwar peace. The dropping of atomic bombs needed
no justification: a country made up of fanatical warriors had to be brought to
its knees by whatever means was available.
Within a few years of Japan's defeat, however, the country was being
described in very different terms. Almost as soon as he got to Tokyo, General
Douglas MacArthur decided that the Japanese were capable of becoming a
peace-loving people. In March 1947, he told reporters in Tokyo that the
country had undergone the greatest "spiritual revolution" in history, and that
it posed no threat to neighboring countries. It now entrusted its security to
the goodwill of mankind, and to its own "advanced spirituality." In 1950,
he praised the Japanese for taking the lead in dedicating "all energy and all
resource to peaceful progress." In due course, he said, "other nations will
join you in this dedication, but meanwhile you must not falter."4 Japan was
now depicted as the most peace-loving nation on earth!
The idea that the Japanese are more committed to, or interested in, peace
than war, has remained more or less unchanged since then. American opinion
has in fact been critical of Japan for not doing enough for its own defense,
for spending barely 1 percent of its income for military purposes, and for not
being more cooperative with its allies in the global confrontation with the
Soviet bloc. It is as if Japan today were being accused of not being belligerent
enough, of being too preoccupied with peaceful pursuits.
What does such a reversal of American perceptions reflect? Does it indicate
that the Japanese have in fact changed? Or, alternatively, have they remained
essentially the same, but have American views of them been transformed? If
so, how should one account for it? Have Americans themselves changed? If
neither Japanese nor Americans can be expected to have changed so drastically
in a few decades, what are the variables that we should look for in explaining
the shifts and turns in American attitudes toward Japan?
I would argue that American perceptions of Japan are linked to ideas about
war and peace. Japan is judged to be warlike or peace loving according to
certain accepted definitions of these terms, but the definitions have changed
significantly since the 1930s. To put it simply, before World War II, peace
was considered a normal and normative state of affairs among nations: to
accuse a country of being bellicose was to ostracize it as unworthy of mem-
bership in the community of nations. To regain the respect of the world, it
would have to demonstrate its pacific orientation. This was what MacArthur
was doing as he argued for a speedy end to the occupation of Japan. By then,
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however, something had happened to the vocabulary of war and peace, so
that his declamations sounded naive and, according to officials in Washington
who were formulating a different policy toward Japan, even disloyal. In a
changed environment after 1945, it was no longer an unqualified virtue for a
nation to be pacifistic. If the ideas that Peffer expressed had continued to
provide a basic ideological framework, it would have made sense to char-
acterize postwar Japan as MacArthur did. Japanese opinion, in fact, would
continue to be strongly influenced by those ideas. In the United States, in
contrast, new formulations of international affairs steadily undermined earlier
views, so that gaps inevitably developed between Japanese and American
conceptions.
This essay will trace this transformation by examining postwar American
ideas about war and peace, as expressed in books and magazine articles in
the 1940s and the 1950s. By the end of the 1950s, it would appear that the
most influential of such ideas had already been expressed, so that writers in
the subsequent decades would merely be rephrasing them. Japan was hardly
mentioned in the bulk of these writings, but this in itself is an interesting
phenomenon, for the failure to fit Japan into a discussion of war and peace
is illustrative of the state of uncertainty in U.S.-Japanese relations.
When Peffer characterized Japan as bellicose in the 1930s, he assumed
that peace was a normal condition of modern life and war an aberration, a
product of medieval romanticism or feudal mentality. Although fewer and
fewer writers retained their faith in that view, at least until 1939 it remained
the most orthodox idea in the United States and Western Europe regarding
international affairs. According to this orthodoxy, which may be termed Spen-
cerian, the more advanced a country became economically (and therefore
politically—another Spencerian legacy), the less reason there was for it to
engage in war. Economic development was conducive to peace as it generated
an environment and a mentality for rationalism and liberalism, conditions
favorable to peaceful pursuits. Only in less developed, premodern societies
were people driven irrationally to war, exalting the martial spirit and finding
glory in physical violence. As these premodern societies, or premodern classes
in a modern society, were replaced by a more advanced variety, war would
become obsolete. This was what Peffer undoubtedly had in mind when he
wrote that the premodern ethos of Japan was "dangerous in a world in which
the nexus is made by intricate economic ties and which at least hopes to
substitute the rule of reason for war in international relations."
Such ideas were identical to what Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen
had written about Japan, all in the Spencerian tradition; despite its techno-
logical modernization, Japan had barely emerged out of the feudal past, and
must therefore be considered less rational and more warlike than Western
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democracies. These views said more about the writers' ideas of war and peace
than of Japan, or of any country. If a country such as Nazi Germany appeared
bent upon aggression, it was because it, too, contained premodern elements
or, alternatively, because its leadership was revolting against modern civili-
zation. In all such analyses, peace and war were sharply differentiated; they
were dichotomized in terms of rationality and irrationality, modernity and
feudalism, or civilization and chaos.
The situation changed in the late 1930s and altered, perhaps forever, the
Spencerian formula. There are two aspects to this change. First, war was no
longer an irrationality or an evil when it was waged against warlike nations
like Germany, Italy, or Japan. War against aggressive powers was justifiable
because, without it, they would dominate the world and crush the values that
underlay modern civilization: peace, order, rationality. As Norman Angell,
an erstwhile Spencerian, wrote in 1939, "the principle on behalf of which
Britain has declared war is in truth the fundamental principle of all organized
society and of orderly civilization." Agreeing with such a justification of
war, Reinhold Niebuhr asserted in 1940 that now peace was the greater evil,
for there could be no peaceful compromise with "modern tyrannical States"
that engaged in acts of brutality."6 The title of the theologian's book, Chris-
tianity and Power Politics, exemplified his argument: in order to defend their
values, Christians must be prepared to practice power politics. They could
no longer afford to be pacifists, for peace would only abet more brutality and
more war. As the New Republic editorialized in July 1941, "It is just as true
as it ever was that the best defense, the only defense, is to attack. . . .  All
over the world people have come to see in the recent past that if a democracy
is not prepared to be militant, it is not prepared to survive."7
Such views suggested that war and peace were no longer viewed as op-
posites, representing sharply contrasting compartments of human action. This
was the second aspect of the change. More and more came to see war as
always a possibility in a peaceful world and, on the other hand, peace as part
of an act of war. "When the most fundamental values of life are at stake,"
wrote G.T. Robinson, a Columbia University historian in 1941, "there is
only one thing to do about it, and that is to do something about it." Americans
could not indulge in peaceful pursuits when the values that sustained them
were in danger of annihilation elsewhere. They must be prepared to go to
war. But they must recognize that "the most fundamental thing at issue is
not the present . . . but the future contained in the present—in the freedom
of the people to plan boldly and to act democratically in the realization of
their plans." Even as they went to war, Americans should not lose sight of
the future. The antifascist conflict was a total war, enveloping past, present,
and future. Put another way, war and peace were comprehended as simul-
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taneous occurrences; war was necessary to enjoy the fruits of peace, while
visions of peace were part of the war effort.
Justification of war, and the view of war as always a possibility even in
peace, amounted to the blurring of traditional distinctions between war and
peace. This was not entirely a new phenomenon, as I have suggested else-
where.9 But it clearly emerged as a main feature of international affairs in
the late 1930s and remained so during and after the war. In contrast to World
War I, in which President Woodrow Wilson maintained that the war was
being fought "to end wars" and civilians were asked to volunteer for national
service to meet the emergency—with the understanding that once the fighting
was over they would all go back to "normal" living—wartime and postwar
life became much less distinguishable after 1941. As early as August of that
year, the New Republic noted that "the kind of peace that will emerge after
the war will not be a theoretical or ideological construction, imposed on the
world when the fighting is over, but will result from the institutions created
during its course. Hitler is now shaping his New Europe. If his enemies are
to create a democratic internationalism, they must do so to win the war as
well as to organize the peace."10 This type of thinking called forth an enor-
mous amount of writing during the war about the shape of the peace; virtually
all of these publications assumed that wartime arrangements, whether do-
mestic or external, would be carried into the postwar period.
Although there was no consensus, a significant theme in these writings
was "realism." This reflected the far more sober state of mind during World
War II than World War I. It rejected pacifism as naive and suggested that
another war could be avoided only through preparedness. As Charles E.
Wilson, the businessman who was appointed vice chairman of the War Pro-
duction Board, insisted in 1944, the American economy would never resume
purely peaceful activities when the war ended, for "the tendency to war is
inevitable." To survive in modern world conditions, the line between peace-
time and wartime pursuits must be obliterated. "Instead of looking to dis-
armament and unpreparedness as a safeguard against war . . . let us try the
opposite: full preparedness according to a continuing plan."11
The stress now was on preparedness and on the need to base national policy
on the realities of power, not on human goodwill or idealism. Appeasement,
connoting peace at any price, was considered a greater sin than war. Instead
of peace and appeasement, the sacred concepts after 1945 were security and
national interest. Less a durable peace than a state of uncertainty was expected
to prevail in international relations. Whereas before 1939 writers had tended
to view problems of war and peace as fundamentally socioeconomic and
published numerous treatises on such topics as the nature of mass politics,
the future of democracy, and the relationship between social reform and world
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peace, after 1945 they were more concerned with military and strategic issues.
International relations were seen in interstate, rather than domestic, contexts.
It is not surprising that this led to, or reflected, an emphasis on power, for it
is easy to see interstate relations as power relations, whereas in domestic
affairs one has to pay heed to ethical, religious, social, cultural, and other
nonpower factors.
The acceptance of power politics thus was a main characteristic of Ameri-
can ideas of international relations after 1945. This continued the wartime
tendencies, but there is little doubt that it was reinforced by the emergence
of the Soviet Union as a formidable power, and by nuclear weapons. The
two were combined insofar as the Soviet was expected soon to possess its
own atomic arms. Any discussion of postwar international affairs had to start
by coming to grips with these developments. War and peace came to mean
neither war nor peace in the traditional sense. Instead, a state of war-and-
peace was envisaged between the United States and the Soviet Union.
There were several aspects to the concept of war-and-peace. One was
preparedness, or Daniel Yergin's idea of the "national security state." It was
not so much that a third world war was an immediate prospect, as that peace
would not be possible without preparing for such a conflict. As one writer
put it, "Peace through preparedness for war is the promise that is now being
held out to the American people by our elected officials and military lead-
ers." If the United States reverted to peacetime normalcy, this would only
increase chances of a future war. Peace and war, in such a view, were no
longer clearcut alternatives, but represented a simultaneity, a definition of the
prevailing condition of world affairs in which the two superpowers confronted
one another. To cite but one example, in the May 1947 issue of the Atlantic,
a professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania wrote an article
entitled "The Scientist Fights for Peace." The article actually discussed how
scientists should prepare for war. "I regard it as deplorable," he said, "that
our nation is preparing for war . . . but so long as it is the policy of our
nation to prepare for war, I shall certainly not attempt to impede such prepa-
rations." It was, he continued, "deplorable but understandable that this coun-
try, while desiring and working toward peace, feels it necessary to be strong
in a military sense." He fully recognized that "the desirable freedoms of the
individual" would be submerged in the event of another war, but felt confident
that they would be restored "if we had a succeeding peace." It was not clear
how such a peace was going to be achieved, especially as the author justified
the development and use of atomic weapons, a "relatively insignificant matter
of improving the means of murder."
That the next war would be a nuclear one was assumed by virtually all
writers in the immediate postwar years. Americans, a writer noted, were living
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"in justifiable terror of an atomic attack that can devastate our cities and
industries at a single blow."14 It was not clear, however, that such a war
should be avoided at all cost. Memories of the interwar years seemed to
indicate that it would not do merely to try to avoid war. In the words of
Robert E. Osgood, the interwar fear of war had blinded nations to "the
complex conflicts of power that lie at the roots of war." Moreover, it had
"made the avoidance of war rather than the achievement of the national interest
the indispensable requirement of foreign policy."15 Such "lessons" persuaded
postwar writers not to succumb to the temptation of condemning all wars.
Some, in fact, would argue that World War II had not brought about peace,
but that another war had already begun. The Cold War, according to numerous
National Security Council memoranda, was "in fact a real war," to be waged
until victory was achieved. Many commentators echoed the theme and
warned their readers that America would "lose the war against communism"
unless they stepped up their preparedness. Even those who did not go to
such extremes argued that "the fear of these atomic weapons" was a vital
instrument for preventing war, as Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out. The theo-
logian was one of the prominent postwar realists who defended the continued
production of atomic bombs as necessary for prevention of nuclear war.18
There was a danger, of course, that an arms buildup by the superpowers
might in fact increase chances of war. But such a risk had to be taken, for
the only alternative might be an unacceptable accommodation with commu-
nism, which could lead to Soviet domination of the world and extinguish
liberty, democracy, and all those values in defense of which the country had
just fought a colossal war. There was now a greater willingness than in the
1930s to consider war a lesser evil if the only alternative were submission to
totalitarian rule. As Archibald MacLeish said, the United States must try "to
avoid world war on the one hand and Communist domination of the earth on
the other."19 Or, as Niebuhr put it in 1953, "we face two problems in our
generation rather than one: the avoidance of war and resistance to tyranny.
The 'pure' idealists are always tempted to war against communism in the
name of justice or to come to terms with it in the name of peace." Both
alternatives must be rejected and replaced by "a wisdom which is more rele-
vant to our two-pronged predicament." Such wisdom would try to avoid war
with communist states but would also build up "our defenses even though
the peril of conflict always confronts us."
The war that these writers had in mind was, at least until the mid-1950s,
a nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Horrible
as it was to contemplate—as early as 1947 Arnold J. Toynbee had written
that in a global atomic war the only survivors might be "Negrito Pygmies of
Central Africa"—it would be even more disastrous not to be prepared for
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it.21 Preparedness meant deterrence, it was hoped, so that the experiences of
the 1930s would never again be repeated.
As in the 1930s, however, arms buildups provoked a fierce opposition.
Although pacifism and neutralism were much less vocal and far more limited
after 1945, there was an essential continuity in their ideological assumptions.
In 1936, for instance, Aldous Huxley had written, "In the war industry tech-
nological progress is being made at the rate of ten per cent per annum. In
these circumstances can we possibly afford to go on using war-like means to
preserve peace?" In order to defend democratic societies against totalitarian
states through military means, he argued, "one must be militarily efficient,
and one cannot become militarily efficient without centralising powers, setting
up a tyranny, imposing some form of conscription or slavery on the state. In
other words, the military defence of democracy in the contemporary circum-
stances entails the abolition of democracy even before war starts."
The idea that war and war preparedness were incompatible with democracy
was a Spencerian legacy, and it lingered on after 1945. One of the earliest
expressions of this was a celebrated article by Cord Meyer in the June 1947
issue of the Atlantic. A former marine who had been engaged in battles in
the Pacific, Meyer argued that the policy of deterring war through preparedness
necessitated the buildup of arms for an effective counteroffensive. "Not only
must this retaliatory force be capable of immediately destroying the cities of
all possible opponents, but it must be so distributed and organized as to be
able to deliver its blows after our own cities and factories have been leveled
by the enemy's initial assault. Preparedness to defend the nation must be
supplanted by preparedness to endure the loss of our urban industry and
population and to preserve from the wreckage the ability to strike back in
equal force." This would call for the maintenance of "the world's largest
arsenal of atomic bombs, radioactive poisons, disease-producing germs, and
long-range rockets and bombers." In addition, it would be necessary to dis-
perse people and factories of the nation to prevent their destruction, and
governmental leaders, arms production works, and other essential personnel
would have to be housed in underground shelters. "When this program has
been put into effect, the country may be able to fight on though its cities lie
in ruins and the majority of its people are maimed, dying, or dead."
As if to anticipate George Orwell's depiction of a nation in a constant state
of preparedness, Meyer wrote that the government would drastically restrict
the rights and movements of its citizens, who would be subjected to a system
of efficient intelligence so as to prevent sabotage. They would become ideo-
logically indoctrinated; "the leaders of the only two nations capable of waging
such a war tend to exaggerate the points of difference in the two societies as
a means of persuading their respective populations of the moral value of their
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sacrifices. The noblest principles of freedom become fraudulent propaganda
when they are used to disguise an amoral competition for brute force and to
lash masses of men into a crusading fury against each other." Echoing Huxley,
Meyer concluded, "Total preparedness means totalitarianism for American
citizens."
This was a lone voice. Unlike Huxley in England in 1936, Meyer had few
supporters in America in 1947. (He himself would soon change his views
and embrace "realism.") The bulk of writings on war and peace made a sharp
distinction between democracy and communist totalitarianism even as both
prepared for war. This was the legacy of the antifascist war. At the same
time, it should be noted that there was essentially no difference between the
images of future war visualized by Meyer and those of his opponents. They
only differed about the implications of preparedness and deterrence for free-
dom and democracy. Moreover, neither side had a clear vision of peace. For
the Cold Warriors and the realists, peace was at best a state of uneasy co-
existence with the Soviet Union, at worst a deceptive calm that hid the realities
of power politics in the world. In either case, peace was not an ultimate value
to be pursued through nonmilitary means. For critics like Meyer there also
was a failure to articulate just what a peaceful state of international affairs
would entail. In the above article, he wrote that the two superpowers should
have been willing, in 1945, to "confer sufficient power and authority on an
international organization to make it a reliable instrument for the preservation
of peace." The idea that the United Nations should have been the enforcer
of peace was shared by a number of writers, but this idea was vague and
assumed that the United States and the Soviet Union should have been able
to work together in the world body. Because obviously they had not, peace
would have required much more than a reaffirmation of faith in the United
Nations. It would be more correct to say that no vision of peace existed in
the immediate aftermath of the war comparable to earlier definitions of it,
Spencerian or otherwise.
The situation seems to have begun to change in the mid-1950s. That the
Korean War had not led to a war between America and Russia made a profound
impression on American observers. In retrospect, it is clear that for the first
time since 1945 they began to think that perhaps a mutually devastating war
between the two superpowers could be avoided, and that they could possibly
expect to coexist more or less indefinitely. This slight optimism was buttressed
by the death of Joseph Stalin, the Geneva summit of 1955, and the subsequent
series of high-level contacts between American and Soviet leaders. Peace now
came to be defined as peaceful coexistence—not a permanent state of affairs
but at least a detente, a word that appeared in American writings as early as
1951. At the same time, ideas about war, too, underwent change. On one
200 Akira Iriye
hand, much came to be written about limited, rather than total, war. On the
other hand, another type of war, the national liberation conflict in underde-
veloped areas of the world, began to be noticed.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the emergence of such ideas about
war and peace. A Gallup opinion poll in late 1954 asked the question, "What
do you think the people of this country have the most to be thankful for this
year?" Peace led the list of answers with 57 percent.24 This certainty reflected
the end of the hostilities in Korea and Indochina. Even Life magazine rec-
ognized the change in the atmosphere when it noted in November, "It may
well be that, for the moment, the struggle for the world, and men's minds,
is shifting away from one of mere military might to one of economic and
political rivalry." The new rivalry that would replace military confrontation
would call for America's initiative in world economic expansion, development
of underdeveloped areas, and raising the level of world prosperity.25 The idea
that peace must be taken seriously, not just in terms of creating a military
deterrence but in nonmilitary ways as well, seems to have echoed the detente
of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev era. In an editorial entitled "Peace Must be
Waged," Collier's pointed out in 1955 that "One can paraphrase Clausewitz
and say that peace is but the extension of national policies, of competition
with other powers, by means other than war." Americans must wage peace
through "even greater energy, even greater creative thought, even greater
faith than war."26 Vannevar Bush, the scientist who had been involved in
the wartime development of atomic weapons and who had advocated a nuclear
strategy against the Soviet Union, declared in 1956, "We can have
peace. . . . We look forward to living in a new sort of world. The flowering
of science, which has rendered a war absurd, is also giving us wealth, comfort,
and freedom from disease of the body or the mind."27
Lest such ideas should sound too complacent, realists such as Robert E.
Osgood and Henry Kissinger began writing of limited war. Total nuclear war,
they argued, was now less likely because neither America nor Russia would
gain from it. Instead, in the future there might be a small-scale conflict between
them that might involve the use of tactical nuclear weapons or consist entirely
of conventional forces.28 Such a war would not devastate the world, and for
this very reason it was more likely to occur. The Korean War, as Kissinger
pointed out, was a precursor of the new generation of wars. Actually, it was
also an old-style conflict for specific objectives, and the United States had
intervened in it to restore the balance of power, not to menace Soviet sov-
ereignty. Both Osgood and Kissinger asserted that the United States would
be amiss if it concentrated on nuclear armament, for it would then be incapable
of waging limited war. Agreeing with such thinking, Bernard Brodie wrote
in an article entitled, "How War Became Absurd," that, because an unre-
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stricted thermonuclear war was in the interest of no nation, "we and our
opponents will have to adapt ourselves mutually to ways of using military
power which are not orgiastic."29
Predictably, the limited-war doctrine provoked fierce debate in the late
1950s. On one hand, some viewed limited war as no more acceptable than
total war. As Matthew Josephson put it, "Is it to be, then, limited war? This
is improvement, indeed! Up to now we had only a stunning picture of a total
war that would destroy civilized life in Eurasia, while leaving us with (an
estimated) 68 million dead or maimed. Now that there are to be only 'small'
wars, with but three or four million sacrificed here and there, we may breathe
more easily."30 On the other hand, hardcore Cold Warriors held on to the
view, in the words of Robert Strauss-Hupe, that "Communist doc-
trine . . . has never been . . . a theory of limited war but of protracted war."
Such being the case, the limited war doctrine was nothing but "a nostalgic
protest." It sought "to reduce the life-and-death struggle of two vast systems
to a reasonable proposition all reasonable men are bound to understand and
to accept." This was a liberal Western concept, "as remote from the Com-
munist concept of protracted conflict as Montesquieu is from Mao." The
United States should not succumb to such fantasy but continue to strengthen
its "capability for all foreseeable types of war."31 One ironical result of the
debate on limited war may have been the general acceptance of both atomic
and conventional war. As Mark S. Watson noted, "preparation for atomic
warfare, either restricted or unrestricted, or for conventional warfare, is not
enough. There must be first-class preparation for both, wasteful as that may
appear—all war being wasteful."
Why, given the "armistice" in the Cold War, as Walter Lippmann called
it, the nation should continue to accept such "waste" was a question that
fascinated observers. Many writers anticipated President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower's thesis about a "military-industrial complex." Josephson, for instance,
asserted in 1957 that "expansion-minded military bureaucrats" and "the tech-
nical-war industries" were allied to press for more expenditure of money for
arms. Instead of joining forces to work for peaceful compromises with the
Russians, they were enjoying the benefits of continued armament. Pushing
the thesis still further, C. Wright Mills wrote, also in 1957, that in both the
United States and the Soviet Union, "science and loyalty, industry and na-
tional canons of excellence are in the service of military metaphys-
ics. . . . Both the Russian and the American elite have fought the cold war
in the name of peace." They were aware that war was becoming obsolete,
and yet "in both, virtually all policies and actions fall within the perspective
of a third world war." It was because "small ruling circles" in the two
countries were possessed by a "whole supporting ethos of an overdeveloped
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society geared for war."33 This was nothing but madness. A few years later,
Lewis Mumford, in The Pentagon of Power, brought this type of critique to
an extreme by castigating the American elite as morally bankrupt: "So
far . . . from [Hitler's] megamachine's being utterly discredited by the co-
lossal errors of its ruling 'elite,' the opposite actually happened: it was rebuilt
by the Western allies on advanced scientific lines, with its defective human
parts replaced by mechanical and electronic and chemical substi-
tutes. . . . [In] the very act of dying the Nazis transmitted the germs of their
disease to their American opponents: not only the methods of compulsive
organization or physical destruction, but the moral corruption that made it
feasible to employ these methods without stirring opposition."34
For critics like Josephson, Mills, and Mumford, peace defined as a tem-
porary truce in the Cold War was unacceptable, as it assumed continued
armament and preparedness. Rather, they would call for a restructuring of
society to liberate it from military-oriented interests and "the inhuman features
of the overdeveloped," in the words of Mills. In calling America, Russia,
and other military powers "overdeveloped monstrosities that now pass for
human societies," the sociologist was anticipating the radical movements of
the 1960s with their emphasis on communal harmony, small-group encoun-
tering, and disarmament as bases for peace.
Ideas about war and peace were enlarged in another sense during the 1950s,
which saw conflicts and crises in underdeveloped areas of the world. The
Korean War was in a sense a precursor of the new type of struggle, as was
the French war in Indochina. These were followed by conflicts in the Middle
East, on the China-India border, and in Africa. Soon, in the 1960s, the United
States itself would become involved in Vietnam. Wars in areas that came to
be called the Third World, or wars of national liberation as indigenous ideo-
logues preferred to define them, necessitated concepts and a vocabulary that
had not been available in the early phase of the Cold War. Conversely, Third
World commotions compelled reconsideration of ideas about peace.
In August 1945, Pearl Buck had predicted that unless the United States
understood and dealt adequately with "the peasant mind" in Asia, "we must
prepare for endless wars." It was clear to her that Americans could "still
win" only by understanding "the mighty peasant peoples" that made up four-
fifths of Asians.35 The idea that the United States faced, in addition to Soviet
military power, social revolutions throughout the Third World was not hard
to accept, but for a while after 1945 predictions about a future war almost
invariably concerned a nuclear conflict between the superpowers, not colonial
struggles. Among the first to stress the latter was Robert S. Lynd, the Columbia
sociologist, whose essay "Whose Wars?" was published in a 1952 issue of
the Nation, suggesting that the United States was becoming involved "in a
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rapidly broadening counter-war against the long overdue world colonial revo-
lution." Although the people were told that they were fighting against Soviet
communism, they might actually be engaged in "twentieth-century colonial
wars." Agreeing, Edgar Snow pointed out in 1955 that "the very knowledge
that the major atomic powers dare not use their thermonuclear thunderbolts"
seemed to be encouraging "a new crop of conventional wars"—rebellions,
civil wars, and national colonial revolutions. Nationalism was a "major threat"
to world peace. But it was now far more self-confident and widespread than
ever before. The world system of states had been fundamentally transformed
when "1,200,000,000 brown men inhabiting about 7,000,000 square miles
of territory have attained full national independence and political equality with
the West." The United States must reckon with this fact as it continued to
face the Soviet challenge. The only policy it should pursue was to give aid
to underdeveloped areas and support their self-determination. Snow was con-
vinced that the rivalry with the Soviet Union would now largely take place
in the Third World. "The metamorphosis of Cold War I into competitive
coexistence," he concluded, "does not and cannot end ideological rivalry. It
intensifies its continuation by other means."
By the late 1950s, the idea that the Cold War involved a global question
of development had become commonplace. A good summation of that phase
of the Cold War was offered by Reinhold Neibuhr in an article he published
in the New Republic in 1956:
Naturally it is necessary to resist Communism whenever it presents itself
in terms of military aggression, as in Korea, and to prevent the Com-
munist movement from gaining supremacy in weapons, nuclear and
otherwise, with which modern warfare is bound to be conducted. Mili-
tary force is always the ultima ratio in the contest between nations. But
this ultimate form of logic in international relations cannot obviate the
significance of competition on all other levels—moral, political and
economic. . . . The long ardors of competitive coexistence to which
we will be subjected perhaps for a century, cannot be understood at all
or borne with patience, if we do not realize that the contest between a
free society and a tyranny is one in which the tyranny has all the im-
mediate advantages in the colored continents, while we have all the
ultimate ones. That is why time is on our side, however much the battle
may run against us for decades.
Niebuhr entitled this essay "A Qualified Faith." It was the same faith that
yielded an increasingly voluminous literature on "nation-building" during the
1950s and the 1960s. A product of traditional American utopianism combined
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with the postwar vogue for social engineering, it seemed to be a perfect answer
to the problem of coping with the challenge of communism in underdeveloped
parts of the world. By encouraging the nation-building efforts of Third World
peoples, it was confidently expected, the United States would ultimately win
the Cold War. Until the faith was severely tested by the Vietnam war, de-
velopmentalism provided a weapon as important as military arms.
It may be noted, however, that while the strategy of nation-building was
clear within the context of the ongoing struggle with Soviet communism, it
did not produce an easily formulatable idea of peace. It was one thing to say,
as Stewart Alsop did in 1960, that "we must . . .  find the means and the will
to give poor countries and poor people a practical alternative to Commu-
nism."3 There was no assurance that the poor countries, once given aid,
would not bestir themselves even further and create pockets of instability. In
the mid-1950s, it is true, the "spirit of Bandung" (after a conference of Asian
and African nations held in 1955) defined a vision of peace as formulated by
Asian and African countries. That definition—based on such principles as
respect for sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and nonviolation
of territorial integrity—would have been acceptable to the United States. But
the Bandung doctrine was soon superseded by a far more violent view of
world affairs, with advocates of "peace" openly calling for guerrilla warfare
against colonial regimes and turning anticolonial struggles into revolutionary
movements. They added to the vocabulary of war through their conception
of "people's war" which, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, made no dis-
tinction between civilian and military activities, or between civil and external
wars. Moreover, even when they were not engaged in a war of national
liberation, Third World countries' conceptions of international order conflicted
with the idea of a peaceful coexistence among military powers. They viewed
such a peace as involving the freezing of the status quo, keeping them in a
state of dependency on the rich and powerful nations. "Peace with justice"
for them must involve a global redistribution of wealth so that the anomaly
of three-fourths of mankind enjoying only one-quarter of the world's income
could be rectified. They would demand preferential access for their primary
products, which comprised 90 percent of their export in 1955, into markets
of advanced countries, both capitalist and socialist.
Given such developments, it became more than ever difficult to define
peace. In 1973, as the Vietnam conflict was winding down, Henry Kissinger
remarked, "Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we
face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace."41 He
had no easy answer, nor, it would seem, has there emerged in the past fifteen
years a workable definition of peace. On the other hand, Kissinger's optimism
has not been borne out. The danger of global conflict has not diminished,
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and many types of wars have been waged in the meantime. The distinction
between war and peace appears to be as blurred as ever, as if to suggest that
the world today approximates George Orwell's in which "war is peace."
In examining American views of war and peace since 1945, one notices
that Japan is hardly mentioned. This is in sharp contrast to the situation before
1945, when it was impossible to discuss world affairs without considering
U.S. relations with Japan. A key question that concerned Americans before
1941 was whether there would be war with Japan, and after Pearl Harbor
they were determined to punish the Japanese so that the latter would never
again launch a "sneak attack" on the United States. After the war, many
books and articles were written about the American occupation of Japan,
dealing with measures that were taken to prevent the resurgence of militarism.
Apart from the initial spate of such writings, however, discussions of inter-
national affairs would appear to have begun to bypass Japan. It was as if
Japan had ceased to matter. And this was probably the case.
It was not that the memories of the war were erased; Pearl Harbor was
always remembered, the New York Times writing an editorial on its anniver-
sary every year until the early 1960s. The event and the subsequent war clearly
formed an important basis for American perceptions of Japan. Such memories
and images, however, did not serve to structure ideas about Japan in the
context of the developing conceptions of war and peace. Pearl Harbor was
mentioned in discussions about nuclear strategy, to consider how to respond
to "an atomic Pearl Harbor," or "a sneak atomic attack." Clearly, the Pearl
Harbor precedent had made Americans sensitive to "sneak attacks," but these
possibilities would arise in the context of American tensions with the Soviet
Union, not with Japan. If Walter Lippmann is to be believed, moreover, few
in the 1950s thought the Soviet Union would launch an atomic Pearl Harbor
on the United States. "The equivalent of a 'Pearl Harbor' today," he wrote,
"would have to be a sudden, annihilating blow not at our cities but at the
Strategic Air Command. That would not be an easy thing to do, and it is
something that can be made increasingly difficult to do. During the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962, the Kennedy administration considered and then dis-
carded the option of a sneak attack on the missile sites on the island, fearing
that an American Pearl Harbor would not be acceptable to the people. The
point is, however, that such discussions had nothing to do with Japan or U.S.-
Japanese relations.
The same holds true of mentions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For most of
the period through the 1960s, the atomic bombings of these cities were re-
membered less to illuminate postwar Japanese attitudes toward peace and war
than to imagine what a future war would look like. This was true even of
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those who were highly critical of the postwar atomic strategy. An editorial
in the Christian Century, for instance, noted in August 1951, "All the
signs . . .  indicate that the nations are hastening toward the next world war,
which is to be the First Atomic War. And the common man has concluded
that there is nothing he can do but wait in dumb resignation. So we come to
Hiroshima—plus six years. Each of the recurring anniversaries of that dreadful
day has seen the hope of lasting peace a little more dim than it was the year
before."43
That Japan ceased to be a factor in discussions of war is not surprising.
The country was clearly not a hypothetical enemy, nor was its potential mili-
tary power to be feared. Japan would be incorporated into a regional system
of mutual security through which Soviet and, after 1949, Chinese power would
be contained. Japan was not expected to play a military role in American
strategy. Instead, it would function as a showcase of political stability and
economic development, as an alternative to revolutionary upheaval. In this
sense, Japan fitted into the "nation-building" strategy of the 1950s and the
1960s. Although not a "new nation," postwar Japan seemed to exemplify
how a country could undertake modernization and, in the process, avoid falling
prey to the allure of communism.
What role Japan would play in world affairs, however, was by no means
clear. If Spencerianism had retained its influence, postwar Japan might have
been held up as an example of an industrializing country that had shed its
feudal past and had entered the phase of peaceful economic development.
Such an image would have been fitted into a liberal internationalist conception
of world affairs and defined a positive role for Japan as a nonmilitaristic nation
making use of its economic resources for global interdependence and peace.
If liberal internationalism had not been overshadowed by geopolitical realism,
the kind of idealism underlying MacArthur's image of Japan, quoted earlier,
would have received wider acceptance and might have established itself as a
postwar orthodoxy.
A few remained committed to those ideals. For instance, Stanley I. Stuber,
executive secretary of the International Christian University of Japan, wrote
in September 1951 that the will of the Japanese people, as reflected in the
new constitution, must not be "flouted by American military strategists who
are thinking only in terms of another Spain in the Far East. . . . While military
strategists are trying to make a fortress of Japan, and while certain businessmen
are aiming to supply Japan with the raw products from which the materials
of war can be produced, let the Christian church do everything possible to
develop the new Japan as a peace-loving nation." This was a theme that
was sustained throughout the next two decades, but "a peace-loving nation"
became more and more at variance with American strategy.
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Both the disasters of the Vietnam War and the failure of the detente have
induced the United States to call upon other countries to cooperate more
actively with the United States in maintaining the global status quo, which
is how peace has continued to be defined. If American power were insufficient
to match the increasing might of the Soviet Union, then others would have
to be brought into the equation. To stand outside of power calculations would
be naive and selfish. Today, the image of the Japanese as naively pacifist and
selfish in pursuit of economic objectives seems to have replaced the earlier
emphasis on their bellicosity and sneakiness.
Such a transformation in American perceptions of Japan is a corollary to
the more fundamental changes in conceptions of war and peace. Basic to the
"perception gaps" between the two countries is the fact that, whereas Ameri-
cans have been willing to embrace geopolitical realism to add to, if not entirely
replace, their traditional internationalism, the opposite trend has characterized
postwar Japanese thought. The Japanese have tended to view war and peace
as domestically generated, much as earlier generations of American writers
did. There would be no peace unless the countries of the world were them-
selves peaceful, and a key assurance that Japan remained peaceful, according
to Japanese thinking, would be its refusal to undertake rapid armament ex-
pansion. Beyond this, however, they have not been very helpful in defining
how they propose to promote peace in the world. They have failed to develop
a coherent image of a peaceful international community, and peace research
has been fragmented along ideological lines. Although the Japanese govern-
ment has promoted the idea of "an international state" as a goal for the nation,
the concept has included everything from balance of power to trade liberali-
zation. What both Americans and Japanese need as they approach the end of
the century would be a serious collaborative effort to come to grips with the
contemporary world's existential problems—not just wars, but population
explosion, deforestation, pollution, disease—and to develop an agenda for a
new kind of peace, a peace that assumed the basic unity of humanity even
while recognizing diversity. Not old-fashioned internationalism, nor conven-
tional power politics, but the internationalization of consiousness would be
the way to peace.
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America in the Mind of the Japanese
NAGAYO HOMMA
In recent years, the postwar period in Japanese history has been interpreted
and reinterpreted. Controversies—both academic and nonacademic—have
surrounded issues such as the meaning of Japan's surrender, the significance
of the American occupation, the character of the "New Constitution," and
the importance of the Japan-U.S. security system. Behind these issues lies
the fundamental problem of the relevance of the United States to Japan and
the Japanese people—the United States as a nation, a power, a party in
economic relations, a positive or negative model, a civilization, and, above
all, an object of identification.
Recent trends in reconsideration of what America has meant to Japan and
to Japanese people point to a kind of impasse in our effort to adjust ourselves
to forces of Americanization and to understand America and Americans. As
the following examples show, the meaning of "Americanization" has become
increasingly ambiguous and the concept of "understanding" less and less
clear.
In an article written in January 1984, Matsuyama Yukio, editor-in-chief
of the Asahi newspaper, uses the metaphor "twist in the intestines" to describe
Japanese-American relations. He contends that the Liberal Democratic party
embodies elements that are incompatible with American democracy and la-
ments that an increasing number of people whom the American founding
fathers would not find congenial have come to pass as "pro-American." For
Matsuyama, Japan's identification with the United States is twisted.1
To take another example, Kiuchi Nobutane, an influential senior economist,
calls for a reexamination of the term "internationality" in a December 1983
article. He asserts that the Japanese people suffered after the war from a kind
of "internationality complex" and embraced internationalism uncritically.
Whereas the substance of postwar internationalism was Americanization, Kiu-
chi considers the change in Japanese business ways into American ways to
be undesirable; he insists that a new view—"to be American is not necessarily
good"—is replacing the old one. He argues that the Japanese people must,
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therefore, discard their "Americanization complex" and recognize the inher-
ent internationality of Japan itself.2
Isoda Koichi's Sengoshi no kukan provides a third recent example of re-
consideration of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Isoda, a literary critic, at-
tempts to reconstruct the historical meaning of the postwar period through
various works of literature. Isoda includes topics such as the image of defeat,
the double structure of the occupation, the 1960 upheaval against the revision
of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and the end of ryugaku (studying abroad).
His fundamental concern is Japan's national identity, illustrated, for example,
in his discussion of the occupation. He argues that, although initially Japan's
democratization was identified with pro-Americanism, the growing awareness
among the Japanese people of "the national" gradually transformed pro-
Americanism into anti-Americanism. In the last chapter of his book, Isoda
observes the ambiguity in Japan's economic growth and prosperity. Economic
nationalism, supported by the machismo of the work ethic, is closely related
to Japanese nationalism vis-a-vis the United States. Yet the pervasion of
Americanism in the whole area of Japan's culture of consumption, as described
so effectively in the novel Nantonaku, kuristaru (Passively, Chrystal), by
Tanaka Yasuo, symbolizes the feminine acceptance of the occupation and
nostalgia for Japan's dependence on the United States during the occupation.
The psychology of manliness leads to exhortations such as "Japan! Be a state!"
In contrast, the feeling of feminine passivity, Isoda suggests, could make it
possible for the Japanese people to play with a fantasy in which Japan becomes
the fifty-first state of the United States. Isoda's book expresses, in a sophis-
ticated and sometimes tortured way, the feeling shared by many Japanese that
we are still caged within a space of protection and dependence guaranteed by
America's power. He concludes by arguing that only with the establishment
of the "individual" will the Japanese people finally be liberated from the
limitations of the postwar period.3
The above cursory look at a few samples of recent thinking—or re-
thinking—about the postwar period of Japanese history may tempt us to
simplify the major intellectual trend in Japan during the period as one changing
"from dependence to autonomy" or "from acceptance to self-assertion" or
"from Americanism to post-Americanism." The issue is not so easily re-
solved, however, because the postwar period is filled with ambiguous and
contradictory currents in the attitudes, feelings, and calculations of Japan's
leaders and people toward the United States as a power and a civilization.
A three-volume study of the impact of American culture on postwar Japan
entitled Amerikan karucha (American Culture) edited by Ishikawa Hiroyoshi
et al. proposes a challenging periodization. According to Fujitake Akira, one
of the three editors, the first period from 1945 through the 1950s can be called
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the period of love-hate feelings toward America. During this period, Japanese
identification with America as a model of democracy and assimilation of
American popular culture went hand in hand with anti-Americanism on a
political level.
The second volume discusses the 1960s, characterized again by permeation
of Japanese society by the American life style. The American way was still
the goal for the Japanese people, but as Fujitake analyzes the trend, America
remained Japan's model not from a desire to be "American" but as an in-
evitable consequence of economic growth. The leitmotif of this period, then,
was the realization of the American way in Japan without a clear awareness
of its being American.
In the 1970s, the Japanese people experienced changes in their value sys-
tem, represented by the then popular commercial, "from hardworking to
beautiful." New concerns and movements in America about ecology and its
related problems found their counterparts in Japan almost simultaneously;
Fujitake therefore contends that Japanese and Americans came to share com-
mon problems of contemporary civilization. Particularly for the youth in Ja-
pan, the United States had come to serve as the source of information so that
young people regarded America not as a foreign country but as their cultural
fatherland. The new generation of Japanese grew up in Japan but breathed
American air, Fujitake explains, and wonders whether the Japanese people
today discover their birthplaces not only in the ancient cities of Nara or Kyoto
but also in the United States in various places such as Atlanta, Georgia, home
of Scarlett O'Hara in the fictional world of Gone with the Wind, with which
a vast number of Japanese identify themselves by way of the original novel
as well as its film version.4
If Fujitake's interpretation of the general trend in the Americanization of
Japanese society and life-style is valid, what are we to make of those Japanese
whose identification with American culture is so advanced that they are not
conscious of it as a foreign culture? Is it possible that these people have
achieved a kind of autonomy of culture or life style, or should we regard
them as a case of complete subservience? With such slices of Americana as
McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Mister Donut, and Seven-Eleven be-
coming an inescapable part of any Japanese city, the American way appears
to be conquering Japanese society, on one hand, while on the other, this can
be construed as an indication of successful Japanization of American culture.
If the younger generation today is free from an inferiority complex, it may
have acquired that freedom at the expense of its sense of nationality.
Evaluations of political and economic relations between Japan and the
United States all show that the facile generalization of "from dependence to
autonomy" is misleading. After the war, the goals of Japan were maintaining
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relations of mutuality with the United States and achieving a sense of equal
partnership. In the 1960s, the terms partnership and equal partnership were
used to describe the relationship between Japan and the United States. Part-
nership was a euphemism for alliance, but the very fact that it functioned that
way reflects precisely the reluctance among the Japanese people to accept the
full connotation of the term alliance.
Part of the problem was not unique to the alliance relationship between
Japan and the United States. Theodore Draper's characterization of the re-
lationship between the United States and Western European countries as a
mesalliance applies equally to the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Recalling President
Kennedy's remark that "real partnership is possible only between equals,"
Draper argues that "real partnership is not the only thing possible between
equals; independence and antagonism are not only possible—they are proba-
ble," and he may well be right.5 The meaning of the alliance with the United
States is becoming less and less clear in the minds of the Japanese people.
According to Nagai Yonosuke, those political realists among Japanese spe-
cialists in international relations are now discredited by American politicians
as being harmful to U.S. strategic thinking. In their place the so-called military
realists in Japan seem to be gaining the confidence of American policymakers,
we are told. In Nagai's view, some of the military realists are latent Gaullists
of Japan, aiming at real autonomy rather than at strengthening the alliance
relationship. The whole picture is confusing, making us wonder who are
genuine realists and who are pseudorealists.
The emergence of the Nakasone administration in November 1982 further
complicated the situation. At the time of his visit to the United States in
January 1983, he reportedly uttered provocative expressions, such as linking
Japan and the United States under common fate (unmei kyodotai, a phrase
that evokes dark memories of Japan's fatal tie with Nazi Germany) and calling
Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." Thanks to his articulate opinions,
Nakasone apparently succeeded in establishing his reputation as a hawk and
a close collaborator with President Reagan. This stance was supposed to have
earned Nakasone an aura of an equal partner to the highest American political
leader, but Shimizu Tomohisa, an independent leftist historian, asserts that
the Nakasone administration deliberately chose, from among many possi-
bilities, subservience to the United States at the very time when, because of
the relative decline of American power, Japan could have avoided that choice.6
Policymakers in charge of Japanese-American relations seem to be aware
of the danger of simplistic appraisals of the political and economic relationship
between Japan and the United States. For example, a published discussion
among three high-echelon officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims at
a review of past and present relations between the two countries, but their
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attempt is at times confusing. For example, although Okazaki Hisanhiko notes
that Japanese-American relations have been remarkably amicable since the
time of Commodore Perry, with the sole exception of the period between
1930 and 1945, that there is something inherently good about the relationship,
and that, because of the geopolitical advantages they share, the two countries
make natural allies, he cautions that Japan must make some sacrifices and try
hard to maintain friendly relations with the United States. Kitamura Hiroshi
agrees with Okazaki, saying that, although Japanese-American relations are
basically good, they should not be taken for granted. The three officials agree
that equality in the relationship between the two countries was achieved in
the middle of the 1970s, but, on problems of economic frictions and defense,
Murata Ryohei argues that economic frictions can be contained as long as the
crucial issue of defense is dealt with satisfactorily. A little later, however,
he qualifies his view by saying that Americans see the two issues as inter-
twined.
All three officials lament the deficiency in understanding between Japanese
and Americans, pointing out the lack of a sufficient number of America
specialists even within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hoping that the
American policymakers study and understand the realities of Japanese politics
and society.7 But before we take up the problem of perception and under-
standing, we should recall what George Kennan has said about the nature of
Japanese-American relations and compare his views with those of the three
officials. In The Cloud of Danger (1977), written hastily as an overall analysis
of the realities of the world and as a prescription for a new administration's
foreign policy, Kennan explained why Japan should be the cornerstone of
American policy in the Far East. The first reason is geographic or geopolitical
and the second is that Japan's industrial power is so tremendous that it could
constitute a force either for great good or for great evil. But the most important
point about Japan, according to Kennan, is what he calls a kind of moral
obligation or moral opportunity. Without the Pacific war, Kennan would have
advised, as he does about China, "Let us not push an unnatural intimacy too
far and too fast." But the war and the subsequent occupation of Japan threw
the United States into the closest contact with the Japanese, and there came
"an intimacy born of conflict and much agony." Clearly Kennan regards the
newly formed intimacy as a crucial factor in Japanese-American relations.8
We may assume that Kennan's views about the American relationship with
Japan have been consistent throughout the postwar period. The question is
how much emphasis Japanese policymakers have put on the war and the
occupation as contributive factors in the intimacy the country enjoys with the
United States. The view that the wartime period was an aberration from the
naturally amicable relationship between Japan and the United States may or
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may not be compatible with Kennan's theory, but the concepts of natural
allies and unnatural intimacy are in conflict. In this respect, the increasing
interest in studying the Pacific war and the American occupation of Japan
might give birth to a new identity crisis among Japanese. There is a possibility,
for instance, that a highly critical reinterpretation of occupation policies may
offer grounds both for a hawkish view of Japan-U.S. strategic collaboration
and for an identification with the antinuclear movement.
We need a new perspective, particularly in the cultural area. Hirakawa
Sukehiro, the controversial specialist in comparative literature and compara-
tive culture, recently published a long essay analyzing the autobiographies of
Benjamin Franklin and Fukuzawa Yukichi. In this well-researched essay,
Hirakawa points out the remarkable resemblance between the two great men:
both were self-made men, advocates of the so-called work ethic and fathers
of capitalism, masters of foreign languages, orators, deists, interested in sci-
ence and technology, coiners of new words, political and social reformers,
writers of clear style and felicitous phrases, and both were endowed with
pleasing humor. Moreover, Franklin and Fukuzawa disliked impractical in-
tellectuals ("Interi," with a special Japanese derogatory connotation). As
Hirakawa explains, Franklin's writings influenced Fukuzawa—and, for that
matter, a great many Japanese people in the Meiji period knew the name of
Franklin—but the degree of likeness between the two men of such different
times and different places is simply amazing. It is of course debatable whether
this discovery of historical affinity between Japanese culture and American
culture in the personalities of Fukuzawa and Franklin could provide the
younger generation of each country with a new basis for a sense of mutuality.
It is more likely that young people of both countries will share many things
with each other in the world of consumption culture. Even so, a healthy sense
of balance between the search for uniqueness and the pursuit of commonness
will become more and more important.
What is most disturbing about mutual understanding between Japan and
America is that specialists—at least in Japan—do not seem to be functioning
effectively. The urgent need for the study of American society was proclaimed
by Nitobe Inazo in 1919, and today the same plea continues to be repeated.
Tokutomi Soho, an influential journalist whose long career covered the three
periods of Meiji, Taisho, and Showa, stressed in 1920 that Japan was mis-
understood by Americans partly because of the Japanese themselves.10 Ki-
yosawa Kiyoshi, another journalist whose wartime diaries are highly valued,
said in 1938 that Japan was misunderstood by foreigners; in his opinion Japan
was at that time the most unpopular nation in history.11 According to To-
kutomi, pro-American Japanese, anti-Japanese Japanese, and those despicable
politicians and military people who served them were to blame. Kiyosawa
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criticized the ignoranace and lack of communication that generated misun-
derstanding. But the point is that even today complaints are heard that for-
eigners do not—some people say cannot—understand Japan.
Specialists have made serious efforts to improve our understanding of the
United States. Even during the war some research was done, and there were
publications about American society and culture that were not blatant propa-
ganda. For example, in January 1944, at the critical stage of the war, Taiheiyo
Kyokai, a society dedicated to the study of the problems of the Pacific region,
published the first volume of a projected ten-volume study of the United States.
Judging from the plan of the project, it was an ambitious attempt at a sys-
tematic understanding of American power. The ten volumes were to deal with
topics such as the American national character, American world hegemony,
American national character as seen by foreign observers, American power
of economic mobilization, American religious ideals and religious organi-
zations, foreign missionary activities, American organizations of investigation
and the methodology of investigation, recent trends in American scientific
research, physics and chemistry, and American heavy industries. The con-
tributors to the first volume on American national character included Tsuru
Shigeto who, returning from the United States in 1942, wrote a chapter on
the philosophical vulnerabilities of the American national character. Another
contributor, Sakanishi Shiho, who had worked for the Library of Congress
in Washington, D.C., until 1942, wrote a chapter on the contradictions hidden
in the American national character. Apparently this ambitious project was
disrupted by Japan's defeat, although the volumes on American national char-
acter were published after the war.12
This endeavor was symbolic of the seriousness of Japanese specialists'
interest in grasping the essential characteristics of the American people. Takagi
Yasaka, who gave lectures on American politics at the Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity even during the war, wrote a small book on American political culture,
based on the lectures, and identified Puritanism and the frontier spirit as the
sources for American democracy. Takagi was the intellectual pillar of the
academic study of America, and, together with Matsumoto Shigeharu, who
later established the International House of Japan, founded an organization
for American studies that grew into the present Japanese Association for
American Studies.
Takagi had studied in the United States in the early 1920s. He identified
with what might be called "WASP Americanism" and built the orthodox view
of the United States for Japanese specialists. In contrast, Hasegawa Kaitaro
(also known as Tani Joji, Maki Itsuma, and Hayashi Fubo), who also lived
in the United States in the early 1920s, wrote popular fiction and depicted
the ethnic United States of the Jazz Age. In his own ragtime style, he discussed
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an America of movies, horse racing, dancing, saxophones, speeding, sky-
scrapers, and a world record of divorces. Tani created a fictitious type of
"Meriken-Jappu, American-Jap," a kind of caricature of the Issei immigrant
from Japan. In one of Tani's short stories, a Meriken-Jappu appears as a very
skillful and cunning gambler from the West Coast who succeeds in a smart
way in taking from a white American of Louisiana not only $10,000 but also
his wife.14 His America was poles apart from Takagi's, and it is very doubtful
that either was aware of the other's image of the United States; but, looking
back, we may say that they represent two contrasting ways of identifying
America: one is academic, orthodox, frequently idealizing, and WASP-
oriented; the other is nonacademic—journalistic or literary—antiestablish-
ment, debunking or muckraking, and ethnic-oriented.
Ironically, the development of American studies in the postwar period
moved in the direction of increasing reluctance to generalize, undermining
the belief of such people as Matsumoto Shigeharu that one reason for the
Pacific war was the appalling ignorance of the Japanese—both the policy-
makers and the public—about the United States, so that knowledge of the
country should be disseminated widely for the cause of lasting peace.
In recent years Americans themselves have emphasized the regional and
ethnic diversity of American society, and academic discussions of national
traits seem to be unfashionable. With the vastly improved access to infor-
mation, journalists can provide detailed stories on segments of the American
political and social scene. American studies specialists in Japan are caught
in a dilemma; they are faced with a hard choice of either pursuing a spe-
cialization at the expense of meaningful generalization, or trying desperately
to influence both policymakers and the general public by the force of their
expertise.
As of the mid-1980s, Japan's problem of self-identity is increasingly dis-
cussed vis-a-vis the ambiguous concept of the Pacific Age. The Japanese
people, like Americans, are dreaming a dream of the Pacific Age, forming
organizations, holding conferences, and issuing reports. For instance, in Oc-
tober 1984, Fukukawa Shinji of the Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (MITI) delivered an address before the U.S.-Japan Council, Aspen,
Colorado, on the Pacific Rim idea. Fukukawa recalled that Prime Minister
Ohira had advanced the Pacific Rim concept five years earlier and that Fu-
kukawa himself participated in drafting a report on it. Using the phrase "the
advent of the Pacific Age," he emphasized that "one fact that speaks plainly
about the arrival of the Pacific Age is the tempo at which trade has been
expanding . . . The vast Pacific region is developing the conditions needed
to become an increasingly interdependent 'regional society,' " Fukukawa
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noted, adding that "the political and economic ties between the United States
and Japan . . . will only work to the benefit of the region's development."16
Another recent example of the Japanese interest in the Pacific region is
the activity of the Pacific Basin Study Team of the Kansai Keizai Doyukai,
an influential organization of businessmen chiefly in the Kansai area of Japan
with the city of Osaka as its home. The members of the study team visited
seven countries and eleven cities in the Pacific region in October and No-
vember 1984, and the report of the team noted that "the Pacific Basin has
the potential to launch a new economic era in the 21st century," and that
understanding each other's societies and cultures within the region is "essential
for effective economic cooperation." The economist Royama Shoichi, one of
the members of the study team, stressed his view that the Pacific Age should
be basically an "economic age" in which economic interests should play a
central role, and strategic concerns should be subordinate. Royama maintained
that the Pacific Basin Community, if it is to materialize, should be multicen-
tered with countries such as the United States, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia
being more salient than the rest of the member countries rather than having
just one country of overwhelming influence.17 A somewhat similar idea was
expressed by Fukukawa in his Aspen address, in which he urged that Japan
and the United States "must construct and manage a free and vigorous 'Pax
Consortis' in the international economic community." The age of Pax Ameri-
cana has gradually changed, Fukukawa contended, and "roles must now be
shared not only by Europe and Japan but also by newly industrialized coun-
tries."18 The idea of the absence of a single dominant power and the need
for partnership between leading powers is common to both Royama's and
Fukukawa's arguments.
In terms of the partnership between Japan and the United States, the whole
concept of the Pacific Age is still very vague, perhaps conveniently so, leading
to a variety of views in addition to the ones already mentioned. In an article
in the Nippon keizai shinbun, Kodama Kqji of the MITI summarizes the
present stage of progress toward what he calls "Pax Pacifica." He emphasizes
economic and cultural cooperation among the nations in the Pacific region
and warns against setting military and political targets for cooperation. Sec-
ond, Kodama insists that the development of the ASEAN nations is essential.
Third, he contends that the form of economic cooperation must be open to
countries outside the Pacific region. Finally, Kodama advises that a joint
project format should be adopted to enable countries in the region to participate
in those cooperative programs that attract their particular attention. Kodama
presumably speaks for the Japanese government, and his counsel is to go
slowly about advancing the idea of the Pacific Basin Community. Comparing
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the job of regional cooperation in the Pacific Basin to that of a gardener rather
than a mechanic, Kodama stresses that the process of the development of the
Pacific countries ought to be regarded as an organic one.19
Amaya Naohiro, who left MITI several years ago and has been active as
an opinion leader, looks at the Pacific Age from a historical perspective.
Starting with the beginning of human civilization, he quickly follows the
westward movement of European civilization from Italian city states to Spain,
Portugal, and then on to the New World; compares the Mediterranean civi-
lization with the Atlantic civilization; and poses the questions, "Why did the
industrial civilization of North America not advance southward but westward
across the Pacific? Why does the region of the western Pacific bustle with
vigor in its economic activities amidst general stagnation in the rest of the
world?"20 Amaya's own answer is that in countries of vitality, such as Japan,
the separation of the sacred and the secular, or to put it differently, the rational
and nonideological order of business, has been established. Moreover, he
asserts, the very heterogeneity of the region in climate, race, religion,
economy, politics, the way of life, will be the fountains for the vigor to
produce a civilization of impressive magnitude.
Amaya's grand theory may be more intriguing than convincing. Whether
American civilization has been distinct in its separation of the sacred from
the secular is highly problematical, and on the other hand, it may not be so
easy for many nations in the Pacific region to make the logic of the secular
prevail. Yet it is interesting to note that Amaya thinks, unlike Kodama who
seeks organic growth of a cooperative system, that the clashes of heteroge-
neous factors will generate the energy for creating a new civilization. He even
ascribes the stagnancy of Europe in recent years to the lack of heterogeneous
factors within European civilization. His thesis serves as a caveat against
assuming casually that homogeneity leads to better mutual understanding,
which in turn will sustain stability and develepment.21
Still another example of theorizing on the concept of the Pacific Age is
offered by Ishikawa Yoshimi, a freelance writer who has lived in California
for several years. Although his arguments sound rather farfetched, he has
been a frequent contributor to influential opinion magazines in Japan, and he
seems to be convinced that the coming of the Pacific Age is a kind of manifest
destiny. Ishikawa asserts that Japan must not be a bridge across the Pacific
Ocean but should be a "stepping island" between the Pacific Ocean and the
Japan Sea. Ishikawa seems to suggest that Japan should not aspire to become
a rival of the United States for hegemony in the Pacific Ocean but rather
should do its best to bring prosperity to Asian countries in the Pacific Age.22
There are other variations on the theme of the Pacific Rim Community,
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but the examples mentioned illustrate that the process of mutual understanding
between Japan and the United States is at a crossroad. The crucial question
is whether mutual understanding between the two countries has reached a
stage where bilateral problems requiring the refinement and revision of facile
generalizations about Japan and the United States can be solved, and where,
at the same time, we can cooperate in the Pacific Rim.
All too often the dialogue between Japan and the United States in the mass
media centers on the political and economic aspects of our relationship and
on crude comparisons between Japanese and American cultures. There may
be a trap for those who are engaged in the study of a foreign culture, or even
the study of culture in general. The American poet Robert Penn Warren gave
lectures on democracy and poetry in 1976 in which he referred to Bertrand
Russell's distinction between "power knowledge," the knowledge given by
science, and "love knowledge," the knowledge that comes from the intuitive
and imaginative grasp of nature and man. The poet's question is, "Will the
continual presence of abstraction in man's thought dry up, as Santayana once
suggested, the old spring of poetry?"23 With the accelerating development
of high-tech industry, the poet's question is of increasing relevance.
A 1985 essay written by a Japanese mathematician on the American char-
acter argues that Americans excel in logical thinking but are deficient in
emotions and that they should think seriously about the importance of emotions
in value judgment.24 Kawai Hayao, a Japanese Jungian psychologist, who
lives in Los Angeles, has focused on the differences between Japanese and
Americans. Lecturing on the feminine consciousness in Japanese folk tales,
he suggested the symbolism of marriage in the Japanese psyche and observed
that marriage as symbolism had been lost in America. Thereupon, someone
in the audience asked him what he thought of nature as symbolism in today's
Japan, and Kawai interpreted it as a penetrating question hurled at the Japanese
people today.25
We must address ourselves to the realm of the humanities, and we should
be free from cultural nationalism, pernicious symptoms of which are now
found in Japan. The Japanese people can be legitimately concerned about
their own economic interests. But that does not necessarily mean that we can
neglect the problem of perception, particularly the image of Japan as a closed
and inaccessible country. After all, in Moby Dick, Herman Melville wrote
"The same waves wash the moles of the new-built California towns, but
yesterday planted by the recentest race of men, and lave the faded but still
gorgeous skirts of Asiatic lands, older than Abraham; while all between float
milky-ways of coral isles, and low-lying, endless, unknown Archipelagoes,
and inpenetrable Japans."26 The awareness of the deep-rooted image of Ja-
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pan's impenetrability held by Americans should serve as a guiding factor for
Japanese policymakers when coping with problems of economic frictions
between Japan and the United States.
However nebulous the concept of the Pacific Age may be, it points to a
new stage of historical consciousness of the passing of Pax Americana or the
"American Century." This implies, on the part of Americans, a radical reex-
amination of the character of American identity. It is, indeed an index to the
seriousness of the task of reconstructing American historical consciousness
that John Diggins has to conclude his searching reinterpretation of the Ameri-
can politicocultural tradition by such statements as, "The problem facing
liberal America is the problem of its uniqueness," or ". . .an understanding
of Machiavelli and Lincoln might help us face the world without the dangerous
self-deceptions of innocence."
As for the Japanese people, the passing of the American century provokes
them into reviewing the double process of the Americanization of Japanese
culture and the Japanization of American culture since the end of the Japanese-
American war. Underlying the endless discussion of America today in books,
magazine articles, and TV programs in Japan, one can detect both conscious
and unconscious searching for a new Japanese cultural identity in the post-
industrial, high-technology age. If we can admit that the dominance of the
American cultural impact in the twentieth century has been supported by what
may be called mass consumption culture, then the Japanese people must ask
themselves whether they can make a breakthrough in changing their way of
life in a new technological environment, or whether they should again wait
for an American initiative. When the Japanese people ask the question, "Is
America really back?" or "Does America really have potentialities for re-
vitalization?" they are simultaneously asking what the role of Japan should
be.
Modern Japanese history seems to favor a Japanese posture of response
and adaptation rather than initiation of a leadership role. Mitani Taichiro draws
an intriguing parallel between the Taisho democracy in Japan as a response
to Pax Americana in its formative phase and the post-World War II democracy
as a response to Pax Americana in its prime. According to Mitani, this parallel
leads to an ominous prospect for the future of Japanese-American relations,
because in the first case the democratic response to Pax Americana led to an
aspiration for a hegemonic nation with strong military capabilities. Thus we
are warned that the end of Pax Americana has in part been caused by the
rebirth of Japan as a leading power in the world, if not in terms of its military
strength then certainly in terms of its economic influence.28 Ironically, as a
consequence of our responsive behavior, the Japanese people are now faced
with the paradoxical challenge of living up to American expectations in sharing
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burdens on the one hand and of refraining from becoming so strong and
disturbing as to be called an "orphan of the world."
Both in the bilateral relations between Japan and the United States and in
the multilateral concept of the Pacific Basin Community, the key word is still
partnership. The vital question for both nations is whether they will let their
partnership degenerate into retaliation, or whether they will be able to work
out a constructive relationship of mutual stimulation in cultivating the spirit
of liberal-mindedness, deprovincialization, and the desire for understanding.
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Beyond the Pressure-Response Cycle
MITSURU YAMAMOTO
Since the late 1960s, trade and economic frictions of a serious nature requiring
government-to-government negotiations and consultations have continued to
reoccur between Japan and the United States. The now familiar sequence of
events typically begins with the United States filing complaints and demands,
which then lead to drawn-out negotiations, and eventually the two sides arrive
at an arrangement to alleviate the particular problem. A brief period of tran-
quility follows, only to be disrupted by the outbreak of a new friction. This
cycle of developments has established itself more or less permanently, intro-
ducing a discordant note into relations between the two Pacific allies. Invari-
ably Japan is driven to the defensive. When protectionism flares up in an
industrial sector, among trade unions or fanners, and in Congress, the Ameri-
can administration responds by asking Japan to reduce export pressure on the
U.S. market and improve access for U.S. products to the Japanese market.
Japan nearly always tries to meet American demands by piecemeal conces-
sions.
Economically, trade friction can hardly be considered an unmanageable
dispute between the two allies when it is approached within the entire context
of their relations, though finding a solution is by no means easy. A recurrence
of friction has had the effect of rapidly developing intensive communication
between the two nations. It has also led to a proliferation of opportunities for
nongovernmental dialogue, apart from the discussions carried on between
their official representatives. For example, in a 1983 symposuim in Wash-
ington cosponsored by Japan's National Institute of Research Advancement
and the Brookings Institution of the United States, there was little, if any,
American criticism of the basic features of the Japanese economy and poli-
cies.1 The symposium addressed a broad theme—the "Future Course of U.S.-
Japan Economic Relations." According to a Japanese organizer of the project,
discussion was conducted in a coolheaded manner and with a willingness
among the American participants to rethink their own problems and to put
Japan-U.S. issues in a broad perspective. Ushiba Nobuhiko, former external
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economic affairs minister who was among the Japanese participants, shared
this observation and said he was encouraged by the impassioned and analytical
manner in which discussions were conducted at the gathering. He nevertheless
wondered whether and to what extent the American participants in that par-
ticular symposium represented the political climate in Washington and, for
that matter, in the United States.2
A mature attitude seems to be developing today among economists and
informed people in Japan and the United States. It is based on the belief that
economic friction can be dealt with far more productively as an amalgam of
economic, political, and even psychological problems, to be tackled by the
two nations together, than as a clash of fundamental national interests. Un-
fortunately, no such change in perception or approach is found outside the
quiet conferences of informed persons. Although the U.S. public decries the
Japanese for taking unfair advantages, the Japanese retort that their economic
success has been attained through hard work and increased competitiveness.
Whether in the United States or in Japan, public opinion is more easily in-
fluenced by simplified images and symbols than by complicated discussions
of international trade and foreign exchange.
The unproductive habit of focusing debate on which side is being unfair
and which party is more industrious or better qualified to win the trade com-
petition needs to be reconsidered. Arguing over who is morally superior only
exacerbates the problem and could even trigger an unwanted crisis in Japan-
U.S. relations. If the United States and Japan cannot hope to remove the
sources of economic friction in a given time span, perhaps of five or ten years,
then it is all the more urgent today for leaders of the two countries to find a
new definition of the issues involved and change the focus of debate.
Japan should switch to a more activist and globalist approach in coping
with trade and economic problems with its largest trading partner. Attention
ought to be directed to developing a preventive policy conceived from a longer-
term and multilateral perspective and not preoccupied with the day-to-day
handling of bilateral frictions with the United States. Prevention of fire is
more important today than fighting fires after they have broken out; Japan's
economic diplomacy should be reoriented in light of the need for such a
change in the focus of concern.
Although specific instances of Japan-U.S. economic friction are outside
the immediate concern of this essay, the basic categories of conflict must be
noted. Trade and economic conflicts already include at least three types. The
first irritant relates to specific Japanese export products to the Unites States,
including textiles, steel, color TV sets, and automobiles. A rapid increase in
the export of some Japanese products at a particular point in time marks each
cycle of product-centered friction. The second concerns the closed nature of
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the Japanese market. Falling into this area of friction are (1) quantitative
restrictions on agricultural imports; (2) product standards and certification,
the complex distribution system, and a plethora of alleged nontariff barriers
in Japan; (3) government procurement (e.g., Nippon Denshin Denwa Kosha,
the Telegram and Telephone Public Corporation, and Nippon Senbai Kosha,
the Salt and Tobacco Public Corporation); and (4) the opening of the credit
and capital markets and of other service sectors including the insurance busi-
ness and data processing. The third major source of friction is the American
irritation over Japan's sizable bilateral current account surpluses. Beginning
in 1965, the payments imbalance became a chronic problem between the two
nations. It underlies the first two types of friction. In this connection, the
controversy often extends to macroeconomic policies in Japan. Added to all
this is the notion of Japanese unfairness, or the concept of industrial targeting.
Inasmuch as the Japan-U.S. economic friction stems from multiple sources,
one must caution against easy generalization. Yet these different types of
friction are so closely intertwined that they present the symptoms of a com-
pound malaise having several causes. Further, the problem of burden-sharing
in a common defense effort under the Japan-U.S. security treaty—a noneco-
nomic factor—also tends to be linked inseparably to the economic issues.
I have argued in favor of shifting the emphasis in Japanese policy from
fighting fires to preventing them. It would seem unrealistic to think that we
can eliminate friction entirely. Prevention here means that Japan and the
United States must prevent future trade and economic problems from becom-
ing unduly exaggerated either by design or by the uncontrolled momentum
of events. The United States and Japan must also see to it that they will deal
with future friction without sacrificing their longer-term interests or allowing
themselves to be overly swayed by short-term motivations. At the same time,
they should seek a solution from a multilateral perspective, embracing not
just themselves but all trading nations.
The proposed redirection of Japanese policies is made necessary by these
considerations. First, the reactive measures regularly used by Japan to date
will inevitably produce diminishing returns after the successive reductions in
the tariff and nontariff barriers implemented under American pressure. Sec-
ond, the recurrent process of American pressure, resulting in Japanese conces-
sion, followed by renewed American pressure has brought about a vicious
circle of cumulative emotional effects among the people of both Japan and
the United States. In April 1983, when the Nakasone cabinet was preparing
to submit to the Diet a bill to amend sixteen statutes on product standards
and certification with clauses that allegedly discriminated against imports, a
Tokyo dispatch of the New York Times quoted William Piez at the American
embassy in Tokyo as saying that trying to move the Japanese on trade was
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like peeling an onion; "You start taking the layers off, but you are never sure
if there will be anything inside at the end—the whole thing is a rather zen
experience, what is an onion anyway?" Indeed, the decisions of the Japanese
government very often are more cosmetic than substantive. There are also
more than a few instances where high-level official decisions are drained of
content through collusion between lower-echelon bureaucrats who skillfully
control front-line operations and interest groups.
Japanese politicians, government officials, and interest groups, for their
part, like to think that they have offered major concessions to accommodate
American demands, in spite of political, economic, and other constraints at
home. They react with frustration and bitterness when they discover that their
sacrifices are not appreciated in the United States but are met instead by
additional complaints and demands. They are driven to wonder whether
Americans are determined to find something unfair behind the Japanese eco-
nomic success, or whether they are simply eager to blame whatever difficulty
they have on the "unfair Japanese competitor," closing their eyes to their
own problems, such as a relative decline in U.S. industrial productivity and
an inadequacy of effort to develop exports.
Elections and mass media contribute to the cumulative process of emotional
interaction both in Japan and in the United States. A popular maxim among
Japanese parliamentarians says, "When a monkey falls from a tree it remains
a monkey, but when a legislator falls in an election, he is reduced to a
nobody." Japanese politicians are too vulnerable to speak out for what they
believe. Their powerlessness is compounded by pressure from the mass media.
Compared with electronic media, print media enjoy more room for presenting
complex realities as they actually are. The electronic media must explain
everything, however complicated, in a thin slice of time sandwiched between
commercial messages. In the face of this relentless pressure for oversimpli-
fication and compression, the gap widens inexorably between realities and
the public perception of them.
Third, economic friction between Japan and the United States must be
considered as a more or less permanent feature of their bilateral relationship,
which is rooted in not only cyclical but also structural factors. Underlying
the friction is a more fundamental problem—the changing pattern of the world
trade environment and the growing inability of the conventional thoughts and
rules of the game to catch up with it. These two considerations—the structural
roots of friction and the conceptual inability to cope with the changed envi-
ronment, both political and economic, of the world economy and trade—
make it all the more clear that the conventional formula used by Japan and
the United States to alleviate economic friction is but an improvisation.
Finally, it is important to recognize that voluntary export restraint on in-
dividual products, a major means of fire fighting  employed together with
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market-opening measures, tends to be self-prepetuating and self-multiplying.
Its effect is to feed rather than curb protectionism. Sectoral adjustments by
other means than voluntary export restriction are no different. An attempt to
protect any one industrial sector is bound to weaken the competitiveness of
its downstream (allied) industries, which in turn prompts the latter to seek
protection, and in a democratic political system, protection can hardly be
denied to those demanding it after it already has been given to many other
groups.
Quantitative import restrictions imposed under the cloak of voluntary export
restraint functions as a sort of international cartel enabling producers in both
the exporting and importing countries to raise prices in the importing market
to the detriment of consumer interests. This is illustrated by the Japanese
program to "voluntarily" limit automobile exports to the United States. In
1982, when the program was forced on Japanese automakers, they even threat-
ened to sue the Japanese government for damages. In a complete turnaround,
they came to welcome the restraint arrangement as a system under which they
could reap profits without exertion.4 The same arrangement was not without
advantages to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). It
afforded MITI an opportunity to regain some of the power and influence it
had lost in the process of trade liberalization.
Tolerating the political and psychological rather than the economic justi-
fications for voluntary export restraint as a short-term, emergency palliative
to economic friction is, admittedly, a practical necessity in view of the current
situation. One must be aware, however, that, although this medicine can ease
the symptoms, it cannot cure the illness. There is even a danger that its abuse
can cause serious poisoning.
In Japan and the United States, politicization of the economy has affected
international economic friction. Politicians, their parties, branches of bu-
reaucracy, various industrial sectors, and other interest groups become so
engrossed in defending their own vested interests as to seriously endanger the
economic rationale and interfere in the definition of public interest. The so-
called residual import restrictions applied in contravention of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) number twenty-seven in the case
of Japan, of which twenty-two are accounted for by agricultural items. The
name of one or another influential member of the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party is associated with each item.5 To give an example, the main production
center of konnyaku roots (devil's tongue roots) happens to be in Gunma
Prefecture where the constituency of former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo
and present Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro is located.
An economic policy package was adopted by the government on October
21, 1983, in time for President Ronald Reagan's visit to Japan. In the course
of shaping this program, different government departments, as usual, con-
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tributed measures that they thought could help ease the trade friction. Each
departmental concession is carefully measured so that the existing distribution
of powers and influences among ministries and agencies, either legal or ad-
ministrative, is not upset. In doing this, "each of them accepted a small share
of the pain and shed tears together. This interagency formula of sharing
the pains and tears is also applied among different bureaus in each ministry
and agency and among different sections of each bureau. The low-level poli-
ticization of the economy is also evident in the United States. In light of these
experiences, it is noted that the trade friction phenomenon is in large measure
a manifestation of the failure to integrate, or define, national interests within
the countries concerned.
We are, therefore, in need of a higher level of politicization of economic
relations among states. This must be considered, for Japan, in three dimen-
sions. First, a strategy must be adopted with a view to facilitating the re-
definition of the long-term, enlightened, forward-looking, and integrated
national interests in the domestic political process of the major trading partner.
Raymond Vernon speaks of two constant strands of U.S. trade policy, a long-
term commitment to the principle of open markets and a tendency to stray
from that commitment in individual cases. The central principles of GATT,
reflecting U.S. ideological preferences, are nondiscrimination, the continuous
reduction of trade barriers, and the mediation of trade disputes on the basis
of multilaterally established rules and regulations. Although Vernon observes
that there is no serious possibility of restoring the strength of these key prin-
ciples that have gradually been worn away by a stream of legitimated excep-
tions, he rightly stresses the necessity of retaining the institution itself as an
important instrument for talking out trade disputes and as a potential launching
pad for new initiatives when such initiatives again become feasible.
No doubt the future of the debate in the United States over international
trade and economic policy will be a matter of serious concern for Japan, and
the coming of new initiatives is what Japan, together with other trading nations
in the world, should strive for. Future Japanese behavior in the game of Japan-
U.S. economic friction must not be governed by day-to-day tactics to reserve
the existing sectoral interests or to fend off American pressure with one small
concession at a time. Instead, Japanese policy must be guided by strategic
considerations to encourage the revitalization of the more positive one of the
two conflicting strands in U.S. trade policy. Stemming the global spread of
protectionism and preserving an open trading system are in the vital interests
of Japan. It is decidedly important to prevent the United States, still the most
weighty presence in the world economy, from abandoning the open-market
principle. The guiding principle for Japan's response should be to focus on
enhancing the above-mentioned basic goal rather than the perceived intensity
of pressure the United States brings to bear on Japan from time to time. This
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kind of response demands political insight beyond economics or lower-level
politicization.
Second, we do not live in a world of untainted free trade where the forces
of competitive markets are at work. Nor are members of the international
trading community interested in finding a theoretical settlement of the con-
troversy between advocates of free trade and of protectionism. If these as-
sumptions are valid, then any vigorous advocacy by Japan of the free-trade
principle from its present position of strength would be of little use to solving
actual problems it faces in world trade. A mature political approach is needed
here. A deficit country would ask for an improvement in the bilateral current
account imbalance with a surplus country. The surplus country replies that
balance of payments problems cannot be usefully discussed on a bilateral basis
and that the multilateral equilibrium is what counts. The deficit country insists
that, whatever the logic of economics may be, it must seek an improvement
in the bilateral balance. This was the pattern of exchange repeated every time
the ministerial-level Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on Trade and Economic
Affairs sat in its annual meeting in the first half of the 1960s, when Japan
ran a deficit more or less regularly in current transactions with the United
States. The two trading nations have since changed places, and Japan now
uses the line of argument then used by U.S. representatives. The episode
shows that the logic of a nation's trade policy changes when its international
economic position changes. What matters is an ability to understand and
appreciate the other's position and difficulties and the political and psycho-
logical impact of these difficulties.
Third, the process of Japan's adjustment to the rapidly changing world
must be made more endogenous rather than exogenous. It must be initiated
and carried out regardless of whether pressure is applied from outside. Japan
urgently needs to transform its export-led pattern of economic growth if it is
to enjoy prosperity in harmony with other countries on the world economic
scene. It must also shift from the intensive industrialization of the past quarter
century toward a new pattern of growth more compatible with the quality of
the environment, social welfare, increased leisure for the people, and other
nonindustrial values. Moreover, as the world's second largest market
economy, Japan must widen its own domestic market not just to domestic
but to foreign producers so that it can contribute to the economic stability
and development of an interdependent world. Japan's international economic
policy must be guided by a new, internally motivated attitude, recognizing
that Japan must change the policy inertia of the past for the sake of its own
interest, not because it faces external pressure for change.
Japan's gradual transition since the 1960s from a closed system to an open
economic system has proceeded often in timid responses to U.S. guidance,
demands, and sometimes outright pressure. Liberalization occurred in the
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absence of any strong free-trade ideology in Japan. Each new round of lib-
eralization in the areas of trade, payments, and inward foreign investment
gave rise to alarms over the coming of "a second black ship" and "a third
black ship." (The first black ship panic was triggered by the arrival in 1853
of Commodore Perry's Pacific fleet and the American demand for access to
Japanese ports.)
Intensified American demands for liberalization of farm imports have pitted
a minority group (e.g., Keidanren—Japan Federation of Economic Organi-
zation—MITI, etc.) against the numerically dominant alliance of farmers'
organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Diet mem-
bers of all ideological hue ranging from the LDP to the Communist party,
labor unions, and consumer organizations. This standoff, however, has never
developed into a national debate on how to direct the evolution of Japanese
agriculture, be it in the direction of liberalization or permanent maintenance
of the existing protection, and how to define the future status of that industry
in the nation's economy as a whole. This seems another notable instance of
the Kurofune (black ship)-style reaction that simply deals with shocks from
the outside. For Japanese agriculture, step-by-step liberalization in one way
or another will have to be introduced if it is to become more productive.
Unfortunately, the debate so far has been focused solely on whether or to
what extend a concession is to be made to U.S. pressure.
One sees little chance of the Japan-U. S. friction being reduced or eliminated
in the near future. It is clear, however, that both sides must and can change
the formats and foci of debate. Too often we have seen the problems of
bilateral trade and economic friction defined entirely by the United States,
with Japan merely responding. To change this pattern, endogeneous moti-
vation should be developed in Japan's decision making as well as in public
debate.
1. Yoshida Shigenobu, "Nichibeikankei—Netsu dewa naku hikario" [Japan-U.S. Rela-
tions—Not Heat, but Light Wanted], Gekkan NIRA (August 1983):5.
2. Yoshida, "Nichibeikankei," 31.
3. New York Times, international weekly edition (April 17, 1983): 5.
4. Asahi Shimbun, evening edition (October 19, 1983): 3. See also, Shimokawa Koichi,
"Jidosha yushitsu jishu-kisei no ketsumatsu" (The results of voluntary export restraint of the
automobile), Keizai Hydron (November 1983): 32-33.
5. Mainichi Shimbun (February 7, 1982): 7.
6. Funabashi Yoichi, "Fukugo boeki masatsu no seijikeizaigaku" (Political economy of a
complex trade friction), Sekai (January 1984): 153.
7. Raymond Vernon, "International Trade Policy in the 1980s," International Studies Quart-
erly 26 (December 1982): 483.
Contributors
Tadashi Aruga, Professor of Law, Hitotsubashi University
Warren I. Cohen, Professor of History, Michigan State University
Robert Feldman, Research Associate, International Monetary Fund
Robert G. Gilpin, Professor of Government, Princeton University
Nagaya Homma, Professor of American Studies, Tokyo University
Chihiro Hosoya, Professor of International Relations, International
University of Japan
Akira Iriye, Professor of History, University of Chicago
Hideo Kanemitsu, Professor of Economics, Sophia University
Stephen Krasner, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
Walter LaFeber, Professor of History, Cornell University
Daniel Okimoto, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
Akio Watanabe, Professor of International Relations, Tokyo University
Mitsuru Yamamoto, Professor of Politics, Hitotsubashi University
Index
Acheson, Dean, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43
Akagi Munenori, 74
Allison, JohnM., 24, 47
Alsop, Stewart, 204
Amaya Naohiro, 218
Amerikan karuchd, 210-11
Angell, Norman, 194
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United
States, pact), 24
appeasement, 195
Arita Hachiro, 86
Aron, Raymond, 204
Asahi, 209
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations), 102, 217
Asian Development Bank, 101, 102, 183
ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council), 102
Atlantic, 196, 198
Axelrod, Robert, 121, 127
Bandung: conference of, 28; spirit of, 204
Barnett, Doak A., 34
Basic Problems of Reconstruction of the
Japanese Economy, 88
Battle Act, 43
Bergsten, Fred C , 108
Bretton Woods System, 5, 13, 15, 146,
179
Brodie, Bernard, 200-201
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 101, 109
Buck, Pearl, 202
Bundy, McGeorge, 99
Bundy, William P., 99
Bush, Vannevar, 200
Chang Chen, 87
Chang Ch'iin, 33
Chen Cheng, 53
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 55
Chiang Kai-shek. See Jiang Jieshi
China. See People's Republic of China
(PRC); Republic of China (ROC)
CHINCOM (China Committee), 22, 29
Chou En-lai. See Zhou Enlai
Christian Century, 206
Churchill, Winston, 40, 42
Clausewitz, Karl von, 200
Cloud of Danger (Kennan), 213-14
Coase, Ronald, 141
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for
Export to Communist Areas), 22, 29,
44
Cold War, 58, 88, 201, 202, 203; and the
Soviet Union, 197; and the People's
Republic of China, 205-06
Colliers, 200
Communist League (Bund), 71
containment: toward the Soviet Union, 5;
toward the People's Republic of China,
22, 24, 34, 93
Council on Foreign Economic Policy, 46
Cuban missile crisis, 205
cultural identity, Japanese, 218-24
De Gaulle, Charles, 11
deterrence, 5, 198, 199; nuclear, 11
Diggins, John, 220
Doi Takeo, 76
Donovan, Robert J., 45
Index 233
Draper, Theodore, 212; on U.S.-Japan re-
lations, 96
DSP (Democratic Socialist party, Japan),
70
Dulles, John Foster, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 37, 38, 39, 45, 48, 49, 91; nego-
tiation with Yoshida, 40-43; and Japa-
nese rearmament, 63; and the security
treaty, 64-66
ECA (Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration), 87
Eden, Anthony, 40, 42, 45-46
EEC (European Economic Community),
5, 6, 7, 15
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 49; administra-
tion of, 22, 43, 46-47; and Japan-China
trade, 44, 51; and trade embargo on
PRC, 45, 58; visit to Japan, 73-74; on
military-industrial complex, 201
energy crisis, 13-14; and U.S. foreign
policy, 109; impact on Japanese trade,
158-59; influence on the yen, 180; and
foreign exchange regulation, 181-82,
185
Europe, Western, 212; relations with Ja-
pan, 3, 5-6, 8-9, 17-19; and East-West
relations, 8; and U.S.-U.S.S.R. rela-
tions, 11-12; trade with Southeast Asia,
80-83
Export-Import Bank, 32, 33, 53, 55
FEC (Far Eastern Commission), 37, 39
FIDA (Foreign Investor Deposit Ac-
count), 174, 179
Ford, Henry II, 48
Foreign Affairs, 104
Franks, Sir Oliver, 38
Fujitake Akira, 210-11
Fujiyama Aiichiro, 64, 103; and the se-
curity treaty, 65-75; Fujiyama Plan, 68-
69
Fukuda Takeo, 102, 227
Fukukawa Shinji, 216-17
FYA (Free Yen Account), 174-75, 181
Gallup polls, 200
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), 5, 6, 38, 120, 145, 156, 227-
28
gensaki market, 181
Germany, 193, 194, 202, 212; Federal
Republic of, 8, 16
GHQ (General Headquarters, U.S., in
Tokyo) 87, 89, 90, 91
Gone with the Wind, 24
Great Britain, 25, 194; relations with Ja-
pan, 36-39; relations with PRC, 37-38,
44-47, 50; and U.S.-PRC relations, 38-
41; and trade with Southeast Asia, 80-
83, 85
Great Depression, 81-82
Green, Marshall, 104
Hagerty, James, 74
Harriman, William Averill, 31, 32
Hasegawa Kaitaro, 215-16
Hatoyama Ichiro, 26, 27, 28, 29, 47; as
Yoshida's opponent, 62; on rearma-
ment, 63
Hayasi Fubo. See Hasegawa Kaitaro
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, 141-
42
hegemonic stability, 119-20
Herter, Christian, 71, 73, 74
Hilsman, Roger, 53
Hirakawa Sukehiro, 29; and Franklin-Fu-
kuzawa theory, 214
HoChiMinh, 101, 103
Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 25
Humphrey, Hubert, 100
Huxley, Aldous, 198, 199
Iguchi Sadao, 39
Ikeda Hayato, 23, 30, 33, 53, 54, 75, 91,
97; and security treaty, 68
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 5,6,
120, 145
international relations: general view of,
196; realists' view of, 199.
Ishibashi Tanzan, 26, 28, 29, 48, 51, 63
234 Index
Ishikawa Hiroyoshi, 210
Ishikawa Yoshimi, 218
Isoda Koichi, 210
Japan Quarterly, 99
JCP (Japanese Communist party), 69,
230; and security treaty, 69-71
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 44, 47
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai Shek), 29, 38,
42, 49, 51-52, 63
Johnson, Chalmers, 58
Johnson, Lyndon B., 33,49, 55, 99, 101,
107
Josephson, Matthew, 201, 202
JSP (Japanese Socialist party), 62, 68; op-
position to security treaty, 69-71
Kanzai Keizai Doyukai, 217
Katzenbach, Nicholas, 56
Kawai Hayao, 219
Kawakami Jotaro, 70
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Or-
ganizations), 27, 230
keiretsu, 141-42
Kennan, George, 99; Cloud of Danger,
213-14
Kennedy, John F., 7, 31, 32, 97; China
policy, 51; Vietnam policy, 97-100
Kishi Nobusuke, 29, 30, 48, 51; vision
of Japan, 63; and security treaty, 64-
76
Kissinger, Henry, 56, 57, 75, 109, 110,
204-05; on limited wars, 200; on U.S.
role in Asia, 104
Kitamura Hiroshi, 213
Kiuchi Nobutane, 209-10
Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 214-15
Knowland, William, 49
KodamaKoji, 217-18
Kono Ichiro, 68, 69
Korean War, 22, 23, 29, 37, 39, 43, 87,
199-200; American view of, 4; impact
on Japan's economy, 89-90, 93; as new
type of war, 202
Laird, Melvin, 105
Lake, David, 123-24
Lamont-Kajiwara agreement, 32, 33 102
Lay ton, Edwin T., 44
LDP (Liberal Democratic party, Japan),
27, 32,48, 53, 54, 56, 62, 67, 97, 125,
142, 227, 230; and security treaty, 68-
70
Liao Ch'eng Chih, 32
Life, 200
Lippmann, Walter, 201, 205
Lipson, Charles, 121
"L-T Trade," 32,33, 102
Lynd, Robert S., 202-03
MacArthur, Douglas, 38, 87, 193; image
of Japan, 192, 206
MacArthur, Douglas, II, 65-66, 69, 73,
74,99
McCarthy, Joseph, 43, 46
McClellan, John, 46
Macleish, Archibald, 197
McNamara, Robert, 103
Maki Itsuma. See Hasegawa Kaitaro
Mann, Thomas, 55
Marshall Plan, 88
Matsumoto Shigeharu, 215, 216; on the
Vietnam War and Japan, 98-99
Matsumura Kenzo, 32
Matsuyama Yukio, 209
Melville, Herman, 219
Meriken-Jappu, 216
Meyer, Armin, 56-57
Meyer, Cord, 199; on deterrence, 198
Miki Takeo, 98, 100, 102; on Vietnam
War, 102
Mills, C. Wright, 201-02
MITI (Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, Japan), 22, 44, 89, 227, 230;
and the prisoner's dilemma game, 124-
26; response to the energy crisis, 181-
82
Moby Dick, 219
Morrison, Herbert, 39
Index 235
Mumford, Lewis, 202
Muraoka Kunio, 104-05
Murata Ryohei, 213
Nagai Yonosuke, 212
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 10, 103, 212, 225,
227
Nation, 101, 202-03
Nantonahu, kuristaru (Tanaka), 210
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion), 3, 5, 43
NDA (Nonresident Deposit Account, Ja-
pan), 175
New Republic, 194, 195,203
New York Times, 46, 48-49, 205, 225-
26
NIC (Newly Industrializing Countries), 8,
13, 15, 16, 17, 18
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 194, 197; on the Cold
War, 203
Nippon keizai shinbun, 217
Nishio Suehiro, 70
Nitobe Inazo, 214
Nixon, Richard, 34, 56, 57, 103-04; eco-
nomic policy, 12-13; China policy, 58,
75; Nixon Doctrine, 102,104-06; essay
in Foreign Affairs, 104; and Okinawa,
106-07; Kansas City speech, 107-08;
New Economic Policy, 108-09
NSC (National Security Council), 24, 47,
50; policy toward Japan, 22, 52; views
of China, 45; concept of war, 197
NYDA (Nonresident Yen Deposit Ac-
count), 174-75, 177, 179
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development), 5, 13,14,
127, 145
Ohira Masayashi, 216
oil crisis. See energy crisis
OIR (Office of Intelligence Research,
U.S.), 47
Okazaki Hisahiko, 213
Okinawa, 103-07
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries), 13, 131
Orwell, George, 198, 205
Osgood, Robert E., 197; on limited wars,
200
Pacific Age, 216-21
Pacific Basin, 16-18; community of, 216-
21
Pacific Rim, 216-19
Pax Americana, 217, 220
peace: perceptions of, 193-207
Peffer, Nathaniel, 191; on peace, 193
Pentagon of Power (Mumford), 202
People's Daily, 26, 33
People's Republic of China (PRC), 15,
18; relations with Japan, 9, 21-23, 26-
32; relations with U.S.S.R., 12, 33,
37; relations with U.S., 22, 24, 28-29,
30, 33; relations with ROC, 29; rela-
tions with France, 31; "L-T trade,"
32, 33, 98-102; and Japan-U.S. rela-
tions, 36-58; relations with Great Brit-
ain, 37-38, 44-47; and security treaty
revision, 75-76; and Cold War, 205-06
Perry, Matthew, 213, 230
Piez, William, 225-26
power politics, 194, 196
preparedness, 196; definition of, 198;
need for, 199. See also deterrence
prisoner's dilemma, 121-22, 124-126
protectionism, 118, 223, 227; and trade
competition, 119; and prisoner dilem-
ma theory, 121-22; selective, 124-27
Reagan, Ronald, 16; administration of,
12; visit to Japan, 227-28
realism: concept of, 195, 199; in inter-
national economy, 118-19
Reischauer, Edwin, 36, 55, 97, 99, 100,
102; on PRC-Japan relations, 56
Republic of China (ROC), 24; peace
treaty with Japan, 21; relations with
U.S,, 25, 27, 29, 33; relations with
236 Index
Republic of China, (continued)
PRC, 29; and Japan-U.S. relations,
36-42; relations with Japan, 38-41,
50-54
Reston, James, 49
Robertson, Walter, 23, 43, 45, 49-50, 91
Robinson, G.T., 194
Rockefeller, David, 109
Rostow, WaltW., 101-02
Royama Shoichi, 217
Rusk, Dean, 31, 40, 53; on Japanese re-
lations with UN, 56; and Japan Asian
policy, 99-103
Russell, Bertrand, 219
Sakanishi Shiho, 215
San Francisco Peace Treaty. See security
treaty
Sato Eisaku, 30, 33; foreign policy prin-
ciples, 54-55; views on U.S. Vietnam
policy, 57, 98, 101; and Okinawa prob-
lem 103-07
Saxonhouse, Gary R., 142
Schumpeter, Joseph, 193-94
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation), 25, 26
Sebald, William J., 39, 40, 86-87
security treaty, 21, 61-62, 64, 80; revi-
sion of, 66-75; and Japanese Socialist
party (JSP), 69-71; Japan's position on,
72-73; and PRC, 75-76
Sengoshi no kiikan (Isoda), 210
Shigemitsu Mamoru, 63
Shiima Etsasaburo, 100
Shimizu Tomohisa, 212
Smith, Alexander H., 40
Sohyo, 69, 70
Soviet Union, 3-5, 8, 196, 199-200, 202,
206; relations with Japan, 9-10, 24, 26-
27; relations with PRC, 12; and U-2
incident, 72; and the Cold War, 197
Sparkman, John, 41
Spencerianism, 193-99; as postwar ortho-
doxy, 206
Stalin, Joseph, 199
Stans, Maurice, 107
Strauss-Hupe\ Robert, 201
Stuber, Stanley, I., 206
Suez crisis, 47
Sulzberger, Arthur O., 46
Taiheiyo Kyokai (Society for Pacific
Studies), 215
Taiwan. See Republic of China
Takagi Yasaka, 215-16
Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 28, 32
Tanaka Kakuei, 57
Tanaka Yasuo, 210
Tani Joji. See Hasegawa Kaitaro
Third World, 71, 202-04
TIT FOR TAT strategy, 121, 127, 140
Thomson, James C , Jr., 98, 99
Tokutomi Soho, 214
Toynbee, Arnold J., 197
Trilateral Commission, 109
Truman, Harry S., 42, 43
Tsuru Shigeto, 215
U-2 incident, 72-73
UN (United Nations), 30, 88, 199
United Kingdom. See Great Britain
Ushiba Nobuhiko, 223-24
Veblen, Thorstein, 193-94
Vernon, Raymond, 228
Vietnam War, 4, 8, 55, 56, 203-04; and
U.S.-Japanrelations, 97-110; and trade,
100-103; and global status quo, 207
Viner, Jacob J., 6
war: perceptions of, 193-207; justification
of, 194-95; prediction of, 196-97; lim-
ited, 200;
Warren, Robert Penn, 219
Watson, MarkS., 201
Weeks, Sinclair, 45, 48, 50
West Germany, 8,12
Index 237
Williamsburg Summit, 10
Williamson, Oliver E., 141, 142-43
Wilson, Charles E., 195
Wilson, Woodrow, 195
World Bank, 5
World War II, 3, 5, 13, 36, 80, 88, 117,
146-47, 195, 197; and the American
System, 8; and concepts of war and
peace, 192-93; in the Pacific, 213-14,
216
Wright, Jerauld, 53
Yamada Hisanari, 73
Yergin, Daniel, 196
Yoshida Shigeru, 21, 25-27, 39, 54, 91;
PRC policy of 24, 40-44; views of
China, 38; negotiation with John F.
Dulles, 40-43; opponents of, 62; and
the U.S., 99
Zengakuren, 71
Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), 28, 29, 32, 53,
57, 105

